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1 INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
The beginning of the 1990s witnessed major changes in the geo-political environment in the 
world and the end of the Cold War resulted in political restructuring in the areas surrounding the 
European Union. At the same time, attention was directed away from the Cold War and to new 
possible security risks. In this context, the attention of especially the South European countries 
was focused on the Southern borders of the European Union, where the rise of Islamic militancy 
and the civil war in Algeria were increasing the fears of the South Europeans of what was called 
“the apparent threat of massive ‘south-north’ migration into Western Europe from the Third 
World, particularly from the Maghreb1, with sensationalist newspaper headlines warning of an 
impending ‘migrant invasion’”.2  
 
The end of the Cold War had directed the external relations orientation of the European Union 
strongly eastwards, especially under the pressure of the newly unified Germany. This eastwards 
balance resulted in concerns from the part of the southern Member States, who felt that the 
attention of the EU should be directed to the South, and especially to Maghreb, because of “fears 
of immigration from the South, and of xenophobia in the North, perceived security threats 
arising from the South, such as terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, and anxiety arising 
from the growth of Islamic Fundamentalism.”3 Migration turned out to be not only one of the 
threats, but a useful bargaining tool for the Southern EU Member States to convince Germany 
and the other Member States that did not share the immediate interests and concerns of the 
South, about the need to concentrate more attention on the security and stability in the 
Mediterranean. The message from the South was that increased activities were needed to 
improve growth prospects in the Maghreb, because without further action, all the Member States 
would experience an increase in the levels of immigration.4 
 
This new way of seeing migration from a security-point of view was connected to the change in 
the security paradigm at the end of the Cold War, where security was beginning to be seen not 
                                                 
1 Referring to the regional grouping of Maghreb is rather common in the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Maghreb has traditionally referred to the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, but 
since the creation of the Arab-Maghreb Union in 1989, the concept of Maghreb usually also includes Libya and 
Mauritania. Source: Maghreb. Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia. 
2 Collinson 2000, p. 301. Sarah Collinson is Northern Affairs Research Coordinator for ActionAid, London. 
3 Adler 2001. Emanuel Adler is known for adapting Karl Deutsch’s theory on Security Communities, through which 
he has been attached to the constructivist theory of international relations. He is Professor at the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Toronto. 
4 Collinson 2000, p. 312. Collinson refers for example to comments of the Spanish ambassador to the UK, Alberto 
Aza Arias, in the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities on 7 February 1995, and to an 
article in the Independent on 9 July 1994: “The Naples Summit: G7 aid urged to halt North African Exodus”. 
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only as a state of being safe from military threats, but more comprehensively from threats against 
economy, culture, identity and environment. For example, Barry Buzan has divided security into 
five different sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.5 The threat 
perceived by the EU Member States to be coming from the South was not connected to military 
security, but more in an all-encompassing way to the broader socio-economic issues in the 
Mediterranean countries, giving rise to the possible “invasion of migrants”. Why was it that the 
EU Member States saw “an invasion of migrants” as a threat to their security? How and why did 
migration become a security issue?  
 
It seems that the Southern EU member states were successful in their attempts to bring the issues 
related to the Mediterranean neighbours into the attention of the rest of the Member States by 
“playing the security-card”. In 1994, the Corfu European Council gave the Council and the 
Commission the task of evaluating the then EU’s Mediterranean policy by “jointly examining 
political, economic and social problems”.6 As a result of this evaluation, the Commission 
proposed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was due to the 
multiple areas of interdependence between the North and the South to be multidimensional in its 
nature.7 The EMP, also known as the Barcelona Process, was launched at the Barcelona 
Conference on 27-28 November 1995 by the Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen Member States 
of the European Union and twelve Mediterranean partner countries (MPC).8 The objective of the 
EMP is to create of the Mediterranean an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation 
guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”.9 The EMP follows in its design the framework of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was created as the 
institutional part of the 1975 Helsinki Model, facilitating “conciliation between East and West 
regarding issues of security, economic cooperation and humanitarian issues”.10 In a similar way, 
                                                 
5 See: Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 7. Barry Buzan is an international relations scholar, working as Professor 
of International Relations at London School of Economics. 
6 European Council. Presidency Conclusions, European Council at Corfu, 24-25 June 1994. 
7 Biscop 2003, pp. 31-33. Sven Biscop is Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-
KIIB). Since 2007-8, he is a visiting professor for European security at the College of Europe in Bruges. 
8 The Mediterranean signatories of the Barcelona declaration are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya has had an observer status in EMP 
since 1999. The non-EU members of the EMP will hereinafter be referred to as the Mediterranean partner countries. 
See: Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27-28/11/95 (hereinafter called the 
Barcelona declaration); and European Commission: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Cyprus and Malta joined the 
European Union in 2004, leaving the number of Mediterranean partner countries to 10. As a very recent event it 
deserves to be mentioned that the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, organised in 
Lisbon, 5-6 November 2007, welcomed Mauritania and Albania to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
9 Barcelona declaration. 
10 Pardo & Zemer 2005, pp. 41-42. Sharon Pardo is Director of the Centre for the Study of European Politics and 
Society at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Lior Zemer is law lecturer at the Radzyner School of Law at the 
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.  
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the EMP is constructed of three different areas of cooperation: the political and security 
partnership, establishing a common area of peace and stability; the economic and financial 
partnership, creating an area of shared prosperity; and the partnership in social, cultural and 
human affairs, developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and 
exchanges between civil societies.11 
 
The Barcelona declaration, summarising the results of the Barcelona Conference, includes 
however a limited number of actions that deal directly with causes or consequences of migration. 
The participants acknowledged the importance of migration in the relationships between the 
partners and proposed to strengthen the cooperation in order to reduce migratory pressures for 
example through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. 
Furthermore, it was agreed to guarantee the protection of all the rights of the legal migrants. 
When it comes to illegal migration, it was only agreed to establish a closer cooperation in the 
field.12 The work programme of the Barcelona declaration, however, gives a clear indication of 
the direction that the cooperation in this field was taking, by encouraging meetings between the 
partners a) in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures, and b) to 
discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, 
customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. An 
interesting comment with this regard is that it is suggested that a differentiated approach has to 
be applied taking into consideration the diversity of the situation in each country.13 Taking into 
account the limited number of actions included in the Barcelona declaration presented above, 
what were then the underlying causes and consequences of the migratory flows towards the EU 
that the Southern EU Member States wanted to manage through the creation of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership? Furthermore, how has the EMP dealt with these causes and 
consequences since 1995? 
 
It appears nevertheless that despite the fact that the Barcelona Declaration was signed more than 
12 years ago, migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU is on the rise. This is 
the case for example in Morocco, which is together with Egypt one of the main countries of 
emigration in the Mediterranean region. The CARIM Mediterranean Migration Report 2006-
2007 presents latest figures for migration from Morocco, which show that the number of 
Moroccans registered by the Moroccan consulates to be living abroad has doubled between the 
                                                 
11 Barcelona declaration. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, Annex: Work programme. 
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past 12 years from 1.545 million in 1993 to 3.185 million in 2005. Furthermore, the emigration 
has not only continued, but it has rather accelerated in pace, which is shown by the same data 
from the Moroccan consulates, recording an increase in Moroccan population living abroad of 
5.4% in 1993-1997, 5.9% in 1997-2002 and 7.0% in 2002-2005.14  
 
Simultaneously with the growth of legal migration from Maghreb towards the EU, also the 
illegal immigration has shown signs of sharp increase since the mid-1990s. As an indication of 
this, we can use the numbers of vessels intercepted and undocumented persons detained in 
Spanish waters between 1996 and 2003 (Table 1). Whereas the number of vessels intercepted 
almost tripled from 339 vessels in 1996 to 942 in 2003, the number of undocumented immigrants 
increased by more than tenfold from 1,573 in 1996 to 18,420 in 2003.15 
 
Table 1: Interceptions of vessels and undocumented immigrants in Spanish waters, 1996-2003 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Vessels intercepted 339 399 557 475 780 997 n.a. 942 
Persons detained 1573 887 2995 3569 14,893 17,697 16,670 18,420
 
Source: Lutterbeck 2006, p. 63. 
 
The increase in the number of illegal immigrants is not only considered a security problem for 
the receiving country, but it is also an increasing humanitarian problem on the level of personal 
security due to the high number of immigrants who die while attempting to make it to the 
European Union.16 
 
The increase in both legal and illegal migration has happened at the same time as the European 
Union has began to implement the Schengen Agreements turning the EU gradually into an area 
without internal borders (with the exception of UK and Ireland, as well as Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
Romania). The possibility for free movement of people inside the EU has consequently led to a 
strengthened control of the external borders of the area. The incorporation of the Schengen 
acquis into the Treaty of Amsterdam brought about common rules regarding conditions of entry 
                                                 
14 Fargues 2007, pp. xiv-xv. Philippe Fargues is Director of the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied 
Research on International Migration (CARIM).  
15 Lutterbeck 2006, p. 63. Derek Lutterbeck was a programme coordinator at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy 
and has since 2006 worked as Deputy Director at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies on Malta. 
16 Ibid. 
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and visa policy, crossing of external borders, freedom of movement and return policy. The 
nationals of all the Mediterranean partner countries are required to have a visa to enter the 
European Union.17 It seems that these unilateral, restricting actions are in contradiction with the 
goal of the EMP to manage migration in a more comprehensive way. Are the interests of the 
European Union with regard to migration in coherence with the goals and activities of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and with the interests of the Mediterranean partner countries?  
 
On the basis of the above illustration, we have decided to base the research in this paper upon the 
following twofold problem formulation: 
 
To what extent has the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership influenced migration in the 
Mediterranean region, and why? 
 
                                                 
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, Annex 1. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, we go deeper into the research methods that will be used in this paper by firstly 
narrowing our problem formulation down into three different working hypotheses that will 
indicate the main direction for our research. Moreover, we will present the framework for our 
research by first explaining the aim of this study and subsequently by describing the different 
chapters of the thesis, beginning from the theoretical framework and continuing through the 
empirical parts of the study and the case study on Morocco. Finally, we will conceptualise some 
of the main terms that will be submitted to analysis in this paper, such as migration, in order to 
create more overall coherence to the thesis and to give an idea of how we define the different 
concepts.  
  
2.1 Hypotheses 
 
The above considerations about the increasing migratory flows from the Mediterranean partner 
countries to the EU, especially from the Maghreb countries, suggest together with the growing 
concerns about illegal migration that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is in its current form 
not able to deal comprehensively with the causes and consequences of migration in the 
Mediterranean. Hence, our hypotheses are based on the presumption that the EMP has been 
unsuccessful in its attempts to influence migration in the Mediterranean. Thus, rather than only 
discussing “to what extent” the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced the migratory 
developments in the Mediterranean region, we also go deeper into discussing “why” the extent of 
this influence has been such as it is. Below we will try to identify different hypotheses that could 
provide us with an answer to these considerations. 
 
Firstly, as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to a large extent a cooperation modelled by the 
European Commission and the partners from the EU, it is possible that the underlying causes of 
migration in the countries of origin are not fully understood by the “architects” of the 
partnership. Furthermore, it is possible that the EU does not have a comprehensive understanding 
of the consequences (both positive and negative) that migration has on the countries of origin. 
This would indicate that the measures introduced for dealing with causes and consequences of 
migration within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are irrelevant and 
ineffective.  
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Secondly, we turn to the differing interests of the EU Member States and the Mediterranean 
Partners, when it comes to migration management. According to this hypothesis, the partners are 
indeed aware of the causes and consequences of migration in the area, and know, what should be 
done in order to deal with them. However, the interests of the EU Member States in relation to 
migration, on the one hand, are directed by their perception of migration as a security threat and 
the main goal for them is to restrict migration in order to diminish this threat. The Mediterranean 
partner countries, on the other hand, do not necessarily see migration as a negative phenomenon. 
It is thus possible that the policy makers in the Mediterranean partner countries do not cooperate 
fully with the EU partners in their attempt to diminish migration. For example the important 
share of remittances in the Maghreb-countries’ GDP can in fact make the governments of those 
countries wish for their nationals to migrate. Furthermore, emigration is expected to have a 
positive effect on the real wages and unemployment in the country of origin.18 Hence, it seems 
that the Euro-Mediterranean Partners have not succeeded in applying the differentiated approach 
to migration management, taking into consideration the diversity of the situation in each country, 
which was encouraged in the Barcelona declaration (see above).19 This hypothesis suggests thus 
that the contradicting interests of the different stakeholders (i.e. countries of origin and countries 
of destination) have made it difficult to deal with the causes and consequences of migration in a 
comprehensive manner within the multilateral framework of EMP.  
 
Finally, it is possible that the causes and consequences of migration are well understood by the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partners, and decisions have been taken within the framework of the EMP 
that can influence migration in the Mediterranean, but that the implementation of these measures 
has not been carried out effectively. This could be caused by many different reasons such as lack 
of resources, lack of capacity, lack of skills or even lack of will from different stakeholders. This 
would suggest that we will find a number of activities within the EMP which have been decided 
upon, and which should address migration, but which do not show any results.  
 
In short, the three different hypotheses that our research will be based on are: 
a) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in 
the Mediterranean due to the lack of ability to comprehensively understand the causes 
and consequences of migration in the region, and thus tackling them with irrelevant and 
ineffective measures; 
                                                 
18 Testas 2001, p. 72. Abdelaziz Testas was at the time of article publication a lecturer in Economics at the 
Shandong Finance Institute, Jinan, China. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Leeds in 1997. 
19 Barcelona declaration, Annex: Work programme. 
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b) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in 
the Mediterranean due to the inability to develop a comprehensive, common strategy, 
taking into account the complex variety of interests of the Mediterranean partner 
countries and the European Union; 
c) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in 
the Mediterranean due to the lack of ability to effectively implement the decisions taken 
within the framework of EMP. 
 
2.2 The framework for research 
 
The aim of this thesis is to define, substantiate and explain the possible influence that the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership may have on migration in the Mediterranean. With migration we 
mainly mean migratory flows in the Mediterranean, and thus, whether the activities within EMP 
have influenced the migratory flows in one way or another. This is however not the only aspect 
presented in this thesis, because it is not only the migratory flows, but also the migration policies 
that develop and are influenced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The investigation of the 
influence of EMP on migration will be done by providing a critical assessment of the EMP, 
concentrating on the abilities of the EMP to deal with the causes and consequences of migration, 
both in the countries of origin and in the countries of destination, and on the interests of the 
countries of origin (Mediterranean partner countries) and the countries of destination (EU) with 
regard to migration. The thesis is structured as follows:  
 
We will begin by presenting the theoretical considerations behind security and its connection to 
migration. Our theoretical part will concentrate on the exploration of the notion of security and 
the way in which it has come to be connected to migration. We will look at the way in which the 
concept of security has changed and how a new security paradigm emerged at the end of the 
Cold War, widening and deepening the security studies to cover multiple referent objects, apart 
from the traditional “state”, and different areas of security, apart from the military security. 
 
Our main theoretical framework is based on the direction of security studies spoken for by the 
Copenhagen school, and especially by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde.20 We will 
                                                 
20 Ole Wæver is Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Political Science, University of Copenhagen. 
He has published extensively in the field of international relations. Jaap de Wilde is Professor in IR and World 
Politics at the University of Groningen. From 2001 to 2007 he was professor in European Security Studies at the 
Department of Political Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.  
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present their concept of comprehensive security as a way to explain the widening of the security 
paradigm. Furthermore, the concept of securitisation is examined in order to provide one way of 
understanding why migration has become a security concern. Finally, we will examine the notion 
of societal security, which suggests that migration has become a security threat because the 
societies in the EU perceive it as a threat in identity terms. This means that the immigrants, who 
arrive in the EU with their languages, cultures and religions, pose a threat to the society and its 
identity. The ideas of the Copenhagen school will be balanced by the contradicting views of 
different theorists, who for example argue that securitisation can turn out to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and issues that do not pose a security threat can become security threats when they are 
presented as such. In the context of this study, this kind of an argument would thus suggest that 
migration has only become a security issue, because the Southern EU Member States presented it 
as such to the other Member States. Furthermore, the Copenhagen school’s argument of societal 
security is questioned, because the traditionalist conception of society is rarely present in the 
European Union; most Western European countries are already characterised by a certain level 
of multiculturalism.21 
 
The use of theories in this paper differs somewhat from a traditional theoretical analysis, in 
which theories are used as a rather rigid support structure for the overall framework for the 
research. In this paper, the main discussion concerning the relevance of the theories in our 
context is already carried out in the chapter including the theoretical considerations on security. 
We will however refer to the findings of this chapter when discussing the differing interests of 
the EU Member States and the Mediterranean partner countries to managing migration, where 
securitising migration is provided as an explanation to the interest of the EU Member States to 
restrict migration from the MPC. A more open deliberation of the theoretical considerations is 
thus used as an explanatory power to determining the usefulness of our hypotheses. 
 
The core of this paper will be on a study of the impacts of migration to the countries of origin 
and the countries of destination. The aim of this study is to identify the causes of migration in the 
countries of origin and the consequences that migration has both to the countries of origin and 
the countries of destination. This study aims to identify both advantages and disadvantages of 
migration, whether in form of economic gains or losses or of demographic changes. This is done 
in order to provide background data for examining what kind of measures the Euro-
                                                 
21 See for example Huysmans 2000, p. 762. The contradictory views of Copenhagen school and, for example social-
constructivists are well presented in the discussion articles of McSweeney (1996 and 1998), Buzan and Wæver 
(1997) and Williams (1998). 
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Mediterranean Partnership should theoretically undergo in order to manage migration in a way 
that is satisfactory to all parties, but also to see whether the perception of migration as a threat to 
the countries of destination holds true when it comes to other aspects than societal identity. 
 
We will then place the findings of this study in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and investigate in which ways the EMP aims at dealing with the identified causes 
and consequences of migratory flows in the Mediterranean. This will be done by presenting 
activities in the three different baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership relating to the 
causes and consequences of migration and by assessing whether they deal with the issues in a 
comprehensive way. This part of our paper moves the attention from the migratory flows 
towards the migration policies and to how the migratory policies within the EMP have 
developed, partly as a result of changes in the internal policies of the EU within this field. 
 
To put the findings of this comparative study into practical context, we will conduct a small case 
study on the migration policies and migratory flows in Morocco. The goal of this case study is to 
present the changes in the patterns of migration from Morocco to the EU in the light of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. In our case study on Morocco, we will study the developments in the 
field of migration with the help of a number of indicators, which mean “[observations] that we 
choose to consider as a reflection of a variable we wish to study”.22 These indicators will 
include: number of immigrants (both legal and illegal) from Morocco to the EU; demographic 
growth; remittances sent to Morocco by migrants; unemployment rate and poverty in Morocco; 
and finally economic growth, measured in GDP and GDP per capita. We will also present more 
specific programmes and projects that have been undertaken in Morocco within the framework 
of the EMP in order to directly or indirectly influence migration. The description of the projects 
will together with the indicators help us to see how well the EMP activities correspond to the 
causes and consequences of migration, and whether any development can be detected. 
 
The empirical part will be followed by an analysis, which will place our findings in the context 
of our hypotheses in order to determine which one of them gives the most suitable explanation to 
our problem formulation. The analysis will be divided into two different parts, following the 
twofold construction of our problem formulation between “to what extent” the EMP has 
influenced migration, and “why”. The structure of the thesis is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
                                                 
22 Babbie 2007, p. 125. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
2.3 Sources and limitations 
 
The main sources used in this thesis will firstly be the basic documents related to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, such as the Barcelona declaration, the declarations from the 
subsequent ministerial meetings organised within the framework of the EMP and the Association 
Agreements signed with the Mediterranean partner countries. Special emphasis will be put on the 
documents describing the activities in the field of migration or having an effect on the issues 
relating to migration.  
 
Statistics describing a number of indicators related to migration and the development of 
migratory flows will be used throughout the thesis. The main sources for these statistics are the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), the Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD), the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied 
Research on International Migration (CARIM) and the Medstat-programme. There are a number 
of comments that it is important to make concerning these sources. 
 
The Medstat-programme has as its goal to harmonise the statistical methods of the 
Mediterranean partner countries in line with European and international norms and standards. 
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Furthermore, the programme aims at improving compatibility of data in the MPC and the 
comparability of the data with the data from the EU and EFTA-countries.23 This is why the 
statistics collected within the framework of this programme are very relevant for this paper and 
provide a solid statistical background for investigating the indicators concerning migration. The 
statistics from the Medstat-programme will especially be used as indicators for economic 
development and demographic changes. 
 
The main block of statistics in this paper concerns migration and migratory movements. CARIM 
has as one of its main tasks to collect statistics especially in this field, which is why these 
statistics form the core of our statistical data concerning migration. Thanks to their extensive 
database in the field of migration in the Mediterranean, we have also chosen not to collect any 
data through interviews or surveys about the implementation of the EMP in the field of 
migration. This database provides us with statistics that are up to date and reliable, and the 
studies conducted especially in Morocco cover a broad range of questions related to the causes 
and consequences of migration.  
 
Statistics from OECD have in many occasions been included in order to supplement the data 
collected from Eurostat, Medstat or CARIM. Using the data from OECD presents us however 
with certain problems, especially due to the fact that not all Member States of the EU are 
members of OECD. This is why the data from OECD is only used in order to provide indications 
of trends and developments, but cannot as such be used when analysing the development of 
migratory flows in the Mediterranean. In addition to the statistics from OECD, a number of 
tables have been borrowed from academic literature, usually collected by the authors from 
various sources.  
 
Furthermore, we have chosen to attempt to direct the research away from the main security issue 
in the Eastern parts of the Mediterranean, the conflict in the Middle East, even though we 
understand the importance of this conflict to the developments in the Mediterranean, especially 
when it comes to security. The conflict does affect the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, mostly 
by leading into difficulties when attempting to agree upon a common declaration on an issue or 
on measures to be taken. It is possible that the conflict in the Middle East has had an effect on 
the policies related to migration as well and we will keep this in mind when studying the 
available data.  
                                                 
23 Eurostat 2007, p. 2. 
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It is however our understanding that many aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
especially in the case of the third basket, are developing well despite of the conflict and we will 
try to evaluate the EMP keeping this in mind. This is why we have chosen to concentrate the 
study of the development of migration to the Western parts of the Mediterranean, and especially 
to Morocco. Morocco is furthermore chosen as the country for our case study because it is 
together with Egypt one of the main countries of immigration in the Mediterranean. What we 
have to consider, is that Morocco shares very close ties with France due to their colonial history 
and that Morocco is the only one of the Mediterranean partner countries to have applied for EU 
membership. This could indicate that its interests in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are not 
representative to the interests of the other Mediterranean partner countries. It would however be 
difficult to find another country that would better represent the interest of all the MPC due to the 
fact that the area is rather heterogeneous. Furthermore, due to the close relations of Morocco to 
the EU, we can presume that the developments seen in the field of migration with respect to 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are most pronounced in Morocco and that the possible lack of 
developments in Morocco could indicate that the developments in the other MPC are even 
slower in character. Comparing two different MPC would have brought an interesting point of 
view to this paper, but taking into consideration the broadness of the topic, we chose to limit the 
scope of the paper rather by leaving one case study out.  
 
2.4 Definitions 
 
When if comes to definitions, it is often possible to recognise many differing views and ways of 
using different terms in the academic and specialised literature. This is why we present our 
understanding of the main definitions used in this paper below. 
 
2.4.1 Migration 
 
Migrants can according to CARIM be defined on the basis of two different criteria: their country 
of nationality and their country of birth. The country of nationality-criteria considers migrants to 
be resident foreigners and the country of birth-criteria sees migrants as residents born abroad. 
The two definitions differ concerning the place of birth (born abroad but having taken the 
nationality of the country of residence) or nationality (foreign residents who were born in the 
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country of residence but have not taken its nationality).24 Instead of defining our own 
understanding of who can be counted as migrants, we have decided to use the definitions that the 
sources used in this paper have chosen and to take this into account when analysing the data. 
Qualifying data for this research only based on one definition of a migrant would make the 
acquisition of data close to impossible. 
 
2.4.1.1 Legal 
 
The European Commission divides the legal migrants into four different categories: asylum 
seekers, family members joining migrants already legally settled in an EU Member State, 
registered labour migrants and business migrants. It is important, especially in the framework of 
this thesis, to distinguish between economic migrants and persons in need of protection (asylum 
seekers). States have no obligation to let economic migrants enter their territory, whereas asylum 
is a human right that has its foundations for example in the 1951 Geneva Convention. The people 
in need of protection are therefore not included in the definition of migrants in this thesis.25 
 
It is easier to study the developments in the legal migration from the Mediterranean partner 
countries to the EU, than that of illegal migration especially due to the fact that reliable statistics 
exist on the number and “types” of legal migrants. This is not the case for the illegal migrants, 
the conceptualisation of which is presented below. 
 
2.4.1.2 Illegal 
 
Illegal or irregular migration is defined for example by the International Organization for 
Migration as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and 
receiving countries.”26 The definition also depends on whether the migrant is seen from the 
perspective of the destination or the sending country, the country of destination seeing irregular 
migration as consisting of illegal entry, stay or work in the country, whereas for the sending 
country the irregularity can for example be seen as the crossing of an international boundary 
without a valid passport or travel document. IOM also mentions that there is a “tendency to 
restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking 
                                                 
24 Fargues 2007, p. xiii. 
25 European Commission. COM (2002) 703 final, 3.12.2002, p. 9. 
26 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 34. 
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in persons”.27 Europol comments on the necessity of migration to the development of the sending 
and receiving countries and defines illegal migration as follows: 
 
“Migration itself is not illegal; it is in fact necessary for the development of both source 
and destination countries. Migration, however, becomes illegal when individuals 
themselves or with the assistance of others attempt to enter countries clandestinely due 
to the fact that they may not enter or stay in a country legitimately.”28 
 
Our definition of illegal migration follows the one used by Europol, which covers the two 
different definitions identified by the IOM. Illegal migrants are thus seen as individuals who 
attempt to enter countries clandestinely either themselves or with the assistance of others. When 
collecting indicators for illegal migration, it is however essential to identify the conceptualisation 
used by the collectors of the original data. 
 
2.4.2 Mediterranean partner countries 
 
In the course of this paper, many different definitions will be used of the non-EU members of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Concerning the time before the signing of the Barcelona 
declaration, the Mediterranean non-EU countries will be called the Mediterranean non-Member 
States. Concerning the time after the signing of the Barcelona declaration, our definition of 
Mediterranean partner countries follows, unless otherwise indicated, the list of signatories: 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority29, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. It is important to specify that until their accession in the European Union in 2004, 
Cyprus and Malta were also Mediterranean non-Member States (before 1994) and Mediterranean 
partner countries (from 1994 to 2004). It is also important not to forget the role of Libya and 
Mauritania. They are both members of AMU and long-term observers of the Barcelona Process. 
During the process of writing this thesis, an important development was seen, as the 9th Euro-
Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, organised in Lisbon, 5-6 November 
2007, welcomed Mauritania and Albania to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Despite this, 
these two countries will as a rule not be included in the definition of Mediterranean partner 
countries, as the changes in their relation towards the EMP have until now been limited.   
                                                 
27 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 35. 
28 Europol 2007. 
29 In a number of official documents, the Palestinian Authority is replaced by “West Bank & Gaza strip”. For the 
sake of being consequent, we have however chosen to use the name Palestinian Authority throughout this paper. 
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2.4.3 Country of origin and country of destination 
 
Academic literature includes several different ways of naming the country where the migrant 
emigrates from and the country where he or she immigrates. We have chosen to use the 
definitions “country of origin” and “country of destination”, which are also the definitions used 
by the International Organization for Migration, whose Glossary on migration defines the 
country of origin as “the country that is a source of migratory flows (legal or illegal)”.30 Country 
of destination is defined as “the country that is a destination for migratory flows (legal or 
illegal)”.31 Definitions used elsewhere include for example “sending country”, “source country” 
and “recipient country”. Furthermore, a definition that will occur in this paper is that of “country 
of transit”. According to the above-mentioned IOM Glossary on migration, a country of transit is 
“the country through which migratory flows (legal or illegal) move”.32 This definition is relevant 
in the context of this thesis because an important part of the migration (mostly illegal) from the 
Mediterranean partner countries to the EU does not originate from those countries, but the MPC 
are rather used as countries of transit. 
 
                                                 
30 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 15. This definition does not, however, suggest that the migrant 
has to be a national in the country of origin, which is the case with the definition “state of origin”. International 
Organization for Migration 2004, p. 62. 
31 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 15. 
32 Ibid. 
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3 MIGRATION AND SECURITY – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As has been indicated above, presenting increasing migration flows from the Mediterranean 
countries to the European Union as a security threat was an important part of the strategy of the 
Southern EU Member States in directing the attention of the EU Southwards and in initiating the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Why did the EU Member States see migration as a threat to 
their security? Is migration a threat to the EU as an international community, to the states 
individually or to the local communities? It is thus not only the case of describing how migration 
can cause conflicts or threats in and between the countries of origin and destination that is 
important, but the main underlying question is also why migration became a part of the security 
framework. It cannot be denied that migration and security share a connection and that security 
has become during the past decade increasingly used as a way to study the different indicators of 
migration. One of the earlier scholars to suggest this approach to migration was Myron Weiner, 
former director of Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology 
(MIT), who suggested that a number of features in the international population movements, such 
as:  
 
“a growth propelled by economic differentials, internal political disorder, […] the 
political as well as economic constraints on the admission of migrants […] suggest the 
need for a security/stability framework for the study of international migration that 
focuses on state policies toward emigration and immigration as shaped by concerns 
over internal stability and international security”.33 
 
Hence, the aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of such a security/stability framework 
for the study of migration by presenting differing theoretical considerations as to why and how 
migration has become to be considered as a security issue. These considerations will be 
developed further in the following chapter of this paper, in which we discuss the causes of 
migration and its consequences to both the country of origin and the country of destination. We 
will begin by presenting the changes in the direction of security studies, and subsequently in the 
security paradigm, which were witnessed at the end of the Cold War.  
 
                                                 
33 Weiner 1992-1993, pp. 94-95. 
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3.1 Developments in the security paradigm 
 
The end of the Cold War not only brought about many changes in the geo-political map of the 
world, but it also contributed to changes in the international relations theories, especially in the 
field of security studies. This change is aptly commented by Steve Smith, Professor of 
International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, who explains that the change in 
the security paradigm brought about an important change at the actor level, where the role of the 
state as a source of security, but also as a source of insecurity for populations became more 
widely accepted.34 The transfer in the security paradigm also led to a change in the traditional 
understanding of what or who it is that needs to be secured. The old paradigm concerning 
national security was characterised by state-centrism, whereas the “new security issues” can refer 
to the security of for example societies or individuals.35 Smith continues by saying that it is not 
only military concerns that are central to the debates about security, but that many different 
aspects of human activity have entered the discussion fora as security issues. In other words, the 
concept of security has both widened and deepened.36 Widening the concept of security describes 
the extension of the understanding of security to cover a wider range of potential threats apart 
from the military one. Deepening the security agenda describes “moving either down to the level 
of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with 
regional and societal security as possible intermediate points”.37 The biggest change, according 
to Smith, is however that security is not only seen as a question of dealing with constant, 
unchanging and unchallenged security issues, but that the debate now deals with the starting 
point of security, namely what counts as security and what counts as a security issue.38 
 
An important role in the “widening” of the concept of security has been played by Barry Buzan, 
whose 1983 book People, States and Fear presented a broadened agenda for the security studies 
by adding four new sectors to it. Thus, according to Buzan, the five main sectors of security are 
military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security.39 In this work, Buzan still saw 
the state as the main referent object in all the five sectors, and he was criticised for this for 
example by Ken Booth and Steve Smith, who argued for the centrality of the individual as the 
                                                 
34 Smith 1999, p. 74. 
35 Ibid, pp. 83-84. This is however not uncontested, the question of individuals as referent objects is discussed 
further down. 
36 Ibid, p. 74. 
37 Krause & Williams 1996, p. 230. Instead of “widening”, Krause and Williams use the name “broadening”. At the 
time of publishing of this article, Keith Krause was affiliated with the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva, and Michael C. Williams to the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Maine. 
38 Smith 1999, p. 74. 
39 Buzan 1991, pp. 19-20. 
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referent that needed to be secured.40 Buzan modified his state-centric statement later on, because 
“[i]f a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than 
the state had to be allowed into the picture”.41   
 
Buzan’s People, States and Fear was also one of the first publications to discuss the connection 
between security and migration. Even though Buzan discussed the threats of migration from a 
state-centric point of view, his example was preceding the way in which the end of the Cold War 
made it possible to direct the view of the security studies towards “diffuse and hard-to-grasp 
security threats that do not emanate from sovereign states but from non-state actors, involving 
issues such as crime, drugs, migration”.42 At the same time, Buzan developed together with Ole 
Wæver the concept of societal security, which marked the separation from the state-centric line 
of thinking. Whereas state-centric security thinking saw sovereignty as the main value to be 
protected, societal security sees identity as the main target of protection. This identity is 
represented in a society’s ability to persist in its essential character under changing conditions 
and possible or actual threats. Moreover, the identity is about the sustainability of the society’s 
language, culture, religion, national identity and customs.43 At least at the first sight, the concept 
of societal security seems to suit well for considering migration through the security framework. 
However, before we move on to discuss further the different referent objects that migration can 
be considered to threaten, it is important to present another concept developed especially by 
Wæver, namely securitisation. We believe that the theory of securitisation will provide us with 
an understanding of how migration became a security issue. 
 
3.2 Securitisation 
 
According to the Copenhagen school, security issues do not exist as such, but issues that are 
presented by actors as threats that require measures and actions outside the normal political 
procedure are ‘securitised’. Securitising an issue (having transformed an issue into a security 
issue) includes thus discussing an issue in a way that breaks the normal rules of conduct, but also 
that this rule-breaking receives public acceptance. The acceptance can be gained through the 
assumption that if the problem is not tackled, everything else will become irrelevant. Security 
                                                 
40 Smith 1999, p. 84. Ken Booth is EH Carr Professor and Head of the Department of International Politics at the 
University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 
41 Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 8. 
42 Faist 2004, p. 1. Thomas Faist is Professor of Transstate Relations and Sociology of Development at the Faculty 
of Sociology, Bielefeld University, and Director of the Center on Migration , Citizenship and Development. 
43 Wæver et al. 1993, p. 23. 
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issues are thus not necessarily formed by real existing threats, but by people, who present issues 
as existential threats.44 These people are according to Wæver called the securitising actors, who 
construct security issues by “speech acts”. Wæver continues by saying that “In this usage, 
security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the 
act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)”.45  
 
According to the theory, security deals with threats to survival that mobilise extreme 
countermeasures. This means that security does not only concern military issues or national 
sovereignty, but that the concept of security should be understood by securitisation, which 
Buzan and Wæver describe as “the discursive processes through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal 
with the threat.”46 This means that all the aspects that a political community sees as threatening 
to something valuable can be considered as security threats.  
 
How can securitisation then be studied for example in the case of migration? Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde explain that it should be studied by looking at discourse and political constellations – 
securitisation does not need indicators. Instead, one should ask questions such as when does an 
argument achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would 
otherwise have to be obeyed? If the securitising actor has been able to gain the acceptance of the 
audience to violate rules or procedures that are normally meant to be followed, one is witnessing 
a case of securitisation.47 
 
A number of scholars have questioned the thinking of the Copenhagen school for example by 
posing the following questions: Who are the audience and how do we know when public 
acceptance has been gained? And who are the people that can be considered as “securitising 
actors” – who are the ones that have sufficient authority to gain public acceptance?48 The 
Copenhagen school replies:  
 
                                                 
44 Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, pp. 23-27. 
45 Wæver 1995, p. 55.   
46 Buzan & Wæver 2003, p. 491. 
47 Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 25. 
48 See for example McSweeney 1996, p. 84 and Léonard 2004, p. 16. McSweeney asks how it is possible to know 
when the society is actively backing up the securitising actor. Sarah Léonard was during the time of writing this 
article affiliated to the Department of Political Science, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 
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“We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be 
adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough 
resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency 
measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken 
the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity”.49  
 
Furthermore, who speaks about security is not as important as the existence of an existential 
threat that requires emergency action or special measures, and the acceptance by a significant 
audience to undertake the action.50 There are thus no specified criteria on who can be considered 
as securitising actor. Common players, who are however more likely to be accepted as 
securitising actors, are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure 
groups.51 Interestingly, the Copenhagen school does not only speak for securitisation, but 
assesses it to be a rather conservative and defensive concept. Protecting a referent object through 
securitisation means that it is wished to continue to exist in its current form. Nevertheless, there 
are cases in which extensive securitisation can lead to stifling the economy, creating an intrusive 
and coercive state and eventually crippling the economy. Thus, it is considered sociologically, 
politically and economically important to avoid excessive and irrational securitisation.52 
 
3.2.1 Securitising migration 
 
What are thus the variables that define whether migration will be securitised or not? Why is 
migration in some cases considered a security threat, whereas in other cases it is accepted? 
Christopher Rudolph proposes four different variables that he sees as the most significant ones to 
the perception of migration as a threat in the Western states: cultural proximity, visibility, entry 
channel and the unintended or latent effects of prior policies.53 Cultural proximity refers to the 
perception of difference between the migrants and the locals in the country of destination in 
terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion and culture.54 This variable implies that the closer the 
migrants are to the locals in the country of destination in terms of “culture”, the smaller the 
chances are that migration is seen as a security threat. Visibility refers to the concentration of 
migratory flows both in space and in time. Rudolph points out that migration is often 
                                                 
49 Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 25. 
50 Ibid, p. 27. 
51 Ibid, p. 40. 
52 Ibid, p. 208. Soviet Union, North Korea and Iran are mentioned as an example. 
53 Rudolph 2002, p. 8. Christopher Rudolph works at the Department for International Politics at the School of 
International Service, Washington D.C. During the time of writing he was visiting Assistant Professor at the School 
of International Relations, University of Southern California. 
54 Ibid, p. 8. 
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concentrated in one geographical area and in a specific period of time. When migration is more 
visible, it is easier pushed to the foreground as a security threat.55 This statement is verified by 
our Euro-Mediterranean context, where there are a small number of main entry points to the 
European Union for the migrants from the Mediterranean partner countries. Furthermore, a 
sudden increase in the migratory flows at a specific geographical location (for example the 
Canary Islands) brings attention to the issue and supports the cause of securitisation. 
 
With entry channel, Rudolph means the way in which the migrants enter the country of 
destination – through legal means with a working visa etc, or through illegal means.56 This 
variable is connected to securitisation, because the debate on the ways of entry creates “a spiral 
of insecurity”, which helps the securitising actors, such as politicians or media, to connect the 
immigration and the means of entry to terrorism, illegality and crime.57 Finally, Rudolph 
suggests that the effect of earlier migration policy affects the securitisation of migration in the 
current society. This is for example because earlier migration facilitates future migration by 
creating migratory channels, but also by sustaining migratory networks, through which contact is 
kept with the “people back home”. If a society has positive experiences of earlier migrations and 
the migrants have settled in the society, perhaps contributing to the culture, it is easier for the 
country of destination to accept migrants of the same background in the future.58  
 
When we consider the question of securitising migration from the point of view of the European 
Union, we have to take a short look at the history of migration to the EU. This aspect will 
however be discussed at length later on in this paper. What is important to understand, is that 
migration to Western European countries was originally based on the increased need for cheap 
and flexible work force in the 1950s and 1960s. As Huysmans argues, the status of immigrants 
for example in France was at that time not politically sensitive.59 This changed however in the 
end of the 1960s and early 1970s, when the need for guest workers diminished and there was a 
growing need to protect the domestic workforce and their social and economic rights. This led to 
a change from a more permissive immigration policy towards a control-oriented, restrictive 
policy. Here we can identify the first signs of securitisation in relation to migration in Western 
Europe. The immigrant population kept growing due to the right for family reunion, despite the 
                                                 
55 Rudolph 2002, p. 9. 
56 Ibid, p. 9. 
57 O’Neill 2006, pp. 327-328. P.E. O’Neill is a Wing Commander at the UK Royal Air Force and has written this 
paper within the framework of the Advanced Command and Staff Course No. 9  JSCSC, Shrivenham. 
58 Rudolph 2002, p. 9. 
59 Huysmans 2000, pp. 753-754. 
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diminishing need for labour immigrants. Subsequently, the public rhetoric began to link 
migration to the destabilisation of public order and the public awareness of migration and 
immigrant population in the European countries increased.60 When the migrants were not needed 
as labour force anymore, the Europeans began to question their presence in the continent. 
Moving on to the 1980s, migration was already increasingly a subject in the political debates 
concerning the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability, but also of 
the welfare state and the cultural composition of the European nations – migration had become a 
security issue, threatening the domestic society.61 As a sign of the acceptance of the audience, 
that is required for an issue to be securitised, we can mention the 1990 Convention Applying the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.62 The Convention makes a connection between 
immigration and asylum on the one hand, and terrorism, transnational crime and border control 
on the other hand, locating thus “the regulation of migration in an institutional framework that 
deals with the protection of internal security”.63 Making this connection, and being ratified by 
the Member States, the Convention is a good example of how migration has come to be 
securitised in the European Union. 
 
Theorising about the connection of security and migration cannot however be made without 
questioning the connection in the first place. On the basis of the above theoretical considerations 
on securitisation in general, we claim that migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to 
the European Union has been securitised inside the EU. The idea of migration as an existential 
threat has been proposed to the European audience by the securitising actors (in this case 
originally the South European EU Member States, but they have been joined for example by 
extreme right-wing parties in a number of Member States), and an important part of the 
European audience has accepted the threat as existing. This is supported by the developments in 
the EU cooperation in the field of migration, where the intergovernmental cooperation has 
spilled over to cover areas of Justice and Home Affairs through the Treaty of Amsterdam, and 
where the Schengen Agreements and the Dublin Convention indicate that the EU as a whole is 
now cooperating with migration questions. 
 
Nevertheless, the act of securitising migration has been harshly criticised by a number of 
scholars. For example Jef Huysmans, Senior Lecturer of Politics and International Studies at the 
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Open University, UK, argues that connecting migration and security together supports the 
nationalist agendas of extreme right-wing groups and provides a self-fulfilling prophecy, in 
which the migrant, who has been turned into a security problem, becomes “the other who has 
entered (or who desires to enter) a harmonious world and just by having entered it, has disturbed 
the harmony”.64 According to Huysmans, it is only natural that security studies – a research field 
that sees itself as problem-solving – does not neglect migration, which is a field that is by many 
considered as a basic security problem. By researching the problem, the scholars however 
reinforce the connection between migration and security, which can be seen neither as neutral 
nor innocent. Huysmans suggests that connecting security and migration is not something that 
necessarily has to be done, but if it is in fact done, it changes the meaning of migratory flows by 
making them a “security drama”.65 Huysmans is supported by Sarah Collinson, who says that 
presenting or discussing migration in terms of security can function as a legitimizing or 
encouraging act for xenophobic and racist sentiments. This is why it is important rather to 
discuss the specific, instead of the general problems related to migration whenever possible, and 
thus to ask what specific types of security problems migration might pose, in order to make it 
clear that it is necessarily not migration in general, that is bad.66  
 
Not denying the fact that securitisation is not always the right way to go, Wæver argues that 
having taken the path of securitising migration once, it is very difficult to go back – that is, to 
desecuritise. Desecuritisation is however considered by the Copenhagen school as the ideal 
option in the long-term, since it means moving threats out into the public sphere, away from the 
threat-defence sequence. The claim of the Copenhagen school is that in specific situations 
securitisation can be chosen, but it should never be seen as “an innocent reflection of the issue 
being a security threat”. Securitising or accepting securitisation by the securitising actors is 
always a political choice.67 
 
3.3 Migration – a threat to what and whom? 
 
The examination of how the movement of persons in form of migration affects security can be 
done from two main points of view – that of the threat and that of the referent object. One thus 
has to ask the questions:  
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- What is the threat? What is it that scares the actors, what do they desire to be freed from? 
- What is it that is threatened? As will be discussed below, the referent object can be for 
example the state, the society, the individual – all depending on from which point of view 
the threat is looked at.68 
Below, we present a number of points of view concerning what migration is threatening, not only 
in the countries of destination, but also in the countries of origin.  
 
3.3.1 Societal security 
 
As mentioned above, the traditional thinking in security studies locates the state as the main 
referent object for security threats, that is, the target of the threat, what is threatened. The change 
in security paradigm brought about a change also in this context, when the security studies 
“deepened” and began to consider other referent objects both on the higher end of the vertical 
scale, such as international organisations, and the lower end of the scale, moving from the state 
level to societies and individuals. In the context of our thesis, the most important change was 
seen in the views of the Copenhagen school, which broadened the state-centric views presented 
earlier by Buzan to include the possibility of threats towards the society, by introducing the 
concept of societal security. 
  
One of the Copenhagen school’s first contributions to the discussion on the widening of the 
security studies was Buzan’s presentation of the five different security sectors (military, political, 
societal, economic and environmental) in his book People, States and Fear. He defined the 
concept of societal security as “[t]he sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of 
traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom”.69 
Moving further away from the idea that only the state can be a referent object when considering 
security threats, society is presented as a referent object of its own in the 1993 book from the 
Copenhagen school, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.70 Security is 
seen to have two different referent objects – state, that has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, 
and society, which is concerned about the identity and how it can be preserved. More precisely, 
“A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears 
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that it will no longer be able to live as itself”.71 Societal security should however not replace the 
focus on state security, but rather be more at the centre of the analysis.72  
 
What is then this society that can be threatened? Wæver et al. explain that society concerns 
identity and “the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as 
members of a community”.73 Furthermore, the Copenhagen school is of the opinion that societies 
encompass, to some degree, more than just the sum of its parts, meaning that a “society” cannot 
be reduced to individuals. This is why individuals and social groups should not be targeted as the 
object of security studies. The Copenhagen school follows thus the Durkheimian conception of 
society being a sui generis phenomenon, one of a kind.74  
 
The connection to our context is revealed when we look at the main threats to society and 
societal security, as they are seen by the Copenhagen school. In Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe, the main threats are presented as competing identities and 
migration75 – and in the more recent work Security. A New Framework for Analysis the most 
common issues that have been viewed as threats to societal security are outlined as migration, 
horizontal competition and vertical competition.76 These three threats are explained as follows: 
 
1. Migration – X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community 
will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being 
changed by a shift in the composition of the population […] 
2. Horizontal competition – although it is still X people living here, they will change their ways 
because of the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighbouring culture Y […] 
3. Vertical competition – people will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an 
integrating project […] or a secessionist-“regionalist” project […] that pulls them toward either 
wider or narrower identities. […]77 
 
How may these issues threat societies and societal security? Societies differ as to what kind of 
vulnerabilities they have, depending on “how their identity is constructed”.78 It is suggested that 
the background of the national or societal identity affects to what extent for example migration is 
considered to be a threat to the society – as an example Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde mention 
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Finland, which has an identity based on separateness and being remote, where even a small 
number of foreigners can be considered as problematic. Furthermore, it is proposed that in 
societies where language is central to national identity, as is in France, an influx of migrants 
speaking for example English, can be considered as threatening to the society’s identity.79 This 
reasoning is valid also in the current times, where religion is playing an important role and the 
Christian societies of Western Europe are feeling threatened by the increasing influence of Islam 
in their daily lives, brought to the societies by the immigrants. 
 
Whether migration becomes a threat also depends on how well a society absorbs migrant 
populations and can adapt to them; societies are very different in this sense. The threat posed by 
the differing culture or ethnicity of the immigrants is especially amplified when the immigrants 
attempt to maintain their identity in the country of destination. The same amount of migrants can 
have a very different effect depending on whether they aim to integrate in the country of 
destination, or whether they bring with them all their habits, whether these are related to religion, 
food or language. This is in accordance with Rudolph’s “visibility” variable, according to which 
a bigger concentration of migrants in space and time will enhance the chances of migration being 
noticed by the local population and thus becoming an issue that is seen as disturbing or 
altogether threatening. Moreover, European integration is said to weaken the territorial state and 
its principle of sovereignty, leading to groups within societies feeling threatened and feeling their 
identities being endangered by for example immigration. Wæver suggests that in these cases 
cultures defend themselves by strengthening the existing identities and thus making culture a part 
of security policy.80 When it is no longer possible to get support from the territorial state in a 
threatening situation, support is being looked for in the culture and society. In case of a “threat” 
of changes in the culture and society, people feel threatened for their identity. 
 
Theorizing about societal security and securitisation can however not be done without 
encountering problems. In the same way as securitisation was criticised for “becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy” and legitimizing anti-immigrant sentiments, Wæver admits that securitising 
the societal sector in an unsophisticated way may result in legitimized arguments for defining 
immigrants and refugees as a security problem.81 Further questions arise for example from the 
identification of the society – how does a society speak, as it does not have formal institutions 
similar to those of a state? Wæver explains that it is never the society as such that speaks, but 
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that society is spoken for, and as societies are full of hierarchies and institutions, there are some 
people that are better placed than others to speak on behalf of “their” societies.82 
 
The notion of societal security, or the security of a culture, is also present in Jef Huysmans’ 
interpretation of the connection between security and migration. In a way that is not very distant 
from the concept of securitisation, he describes the “security drama” that migration is placed in 
and where the migrants create disharmony by taking the jobs, emptying the public purse and 
bringing with them Islamic fundamentalism and criminality. This disharmony indicates that an 
undesired disturbance has been experienced in the way of life, that the people in a society were 
accustomed to, and that this disharmony would not exist were it not for the migrants. Migration 
is thus seen as an existential threat, which threatens the survival of the self-identity of the 
society. This leads to the “natives” trying to distance themselves from the migrants83 in the same 
way that Wæver suggested for societies to strengthen their identity towards the threats posed by 
migration. 
 
In the post-Cold War Europe, the continuing immigration is thus seen as a threat to the 
continuation of the cultural identity of the “natives”. Migrants are however not only understood 
as a threat to cultural identity, but more widely to the political or economic system or to an 
individual’s security. With this statement Huysmans moves further away from the concept of 
societal security, where the Copenhagen school denies that a society could be divided into 
individuals. Huysmans continues by describing the migrant as the “cultural other”, a construction 
that is created by securitising migration and thus setting “the migrant apart from the natives 
mainly in terms of culture”.84 In a later work, Huysmans takes up the problematique of societal 
security, and of the assumption that the migrants threaten the cultural identity of the society in 
the country of destination, by suggesting that most European countries are already multicultural, 
at least to some extent.85 This shows us that the cultural identity is in fact not constant, but that it 
varies. On the one hand, this comment supports the assumption that migration is feared because 
it threatens the cultural identity; this comment shows that the cultural identity has as a matter of 
fact been modified in the European countries. On the other hand, this comment indicates that 
changes in cultural identity should not be seen as threatening, they are a fact and they happen 
because cultural identity is not static.  
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The same way of thinking is present in Reinhard Lohrmann’s account of societal security. He 
argues against the Copenhagen school’s statement that societal security is about sustainability of 
language, culture and religious identity, among others, by suggesting that “most Western 
European countries already have elements of multicultural societies”.86 Following McSweeney’s 
way of seeing identity as a social construct (presented below), Lohrmann concludes that it is not 
the fact that immigrants have different cultural backgrounds that presents problems to the 
countries of destination; “it is the political exploitation of these cultural differences that confers a 
security dimension to immigration”.87 
 
Apart from Huysmans’ departure from the societal security towards seeing the individual as a 
possible referent object to security threats, the work of the Copenhagen school has also been 
heavily criticised by a field of social constructivism, and especially by Bill McSweeney. He 
presents three main criticisms towards the concept of societal security, concerning the 
objectivism of the concept of identity, the misunderstanding of methodological individualism 
and the impact of the Copenhagen school’s identity “theses” on “Buzan’s distinctions between 
strong and weak states and mature and immature anarchies”.88 The debate between the 
Copenhagen school and McSweeney is however not between constructivist and non-
constructivist views, because both parties identify their positions as being constructivist. The 
dispute considers rather the different views of the two on identity construction89 and the question 
of methodological individualism. 
 
McSweeney begins by admitting that focusing on societal identity as the core value that is 
vulnerable to threats and that is in need of security, makes the theorisation of the Copenhagen 
school appealing and influencing. A more traditional sociological formula would see society as a 
system of interrelationships, which connects together the individuals who share a common 
culture. Wæver et al., for their part, describe society as “a clustering of institutions combined 
with a feeling of common identity”.90 According to McSweeney, the concept of society loses 
however all touch with fluidity and process throughout Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe, resulting in a near-positivist conception of identity. Instead, the society 
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should be considered as a process that is constituted by social practices. McSweeney claims that 
this misunderstanding of the society leads to the misunderstanding of “identity”. He suggests that 
the Copenhagen school’s view of identity as a social fact is false, and identity should rather be 
seen as a process and negotiation – we are who we want to be, instead of “we are who we are”.91 
McSweeney discusses the possibility of moving down to the individualistic level of analysis by 
claiming that Buzan and Wæver have misunderstood the concept of methodological 
individualism. McSweeney claims that Buzan and Wæver are mistaken when they say that 
methodological individualism has to be avoided by treating society as a reality of its own and not 
reducing it to the individual level. Instead, McSweeney states that the characteristics of 
collective concepts are in fact not more than the sum of its individual parts because the 
individual parts exist separately from them. As McSweeney puts it, “a collectivity is not a social 
fact in the sense of a thing existing independently of the individuals who comprise it. A 
collective concept focuses on the structural properties of action which are inherent in every 
instance of individual interaction”.92 
 
This discussion is further commented by Buzan and Wæver, who warn that such a move to an 
individualistic level would have severe consequences. The possibility of taking an individualist 
view on security is acknowledged, but this could, according to Buzan and Wæver, lead to all 
security being individual security, where the state security would have to be seen from the point 
of view of how it influences the aggregate security of the individuals. Buzan and Wæver explain 
that “In the securitisation perspective, however, identity is not a value, it is an intersubjectively 
constituted social factor”.93 The view of Buzan and Wæver is strengthened by the fact that there 
are only few commentators who see the individual as the only referent for security and there is 
an ongoing debate concerning the role of the individuals in the broader security system.94 
 
3.3.2 Further considerations on migration and threat 
 
Reinhard Lohrmann from the IOM identifies different levels at which migration affects security 
in international relations. According to him, it is possible to divide the ways in which migration 
affects international security into three different levels: (1) on the national level in the countries 
of transit and destination, which can see immigration as a threat for example to the economic 
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well-being, political stability, social order, culture, religion and identity; (2) on the bilateral 
level, where migratory movements have a tendency to create tensions between the countries of 
origin and destination and thus have an impact on regional and international stability; and (3) on 
the level of the individual migrants, especially in case of irregular migration, which can have 
implications on the individual security and dignity of the migrants and thus make them 
unpredictable actors in international relations. According to Lohrmann, the three above-
mentioned levels interact, which makes it “difficult for researchers to assess the role of specific 
factors”.95 These three levels are also affected by the triangular interaction of migration, which 
includes the migrant’s relationship to both the country of destination/transit and the country of 
origin, but also the relationship between the country of origin and the country of 
transit/destination, as presented by Lohrmann. 
 
Figure 2: Triangular interaction of migration 
 
 
It is interesting to see that the individual emerges as a referent object – migration is threatening 
the security of an individual, however not of individuals in the country of destination, but of the 
individual migrant. In our opinion, Lohrmann leaves out an important level of reference for 
migration; namely the national level in the country of origin. This level is however taken into 
account in the theorisation of Myron Weiner. Weiner, who sees migration from an international 
perspective, explains that migration can become a security threat for both the country of origin 
and the country of destination. To him, security is a social construction that has different 
meanings in different societies. This means that an issue that may be perceived by some as an 
important security risk is by others regarded as an important part of the society. From his point 
of view, in which the concept of migrants also includes refugees, Weiner presents five different 
situations where migration can be seen as a threat either to the country of origin, the country of 
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destination or to their bilateral relations. The first situation can arise, when the migrants are 
considered to be a threat to the bilateral relations of the country of origin and the country of 
destination, mostly in cases where the migrants are opposing the regime in their country of 
origin. The second possible threat scenario can arise when the migrants are seen as a threat to the 
political regime in their country of destination. The third situation may arise when the migrants 
are perceived as a threat to the culture or cultural identity in their country of destination, for 
example when they come from a culture or religion very different to that in the country of 
destination. In the fourth scenario, the migrants may be regarded as a social and/or economic 
problem in the country of origin, and the fifth situation can arise if the migrants are used by the 
country of destination as an instrument of threat against the country of origin.96  
 
Weiner’s presentation is however not unproblematic. As Léonard points out in her criticism of 
Weiner’s article, Weiner falls short of explaining the factors, which influence the fulfilment of 
the necessary conditions in which the migrants may be perceived as a security threat. Weiner 
does nevertheless make an interesting point in explaining that the economic absorptive capacity 
of the country of destination or the volume of immigration it receives, do not play an important 
role, but rather it is the “cultural affinity”, or the lack of it, that “critically influences the 
willingness of states or citizens to welcome or reject migrants”.97 This is an interesting comment 
in relation to the theories presented above, where it was suggested that different countries have 
different capacities for absorbing migrants, that is, absorptive capacity does play a role, but it 
differs from one country to another. 
 
Applying his categorisation into the case of the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries does 
however reveal its usefulness, as at least the four first categories represent situations, in which 
the migrants arriving from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU can be considered as a 
threat. The first situation, where the migrants are opposing the regime in their home country, is 
however more rare, and in the case of EU, the problems between the country of origin and the 
country of destination may rather arise due to the unwillingness of the country of origin to 
regulate emigration. The second situation, where the migrants are a threat to the political regime 
in the country of destination has become increasingly possible due to the recent developments in 
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among the immigrants from the MPC, living in the 
European Union. The third situation, concerning the threat that migration poses to the cultural 
identity of the country of destination, fits well with the theory on societal security, which was 
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presented above, and can in our opinion be considered as one of the main threats from migration. 
The fourth scenario, where migrants can be perceived as social or economic problems in the 
country of destination, is widely present in the EU. The rising anti-migratory movements and the 
increasing support to the right-wing parties are clear signs of the perception of threat from the 
part of the citizens in many European countries. The fifth example, however, is not seen in the 
European Union and it seems to be better suited for the analysis of the situation in the developing 
countries dealing with refugee flows.       
 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
 
Above we have attempted to give a number of answers to questions such as “why did the EU 
Member States see migration as a threat to their security?” and “is migration a threat to the EU 
as an international community, to the states or to the local communities?”. The theories 
presented above suggest that migration has come to be seen as a threat due to the act of 
securitisation, that is, the public rhetoric of the securitising actors (politicians, media etc.) has 
presented migration as an existential threat and this has been accepted by the people. 
Furthermore, migration is seen to present a threat to the state, the society and/or the individuals. 
 
Above considerations only suggest certain answers to these questions and seen from the different 
theoretical points of view, these questions might have altogether different answers. For example 
Faist argues that it is not possible to understand the development of the security framework for 
migration only by looking at the actual threats to the state and human security; instead, it is 
important to understand the “political psychological mechanisms of threat construction”.98 
According to Faist, studies conducted on the phenomenon of threat construction show that 
external threats often increase in-group solidarity, lead to vilification of the source of threat and 
limit any government actions that could help the members of the threatening group in any way. 
Moreover, external threats lead to the support of aggressive solutions directed at the threatening 
individuals or groups.99  
 
Another problem with this regard is presented by Léonard, who points out that the increasing 
amount of studies in this field has brought with it the problem of indeterminacy due to the 
lacking definition of the concept “security” by many scholars. Security is however a concept that 
does not offer a universally agreed-upon conceptualisation, which is why connecting security to 
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migration should always be followed by an understanding of the way(s) in which security is 
identified in each case.100 
 
An interesting way to conclude this chapter is to underline that the connection between migration 
and security is not universal. As an example of this, Collyer mentions the reactions to terrorist 
attacks around the world. Whereas migration was not provided as an explanation in the attacks in 
for example Morocco, Algeria or Jordan, the bombings in Madrid and London were rapidly 
associated with migrants. According to Collyer, it is mostly the wealthier parts of the world that 
associate terrorism (and thus security threats) to migration.101 This is why we will now turn to 
look at the case of European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries in order to identify 
the causes of migration in the countries of origin, the consequences of migration in both the 
countries of origin and destination, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of migration. 
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4 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION 
 
In order to be able to assess to what extent the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced 
the migratory developments in the Mediterranean region, we are in need of a broader 
understanding of these migratory developments. This will be done through a small presentation 
of the historical developments in the migratory movements in the Mediterranean. The statistics 
concerning the developments in migratory trends presented in this chapter are however limited 
and a more thorough examination of the developments will be conducted in the case study on 
Morocco. Moreover, we will try to gain an understanding about migration itself, that is, why 
people migrate and how that affects the different actors involved. We are deviating from the 
trend of the recent years where most concerns have been directed to the disadvantages and 
advantages of migration in the countries of destination. Instead of only looking at how migration 
poses problems to the Western world for example due to rapid population growth, poverty and 
conflict in the countries of origin102, we will try to identify what migration means to the country 
of origin, both in positive and negative terms.  
 
When structuring this chapter, we are following the methodology of Danièle Joly, who suggests 
that in order to gain an understanding of the consequences of migration in the countries of origin 
and destination, it is first useful to identify the causes of migration, and then relate these causes 
to its consequences. Joly follows in her methodology a Durkheimian way of conducting research, 
according to which finding out the causes of a phenomenon will often help in finding out the 
consequences.103 When conducting this kind of research, we have to bear in mind that looking at 
the migratory flows from different angles, such as political or economic, can offer different kinds 
of explanations to the causes of migration. Weiner mentions as an example that seen from a 
narrowly economic angle, the migratory flows from poorer countries to the richer ones can seem 
to be mutually advantageous due to remittances received by the country of origin and the labour 
force acquired by the country of destination. However, when seen through a security/stability 
framework, migration can be seen as a threat to the ethnic composition in the country of 
destination.104 Furthermore, the effects of international migration have to be assessed on a case 
by case basis, because of their varying impact from one country to another. This is why this 
paper includes a case study on the causes and consequences of migration in Morocco. With this 
chapter we are already trying to focus the discussion about migration to the context of our study, 
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and thus to mainly consider migration from developing countries to Europe, discussing as much 
as possible the migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU.  
 
4.1  History of Mediterranean migration 
 
The Mediterranean has always been a crossroads between different peoples and civilizations, 
which is why it has also played a big part in the development of migratory flows between the 
three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. Until the later half of the 20th century, the migratory 
flows in the Mediterranean were in the North-South–direction, emphasising the European 
peoples’ tendency for emigration. A new era of migration can be identified to have begun in the 
1960s, when people from the East and South shores of the Mediterranean started travelling North 
to fill the gaps in the boosting labour market of the European countries, which emerged while the 
economies of the OECD countries grew on average by 5% per year. Especially France, Germany 
and the UK were running short of labour. The nature of this immigration was originally 
temporary, as the immigrants were considered as “guest workers”. It is nevertheless necessary to 
point out that the migratory flows in the 1960s were not only from Asia and Africa towards 
Europe, but similar flows can be identified from the South and East European countries towards 
Western Europe. Between the early 1950s and 1973 the net immigration to West Europe reached 
around 10 million. The flow of guest workers was however slowed down by the economic crisis 
in the 1970s, following the oil crisis that hit the European economies in 1973.105  
 
Reaching the 1990s it is possible to see a multiplication in the number of immigrants arriving in 
Europe from the Mediterranean partner countries. According to Khachani “[f]rom 1992 to 1999 
the number of migrants multiplied by 3.5%. In the case of Moroccans it more than 
quadrupled”.106 At the same time, however, the migratory flows changed in nature, as the 
Schengen Accord signed by five EU Member States (at that time still called the European 
Communities) on 14 June 1985 began to take its effect setting up visas, making border controls 
stricter and introducing more selective systems for issuing work permits.107 This development 
boosted the phenomenon of illegal migration.  
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An implementation convention to the Schengen Accord was adopted in 1990 and the Schengen Convention entered 
into force on 26 March 1995. See: Europa.eu. The Schengen acquis and its integration into the Union and Hix 2005, 
pp. 348-349. 
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When analysing illegal immigration, one has to take into consideration that due to the nature of 
this phenomenon, it is difficult to measure. Even if one can at times find information and 
statistics about the number of illegal immigrants who have been arrested or regulated, it is easy 
to make faulty assessments, depending on the source of the information. This is why it is also 
difficult to estimate the number of immigrants (both legal and illegal) from the Mediterranean 
partner countries entering the European Union every year. According to Khachani, the 
approximate number of immigrants from MPC in the EU in 2006 was six million. Of these six 
million, over 90% were Turkish (50.3%) and North Africans (41%). The North African 
immigrants included in this figure are Moroccans (22%), Algerians (around 13%) and Tunisians 
(5.8%).108  
 
The above statistics are supported by those from the European Commission, according to which 
the most numerous groups of third-country nationals in the EU come from Turkey (2.3 million), 
Morocco (1.7 million), Albania (0.8 million) and Algeria (0.6 million).109 The statistics differ 
however depending on whether the source is the country of origin or the country of destination. 
There are also differences depending on whether the nationals of the country of destination are 
categorised as migrants or not. This is for example not the case in the data from the European 
Commission, which is why it is stated that “the number of foreign-born citizens in some Member 
States, like France, Sweden, The Netherlands and UK, is higher than the number of third-country 
nationals as many immigrants acquired the citizenship of the host country.”110 Moreover, the 
typology of entry to the EU differs widely between the Member States. Some Member States 
witness higher numbers of migrants who enter as a result of family reunification (Austria, France 
and Sweden), while for example Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK have a high percentage of 
work-related immigration.111 
 
4.1.1 Legal migration 
 
Measuring the migration into the EU is done by calculating the difference between immigration 
into and emigration from the area during a certain year. Most countries do not however provide 
accurate figures on immigration and emigration or they have no figures at all. Eurostat estimates 
net migration on the basis of the difference between population change and natural increase 
                                                 
108 Khachani 2006, pp. 10-11. 
109 European Commission. COM (2007) 512 final, p. 3. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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between two dates. The statistics on net migration are therefore affected by all the statistical 
inaccuracies in the two components of this equation, especially population change.112 Below we 
present statistics on net migration to the EU between 1996 and 2007 (estimate). 
 
Table 2: Net migration to the EU 27, including corrections 
Figure 3: Net migration to the EU27, including corrections 
 
 Year EU27 
1996 588,633 
1997 430,463 
1998 528,627 
1999 981,073 
2000 723,198 
2001 600,231 
2002 1,851,878 
2003 2,035,395 
2004 1,874,951 
2005 1,654,358 
2006 1,607,687 
2007 1,647,677 
 
Source: Eurostat 2008. A map presenting net migration to the EU, including corrections, can be found in Annex 1. 
 
These statistics tell however nothing about the migration to the European Union from the 
Mediterranean partner countries, which is why statistics from OECD have been included. This 
data cannot however be used as a comprehensive indicator for developments in the migratory 
flows from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, but should only be seen as data 
indicating trends in migratory flows from one year to another. 
 
Table 3: Inflows of population from selected Mediterranean partner countries to selected EU Member States, 
in thousands, 1996-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
B: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden 
C: France 
D: France, Italy 
 
Source: OECD 2007, B.1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality. For details, see Annex 2.113 
                                                 
112 Eurostat 2008.  
To From 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
A  Morocco  14,9  18,7  43,7  63,4  90,2  88,5  101,4 76,3  116,9  98,4
B  Turkey  83,4  65,1  63,2  61,9  64,6  71,4  79,6  71,6  59,8  52,2
C Algeria  7,8  12,2  16,7  11,4  12,4  15,1  23,3  28,3  27,6  24,6
D  Tunisia  2,2 3,6  6,8  9,8  12,4  13,1  15,7  9,4  14,7 7,9
0
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When examining the above tables as data indicating trends in migratory flows from one year to 
another, certain trends can indeed be identified. Looking at the inflow of immigrants to the 
European Union in general, we can see that the inflow peaked between 2001 and 2002, but has 
since then showed some signs of calming down. A similar pattern can be identified in the 
statistics concerning Turkish and Tunisian nationals entering the EU. The rising trend between 
2001 and 2002 can also be identified in the numbers of immigrants entering the EU from Algeria 
and Morocco, but instead of showing signs of decrease, the numbers of immigrants have rather 
shown signs of decline, followed by a new increase. 
 
4.1.2 Illegal migration 
 
According to Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, the EU Member States noted 
a decreasing trend of illegal entries to the Schengen area in 2006. However, detections and 
apprehensions increased both at the Spanish external borders and in Greece. Interestingly to the 
context of this paper, Moroccans form the core of the illegal immigrants at the southern EU 
maritime borders, representing approximately 70% of all detections at the Italian sea borders. 
They are followed by Sub-Saharan nationals, who mainly migrate to the Canary Islands, and 
Eritrean nationals and Egyptians, who mainly migrate to Italy and Malta.114 The following table, 
put together from data collected by Thomas Spijkerboer, gives an impression of the numbers of 
illegal immigrants intercepted at the EU borders in the recent years.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
113 The data is collected from the OECD International Migration Outlook – edition 2007, which is why data is only 
available for those Member States of the European Union who are members of OECD and a number of selected 
non-member economies. See: OECD 2007. OECD defines permanent or permanent-type migrants to be “persons 
who have been granted the right of permanent residence upon entry, persons admitted with a permit of limited 
duration that is more or less indefinitely renewable plus some entering persons with the right of free movement 
(such as EU citizens within the European Union).” See: Lemaitre et al. 2007, p. 3. 
114 Frontex 2006, p. 7. 
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Table 4: Interceptions of illegal immigrants in Malta, Spain and Italy 1993-2005 
 Malta Spain Italy Total 
Year  Straits of Gibraltar Canary Islands Apulia Sicily Calabria  
1993 ND 4952 ND ND ND ND 4952 
1994 ND 4189 ND ND ND ND 4189 
1995 ND 5287 ND ND ND ND 5287 
1996 ND 7741 ND ND ND ND 7741 
1997 ND 7348 ND ND ND ND 7348 
1998 ND 7031 ND 39,065 8828 848 55,772 
1999 ND 7178 875 46,481 1973 1545 58,052 
2000 ND 16,885 2387 18,990 2782 5045 46,089 
2001 ND ND 4112 8546 5504 6093 24,255 
2002 1686 11,807 9875 3372 18,225 2122 47,087 
2003 502 9794 9382 ND 14,017 ND 33,695 
2004 1388 7425 8426 ND 13,594 ND 30,833 
2005 1822 7066 4715 ND ND ND 13,603 
 
Source: Spijkerboer 2007, pp. 128-129. 
 
The Spanish authorities have furthermore indicated that the number of illegal immigrants 
attempting to cross into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla has decreased significantly from 
55,000 in 2004 to 12,000 in 2005. The numbers concerning the interceptions of illegal 
immigrants in the Canary Islands in 2006 are somewhat unclear. In May 2006, large influxes of 
illegal immigrants were reported to have landed on the shores of the Canary Islands, and by the 
end of May, a total of 8,000 illegal immigrants had reached the Islands. In late July, it was 
reported that all in all 11,000 had entered the Canary Islands, in comparison to the 4715 reported 
in 2005.115 Even though the data in the above table cannot as such be used to identify exact 
trends in illegal migration to the EU from the Mediterranean partner countries, it gives us an idea 
of the volumes of illegal migration that the EU is dealing with. Furthermore, we can see that 
illegal migration concentrates on certain points of entry at certain points in time. Whereas in 
Italy, illegal migration has moved from Apulia towards the more accessible shores of Sicily, in 
Spain the migratory movements have moved from the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Canary 
Islands. 
 
4.2  Causes of migration in the country of origin 
 
When conducting research on the causes of international migration in general, one is presented 
with a number of (mostly economic) theoretical explanations that conventionally understand 
                                                 
115 Spijkerboer 2007, p. 129. Thomas Spijkerboer is Professor of Migration Law at the Free University of 
Amsterdam. 
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international migration to occur “as a consequence of imbalances in development between 
sending and receiving societies”.116 This comes from the assumption that when demographic 
growth exceeds the speed of growth in material resources, migration pressures from the potential 
migration producing countries towards the more developed countries increases.117 The causes of 
migration are often divided into different categories, such as in the classical theory, which sees 
migration as being generated by the “push” and “pull”-factors. The push and pull factors are the 
factors from the point of view of the country of origin (push factors, such as marginalisation and 
destabilisation) and the country of destination (pull factors, such as economic concentration and 
wealth).118 
 
Another way of looking at the causes of migration is to investigate them from the “recruitment” 
point of view. Recruitment is according to Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 
understood as related to the conditions producing migration. These conditions are twofold and 
include on the one hand migration motivation (why people migrate) and on the other hand 
facilitating factors/agents (what/who makes movement possible).119 A similar division is used by 
Khachani, who calls the factors describing migration motivation the generating factors and the 
facilitating factors/agents the spurring factors.120 Both of these can be seen as conditions 
producing migration in the country of origin. When it comes to international migration in 
general, migration is often seen to be caused by the following push and pull factors: 
 
Push factors (these factors are often the result of inadequate or deficient domestic policies or the absence of reforms 
in the countries of origin): 
- Negative or low economic growth combined with unequal income distribution;   
- Overpopulation, high population growth;   
- High underemployment and unemployment rates, including as a result of major economic restructuring;   
- High pressure on land and urban environments;   
- Armed conflict, ethnic cleansing;   
- Human rights abuses, discrimination, persecution;   
- Natural catastrophes, ecological degradation; and   
- Poor governance.121 
 
                                                 
116 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 11. Ninna Nyberg-Sørensen, Nicholas Van Hear & 
Poul Engberg-Pedersen worked at the time of publishing this article at the Centre for Development Research in 
Copenhagen.  
117 Ibid. 
118 See for example European Commission, COM (2002) 703 final, pp. 10-11. Examples from Gallina 2006, p. 17. 
119 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 11. 
120 Khachani 2006. 
121 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, cited in European Commission. COM (2002) 703, p. 10. 
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Pull factors: 
Main pull factors are safety and socio-economic improvement stemming from labour demand in the countries of 
destination.122 
 
Instead of going meticulously into the different theories explaining international migration, we 
will concentrate on our context of the Mediterranean region, and thus limit our consideration to 
the causes of migration in the Mediterranean partner countries.123 In our account, we use the 
division of migration producing conditions into generating factors and spurring factors. 
 
4.2.1 Generating factors 
 
Despite improving macroeconomic indicators, such as decreasing inflation, the economic 
situation in the Mediterranean partner countries has not shown the expected signs of 
development, especially due to population growth. Whereas the recorded population growth in 
the EU will over the next 25 years be only 3.5%, the Mediterranean “hot spot”-countries, Turkey 
and Egypt, will overtake Germany as the country with highest population in the Euro-
Mediterranean region, whereas Morocco will reach Spain’s population of 40 million.124 This 
results subsequently in an increase in labour force, which is estimated to grow on average at a 
rate of above 3% yearly until 2010. Unless the economic growth in the Mediterranean partner 
countries accelerates, the economies will not be able to absorb the new labour force that would 
need approximately five million new jobs yearly. This increases emigration from the 
Mediterranean partner countries and can be expected to add to the migratory pressure towards 
the European Union.125  
 
The sustaining economic and political problems in the Mediterranean region are hindering the 
large development disparity between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean 
from diminishing, which has direct consequences to the stability and security of the region, not 
                                                 
122 European Commission. COM (2002) 703, p. 11. 
123 Such theories include for example: the theory that sees migration as caused by supply and demand of labour, 
related to wage differentials; dual market theory and labour market segmentation, according to which migration is 
primarily due to pull factors in receiving country; World system theory, where international migration is attributed 
to the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral non-capitalist societies, and its disruptive 
consequences which create a mobile population prone to migrate; and New economies of migration, according to 
which migration decisions are made by larger units than the individual, such as households or extended families in 
order to maximise and diversify the sources of income as an insurance against a variety of risks. This theory also 
includes the concept of a “migration hump”, according to which successful development policies may, in the short 
term, lead to an increase in migration. See: Massey et al. 1993; and Olesen 2002, p. 140 onwards.  
124 Khachani 2006, pp. 16-17. 
125 Nadal 2002, pp. 21-23. 
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least due to migration. According to Gallina, the various socioeconomic causes (demographic, 
social, political and economic) have been largely discussed and the broad consensus of the 
scholars has been that migration would by the turn of the 21st century be an explosive issue for 
the Mediterranean region and that we are facing the consequences of this today. The reasons for 
this lie in the “economic marginalisation of the peripheral areas and the political destabilisation 
of countries and regions at large”.126 Put shortly, the Mediterranean partner countries’ economies 
are not able to digest the growing labour force that is created by the fast population growth, 
which is subsequently leading to increasing migration towards the EU. 
 
Khachani argues that the first set of factors leading to immigration from the MPC consist of the 
so-called generating factors, which are mainly connected to economic reasons. This is why 
immigration often stresses the economic inequality between the North and South shores of the 
Mediterranean. The per capita income in the MPC is at least 10% lower (2002) than the 
European per capita income, which can be seen as a great generating factor for migratory flows 
from the South to the North.127 For example in 2006, the EU27 average GDP per capita (appr. € 
22,000) was almost 16 times that of Syria (€ 1382) and almost 13 times that of Morocco (€ 
1708).128 At the same time, the distribution of income in many MPCs is often distorted between 
different social groups and different geographical regions of the country, creating large welfare 
gaps between the different groups of the population.129  
 
Another generating factor can be identified in the fact that the majority of the Mediterranean 
economies suffer from great instability. The economic growth is based mainly on the primary 
sector, which means that climatic hazards affecting agriculture also affect the economic growth 
of the countries. The up-and-down effect of the economy causes instabilities in the labour 
market. When this is combined with a fast population growth, the Mediterranean partner 
countries are left with a great labour force surplus and high unemployment rate. Nevertheless, 
the migratory flows are not always generated by the unemployed, but also people who are 
already employed in an MPC often decide to emigrate in hopes of better salaries in the EU.130  
 
                                                 
126 Gallina 2006, p. 17. Andrea Gallina is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, and Director of 
the Federico Caffè Centre of Studies, Roskilde University. 
127 Khachani 2006, p. 12. 
128 Eurostat 2007, p. 36. 
129 Khachani 2006, p. 13. 
130 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
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4.2.2 Spurring factors 
 
According to Khachani, the economic reasons might be seen as the background for emigration, 
but often a different kind of incentive is needed for taking the final decision to emigrate.131 This 
is supported by Fargues, who argues that it would not be right to consider emigration simply as a 
solution to a problem, since emigration can also be considered as a way to exercise freedom of 
movement.132 One can mention at least three different spurring factors: the social image of 
returning emigrants; easier access to audiovisual information about the other countries; and 
geographical proximity. Firstly, the emigrants returning home for example on holidays, give an 
example of the “better life out there”, adding to the image of better income and job situation. 
Secondly, the developed audiovisual technical equipment gives the people in MPC the chance to 
see how the life is in the European Union. An image of the possible receiving country decreases 
the elements of uncertainty and cuts down the threshold for emigrating. Thirdly, the geographical 
proximity of the EU can also function as a spurring factor. From many Mediterranean countries, 
Europe seems only one step away. The shortness of the distance to the receiving country can 
give the emigrant an image of an easy access to the European Union, thus giving an incentive to 
emigrate.133 These spurring factors can be complemented with “mediating factors”, such as 
social networks that have been created by the migrants that have already immigrated into another 
country; and by improved communication and transportation linkages, which together with the 
audiovisual technical equipment and the geographical proximity of the EU mentioned above, 
provide an easy way to “connect” with the country of destination.134 
 
Finally, Khachani expresses harsh criticism towards the migration policy of the European Union 
by presenting appealing factors in the receiving countries (pull factors) that will make the people 
from the MPC try to emigrate to the EU, even illegally. He calls the dream of emigrating a taboo, 
where the costs of emigration have become very high compared to the gain. Nevertheless, once 
the decision of emigration has been taken, it is not possible for the migrant to return home 
empty-handed anymore, showing the failure to family and friends. The economic appeal put 
together with the strengthened visa rules have created a phenomenon at the Mediterranean, 
which Khachani calls “illusion trade”. This business of selling transport and working documents 
to the European labour market has become a big business, where the emigrant is in a lose-lose 
                                                 
131 Khachani 2006, p. 14. 
132 Fargues 2007, p. xv. 
133 Khachani 2006, p. 14. 
134 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 10. 
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situation, often paying for non-existent documents and being stranded in Europe, where the only 
possibility to work is illegally.135 This means that the EU is, by tightening the control of its 
borders, indirectly encouraging illegal immigration and the trafficking business. The EU cannot 
be accused for deliberately attracting migrants by “being appealing”, but as it has chosen (at least 
for now) to manage migratory flows by closing its borders, migration has changed from legal to 
illegal. This is an interesting point of view, which we will return to later on in this paper. 
 
4.3 Consequences of migration in the country of origin 
 
How does migration then affect the country of origin? Taking into account that migration means 
that countries with (usually) high unemployment rates are sending some of the extra labour force 
abroad, one could imagine that the effects of migration are positive. A reduction in the labour 
force surplus leaves fewer people out of job and has a positive effect on the competitive position 
in the country. The picture is however not that simple. The people who take the decision to 
migrate are usually those, who are the most productive household members. This leads 
subsequently to a lowering of the local labour intensity.136 When the young people migrate, the 
old people stay at home and create a demographic imbalance in the village or city of origin. 
Furthermore, the fact that many EU Member States are especially looking for skilled workers, 
the countries of origin are experiencing a considerable “brain-drain” as the educated labour force 
is emigrating.137 These kinds of problems have also been seen in the political field, where the 
local political leaders have in some cases been the first ones to emigrate. This has led to a brain-
drain in form of social and political capital in some regions.138 
 
It is nevertheless important to understand that migration is not only considered to be a negative 
phenomenon to the country of origin. There are multiple ways in which the migrants contribute 
to the development and well-being of their country of origin even when they are no longer living 
there, or in many cases, not planning to go back. It is nowadays understood that migrants do not 
always move to another country in order to start a life there, but rather to improve their current 
life in their country of origin.139 The most obvious and well-known, albeit heavily debated way 
of contribution are the remittances that migrants send to their country of origin.  
                                                 
135 Khachani 2006, pp. 14-15. 
136 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 20. 
137 European Commission. COM (2002) 703, p. 15. 
138 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 21. 
139 Kyle, D. Transnational Peasants: Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Cited in Gallina 2006, 
p. 18. 
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The European Commission describes remittances as private money used first and foremost for 
improving the living conditions of the family of the sender. The use of remittances can be 
divided into three stages: a first stage, where the money is usually spent on debt repayment and 
family maintenance; a second stage, where the money can be used for improvements in housing, 
consumer durables or education; and a third stage, where the remittances “appear to be invested 
in productive activities and the purchase of land or small businesses”.140 This is supported by 
Gallina, who lists the main uses of remittances as follows: 
 
“Remittances are used for the most part on food, clothing and health care as well as 
housing construction, buying land and cattle, and consumer goods and sometimes on 
conspicuous purchasing – such as gold and precious stones. Generally, only a small 
percentage of remittances are invested in productive activities, even though increased 
housing activities can have significant spillover effects on the local production 
system”.141 
 
Gallina also mentions that remittances form the most stable financial flow in the Middle East and 
North Africa.142 This is verified by the data in the table below, which shows that the amount of 
remittances to the MENA countries has exceeded the amount of public development aid as a rule 
at least since 1990. It can be seen that the foreign direct investment (FDI) has shown some signs 
of growth compared to the beginning of the 1990s, but this growth has been rather marginal, 
taking into account that the FDI in the MENA countries is concentrated in only a few countries 
(Algeria, Libya and Morocco receive more than 50% of the FDI in the region), and a limited 
number of sectors, such as oil and privatisation of public enterprises in strategic sectors. In 2002, 
for example, the Mediterranean partner countries received, as a part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements, an amount of FDI equivalent to 2.8% of the total FDI of the European 
Union for third countries.143 
 
                                                 
140 European Commission. COM (2002) 703, p. 15. 
141 Gallina 2006, p. 21. 
142 Ibid, pp. 18-19. It must however be added that in addition to the MEDA support, the Mediterranean partner 
countries receive loans from the European Investment Bank. 
143 Ibid, p. 20. 
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Table 5: Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment and Public Development Aid during 1990-2004 (billions of 
dollars constant 2000)144 
 
Remittances Foreign Direct Investment Public development aid Year 
World MENA % World MENA % World MENA % 
1990 76,2 19,9 26.1 215,5 2,4 1.1 55,3 15,2 27.5 
1991 78,8 20,7 26.2 156,9 2,1 1.3 61,2 16,4 26.7 
1992 84,4 24,2 28.6 158,6 3,2 2.0 58,3 11,1 19.0 
1993 87,2 21,3 24.4 232,6 3,2 1.4 51,2 7,5 14.7 
1994 92,6 20,0 21.6 252,0 4,4 1.7 57,3 9,0 15.6 
1995 94,1 15,9 16.9 307,2 3,5 1.1 51,2 6,0 11.6 
1996 96,3 15,5 16.1 346,8 3,6 1.0 45,0 7,7 17.2 
1997 110,8 16,6 15.0 436,9 4,6 1.0 38,3 5,8 15.1 
1998 117,1 17,1 14.6 659,1 5,6 0.8 43,4 5,7 13.2 
1999 123,0 16,4 13.4 1052,8 6,7 0.6 46,3 5,1 11.0 
2000 131,6 16,2 12.3 1514,5 10,1 0.7 43,6 4,8 11.1 
2001 147,9 17,4 11.8 798,8 10,7 1.3 44,9 4,6 10.2 
2002 161,8 16,4 10.1 694,2 6,3 0.9 49,6 6,4 13.0 
2003 180,2 16,9 9.4 534,1 9,9 1.9 50,9 5,3 10.4 
2004 186,8 17,7 9.5 545,8 8,5 1.6 47,1 4,8 10.2 
Average 
1990-
2004 
117,9 18,1 17.1 527,1 5,7 1.2 49,6 7,7 15.1 
 
Source: Fargues 2007, Annex p. 381. 
 
Despite of being an important source of income to the countries of origin, there is a lively debate 
concerning the impact of remittances in the country of origin. A rather strong consensus exists 
on the use of remittances, as indicated above when discussing the three stages of their use. Some 
negative developments related to remittances have however also been witnessed. In some 
countries of origin, the remittances have resulted in inflation of real estate prices, concentration 
of land tenure to the families who are connected to migration, and even increased 
unemployment.145 It is argued that this is because the remittances are rather spent on debt 
maintenance, everyday expenses, consumer durables, housing, retirement, health care and 
education, instead of being used for productive purposes, which in turn creates inflationary 
pressures on the local economy. Furthermore, remittances are said to increase inequality, 
encourage consumption of imports as well as creating dependency. Criticism has also been 
                                                 
144 MENA, which is in general used as an acronym for Middle East and North Africa, is in this context used to 
describe the group of countries consisting of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
145 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 21. 
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expressed about the inefficiency of remittances, as up to 20% of their value is said to disappear, 
for example because of high transfer fees and poor exchange rates.146 
 
The above shows that there is no doubt that remittances have a significant impact on the standard 
of living for the households receiving them, but the question of how remittances can help the 
development of bigger communities is not unambiguous. Positive effects have for example been 
seen in cases, where the migrants have formed so-called hometown associations (HTAs), which 
can serve as “platforms and vehicles for matching-funds schemes that pool remittances with 
government funds and expertise. This has often resulted in significant improvements in local 
health, education, and sanitation conditions, for the migrant and non-migrant households 
alike”.147 
 
A new transnationalist way of seeing migrants as a connection between the country of origin and 
the country of destination reveals more ways in which the migrants have become important to 
the country of origin. They are no longer only seen as a source of remittances, investments and 
political contributions, “but also as potential “ambassadors” or lobbyists in defence of national 
interests abroad”.148 It is thus recognised by many countries of origin that the migrants, even the 
ones that are unlikely to return, hold the potential to advocate for the interests of the country of 
origin, especially by organising strong lobbies. In return, the migrants may be provided with for 
example protection or special rights in order to secure their support in the long run.149 
 
4.4  Consequences of migration in the country of destination 
 
Having identified a number of factors causing migration, and some advantages and 
disadvantages that migration has on the country of origin, we will now move on to discuss the 
other end of the migratory movement, the country of destination. In the previous chapter 
discussing theoretical considerations about migration and security, a thorough review was 
conducted of the different aspects connecting migration to security, and the reasons for which the 
countries of destination may see migration as a threat. The goal of this chapter is to see how well 
these fears match with reality, by looking at how migration affects the countries of destination. 
The consequences of migration in general are multi-faceted and extend for example to economic 
                                                 
146 Newland 2003. Kathleen Newland is Director of Migrants, Migration, and Development and Refugee Protection 
Programs, and Member of the Board of Trustees at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington D.C. 
147 Smith, M.P. Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization. Cited in Gallina 2006, p. 22. 
148 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 15. 
149 Ibid. 
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(welfare, labour market etc.), social, cultural, security (criminality etc.), demographic and 
political aspects. 
 
There is however a certain problematique connected with this chapter. Migration can have very 
different consequences on the country of destination depending for example on the type of 
migration (family reunion, economic migration of highly skilled professionals, migration of 
people with low skills, or illegal migration) and the country of destination (a relatively closed 
ethnic society with limited experience on immigration, such as Finland; or a multi-ethnic society 
with a high number of migrants, such as France). Differences in consequences can also be 
detected between countries that have for many years been countries of immigration, and those 
countries that have recently changes from having been countries of emigration to becoming 
countries of immigration. Furthermore, migration can have a number of indirect consequences, 
which can, in addition to the above-mentioned factors, depend for example on the duration of the 
stay in the country of destination.150 As an exhaustive account is not possible neither within the 
limits of this thesis, nor due to the fact that the answers are not unambiguous, once more, a more 
specific investigation will be conducted in the case study on Morocco. 
 
We begin our account by discussing the most clearly identifiable consequence of migration to 
the countries of destination: demographic changes. Cleon Tsimbos explains that migration has a 
two-fold demographic impact on the local population:  
 
“In the short term, migration has a direct demographic effect on the growth and age-
gender composition of the host population through the influx of persons entering the 
country; in the long term, immigration has indirect effects on the vital rates of the 
population of the receiving country via changes in the levels and patterns of fertility 
and mortality; the magnitude of the direct demographic effects depends mainly on the 
relative volume of immigration and the composition of immigrants (age distribution, 
family structure, etc.).”151 
 
According to the Global Commission on International Migration, international migration 
accounted for 56% of the population growth in the developed world between 1990 and 2000. At 
the same time, immigration accounted for 89% of population growth in Europe; and between 
1995 and 2000, the population of Europe would have declined by 4.4 million, were it not for 
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immigration.152 The demographic changes are directly connected to the changes in the labour 
market. The Eurostat population projections from 2004 estimate that the population of the EU 
will continue to increase until 2025, but only due to immigration. At the same time, the working 
age population in EU25 is expected to decrease by 52 million by 2050, which means a decrease 
from 67.2% to 56.7% of the population.153 A decrease in the number of working age people leads 
to a decrease in the amount of money that the European states can collect in form of income tax, 
which is traditionally used for example to cover a number of social security benefits, such as 
elder care and pension. When at the same time the demographic profile changes in such a way 
that the number of pensioners increases, the EU Member States are faced with a situation where 
the social security expenses are increasing at the same time as funds in form of income tax are 
decreasing. This leads to a situation where drastic structural changes are needed in the EU 
Member States and the EU is faced with an increased need to import labour in a similar way as it 
did until 1973. It seems that it is especially the countries that are based on high taxation and a 
broad social security scheme that will face such problems, but the need for extra labour force is 
most likely to be common to most EU Member States. 
 
When discussing the consequences of migration to the economy of the country of destination, it 
is necessary to understand that a cost or loss experienced by a person, business, industry or 
region, may as well be a gain of another one. According to Collinson, this is why it is very 
difficult to reach any conclusions on whether migration is a disadvantage or an advantage to the 
economy in the country of destination, especially when it comes to our context of the European 
Union. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the consequences of migratory movements are highly 
dependent on the context – the situation, the countries and the type of migration that is in 
question.154 
 
On its special reportage on migration in January 2008, The Economist concluded that the rich 
economies do in fact gain from the high levels of migration, but that these gains are very 
unevenly spread among countries. Many Europeans are however not convinced of these 
economic benefits, as a poll conducted in November 2007 showed that whereas 55% of 
Spaniards consider migrants to be an advantage to the Spanish economy, the equivalent number 
was 42% in the UK and Germany, and only 30% in France.155 Immigration often has a strong 
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link to the “underground economy” in the countries of destination. Especially the illegal, and 
sometimes also the legal immigrants, are cheap and flexible labour force and they often take up 
jobs that are not wanted by the local workers. In most cases, the immigrants are not competing 
with the local population for their place in the job market, due to the strong segmentation of the 
market, but there are also cases where the locals feel that the immigrants threaten their jobs. This 
is often true especially for the low-skilled local workers and the people working in the 
construction sector.156 Collinson concludes that there seems to be little evidence to support the 
fear that undocumented economic immigration would be likely to have an important impact on 
the economies of the countries of destination, especially in the way that their economic stability 
would be threatened.157  
 
According to The Economist, if the migrants are at work, they benefit the economy of the 
country of destination as a whole. This is derived from the assumption that an expanding 
workforce permits faster growth and that many migrants, being young adults, are very 
productive. Migrants are also often more flexible when it comes to moving after jobs; they can 
release the local population to the job market, for example by providing childcare and thus 
freeing parents to go back to work; and migrants are consumers, who rent accommodation and 
buy goods and services. It is however difficult to calculate to what extent all of this brings 
economic advantage to the country of destination. It has been reported that migration has helped 
lift the growth rate of the UK above its long-term trend, and that immigration into Greece has led 
to an increase of 1.5-2% to the Greek GDP every year.158  
 
The question concerning the relation of migration and the welfare of the country of destination 
can be examined from various directions. The concerns of the locals can be, in addition to jobs, 
related for example to social benefits and costs related to health care or schooling. These are 
especially important in the cases where migration happens through family reunification. 
Concerns are not totally unfounded. OECD has found that immigrants tend to be somewhat 
overrepresented at the highest and lowest levels of education. In some OECD countries, nearly 
50% of all immigrants between 25 and 64 years of age have not attended upper secondary 
school. This is the case in France, for example, as well as in Italy, Portugal and Belgium. This 
can subsequently lead to difficulties in finding employment in the country of destination, which 
                                                 
156 Tsardanidis & Guerra 2000, p. 330. Charalambos Tsardanidis is Director of the Institute of International 
Economic Relations, Athens, and Stefano Guerra is Researcher at the International Organization for Migration, 
Geneva. 
157 Collinson 2000, p. 306. 
158 The Economist, 5.1.2008, p. 4. 
Hanna-Maija Saarinen   Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 58
is the case in most OECD countries. This is shown for example by the fact that the employment 
rate of the immigrants is well below that of the native-born. For example in France, even if the 
educational level was comparable to that of the native-born, over 60% of the employment gap 
would still exist. There are however countries, such as Ireland, the UK and Denmark, where the 
proportion of immigrants with low education is significantly smaller, and that of higher-educated 
immigrants generally exceeds 33%. The overall conclusion of OECD is nevertheless that the 
results suggest that it is difficult for migrants to “make effective use of their human capital in the 
labour market”.159 For example Kicinger states that there is a risk attached to international 
migration with regard to social security systems and welfare state philosophy. It is possible that 
people may not want to pay high taxes “if they do not feel that the other do the same and share 
the same values, which is true in case of economically inactive immigrants and asylum seekers 
living on social benefits”.160 This indicates that there are differences between the EU Member 
States concerning the extent of the consequences of migration, and whether migration is seen as 
a threat, depending on the degree of their social security systems. This can also lead to differing 
levels of interest towards dealing with the issues of migration within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. We can assume that the Member States with a low social security coverage on the 
one hand, and greater geographical distance to the countries of origin on the other hand, are more 
reluctant to see the causes and consequences of migration to the countries of origin and the EU 
Member States, which are struggling for example with the problem of illegal migration. The 
consequences of migration in these countries are not as drastic as they may be in the countries 
that are built on a strong social security system that can be burdened by the support needed to 
deal with for example unemployed migrants, and that are geographically closer to the countries 
of origin. On the other hand the countries with a strong social security system will also be more 
in need of the migrants to fill the gaps in the labour market and to support the economy in order 
to keep the welfare system running also when the number of people in retirement increases and 
more money is needed in order to cover the increasing social security benefits. 
 
Much of the disadvantages of migration to the country of destination are experienced through 
illegal migration. Illegal migration is often the only kind of migration that receives a significant 
amount of media attention and it can thus undermine public confidence in the integrity and 
effectiveness of a state’s migration and/or asylum policy. Furthermore, illegal migration is often 
connected to corruption, organised crime and trafficking, and can thus be considered as a threat 
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to the public security. It is however the estimate of some researchers that the impact of 
immigration on the crime rate tends to be overestimated. Nevertheless, one cannot look aside the 
fact that for example in Italy many of the illegal immigrants are employed by the local groups of 
organised crime. Also, even though the impact of immigrants on the criminality rate is more 
limited in Spain, the locals see interconnectedness between immigration and crime. Moreover, in 
cases where the illegal immigrants are in fact competing with the locals for their place in the job 
market, migration can lead to xenophobia. This problem is however not only connected to the 
illegal migrants, but can easily spread to include all the different types of migrants in the region 
in question creating a negative attitude towards all immigrants.161 
 
A natural consequence of migration can also be seen in the “place” that the migrants take to 
themselves in the society of the country of origin. Coming to a new country and new culture, and 
especially when coming in bigger groups at one time, migrants have the tendency of 
reconstituting entire communities with their institutions, associations, kinship networks, religious 
organisations and political groups. The connections of the migrants are still stronger with the 
culture and religion of the country of origin, as well as with social networks there.162 This is 
however not only a negative aspect, because where there is demand, there is also supply. As a 
result, ethnic press, banks and businesses are flourishing in many areas that have a high density 
of migrants. An interesting piece of evidence on the political impact of migration in the country 
of destination is presented by Thomas Faist, who uses the case of Algerian migrants in France. 
Faist claims that the Algerian communities and organisations in France seem to have had a 
moderating effect on the political situation in Algeria, thus avoiding a spill-over of the conflict to 
the country of destination; France. Another example is the case where Arab-background 
immigrants helped the French police in dismantling the Armed Islamic Group in 1995.163 
 
As a way of conclusion, we can state that the evidence presented in this section has only briefly 
touched upon the questions of migration and security presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. It 
seems that there are differing opinions on the consequences of migration to the country of 
destination, especially depending on the type of migration. Whereas migration to the EU is seen 
to be increasingly necessary, especially in light of the demographic changes in the EU, especially 
the low-skilled immigrants continue to have a low employment level, burdening thus the social 
security systems in the European countries. Illegal migration is often associated with criminality, 
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but at the same time the illegal migrants are together with other low-skilled migrants helping the 
EU Member States to keep their industries active, especially when it comes to seasonal industries 
such as agriculture. As this section did not provide us with explicit answers to whether the fears 
of the European populations concerning threats posed by migration are well founded, or what 
kind of activities the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should include in order to manage 
migration effectively, we are hoping to shed more light on these issues in the case study on 
Morocco. Now we will however move on to discussing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and 
the ways in which it is aiming to deal with migration. 
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5 MIGRATION AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the various ways in which the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership aims at influencing migration and migratory flows in the Mediterranean either 
directly or indirectly. Directly, by introducing specific actions that are explicitly related to 
migration, and indirectly, by introducing other measures that can have an impact on for example 
the root causes of migration, without them being specifically directed at the migratory flows. 
This chapter is structured as follows: we will begin by introducing the structure of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, in order to gain an understanding of the framework within which it is 
possible for EMP to influence migration. This is followed by the main part of the chapter, which 
is dedicated to an overview of the direct and indirect measures that have been introduced within 
the framework of EMP for influencing migration. 
 
5.1 Barcelona declaration 
 
After numerous attempts to initiate a cooperation between the countries on the Northern and 
Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
experienced a boost in 1994, when the Corfu European Council gave the Council and the 
Commission the task of evaluating the then EU’s Mediterranean policy. This should according to 
the European Council be done “jointly examining political, economic and social problems”. As 
mentioned above, the change in the global security scenario after the end of the Cold War 
changed drastically from East-West axis to a much wider geographical area, bringing the 
Mediterranean non-member states and their security issues closer to the European Union. We 
have argued that this was one of the main reasons for the Southern EU Member States to be able 
to convince the Northern Member States of the necessity of a closer cooperation with the 
Mediterranean countries, aiming at securing peace to the South of the EU.164 
 
The increased support among the Member States led the Commission to propose the creation of a 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was due to the multiple areas of interdependence 
between the North and the South to be multidimensional in its nature. The European Council in 
Essen supported the Commission’s proposal and the Spanish Presidency during the second half 
of 1995 was chosen as the host of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. With 
regard to the participants of the Conference, it was decided that the participation should be 
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limited to the EU Member States and the 11 Mediterranean countries that had signed agreements 
with the EU, joined by the Palestinian Authority. Further observers, such as Mauritania, the Arab 
League and the Gulf Cooperation Council were admitted to the Conference. There were also 
discussions about the inclusion of Libya as an observer due to the proposal from AMU, but this 
was not approved by the EU Member States because of the sanctions against the country.165 
Despite of the fear that some Arab countries might be reluctant to participate, the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995 saw all the countries 
invited being present.166 
 
The main result of the Barcelona Conference was the Barcelona declaration, which is a 
document agreeing the broader framework for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on the one 
hand and more exact measures for the implementation of the declaration in the form of a work 
programme in its annex on the other hand. The declaration is divided into three different parts, or 
“baskets”: a political and security partnership establishing a common area of peace and stability; 
an economic and financial partnership creating an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in 
social, cultural and human affairs developing human resources, promoting understanding 
between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.167 Below, we give a short presentation 
of all the three baskets and the organisational aspects of the cooperation.  
 
5.1.1 Political and Security Partnership 
 
The political and security partnership-section of the Barcelona declaration includes many 
ambitious wordings about developing the rule of law and democracy, as well as respecting 
human rights and freedoms, while respecting self-determination and territorial integrity of the 
signatories. Furthermore, the signatories agreed for example to promote confidence and security 
building measures, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to refrain from 
developing military capacity.168 However, when it comes to the realisation of the aims in the 
Barcelona declaration through its work programme, the goals ended up being much more modest 
than the ambitious goals of establishing a common area of peace and stability. The two main 
activities that were introduced by the work programme were the establishment of a senior 
officials’ meeting to conduct a political dialogue and to prepare the Euro-Mediterranean 
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conferences, and the recommendation for the foreign policy institutes in the region to establish a 
network for more intensive cooperation.169 The senior officials have indeed met at least four 
times a year since 1995 in order to conduct a dialogue on political and security cooperation. 
Further measures that have been adopted so far are: 
 
- Cooperation in matters of justice, police and migration; 
- Training and information seminars for diplomats; 
- A network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo); 
- A register of bilateral agreements; and 
- Exchange of information on international conventions on human rights, disarmament and humanitarian 
rights.170 
 
An important part of the cooperation in this field has been the discussion concerning an 
instrument that would be used in order to implement the Barcelona declaration’s commitment to 
create an area of peace and stability. With this regard, the adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter for Peace and Stability has been negotiated with the participants. The first ideas on what 
this charter would consist of were seen at the Third Euro-Mediterranean conference of ministers 
for foreign affairs in Stuttgart in April 1999. According to the chairman’s conclusions from the 
meeting, the Charter would especially provide for “an enhanced political dialogue as well as the 
evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good-neighbourly 
relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy”.171 The Charter is to be a politically 
and not legally binding document where the rule of consensus would be applicable to all 
decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. Furthermore, the Charter should recognise 
the indivisibility of security in the area and acknowledge the concept of comprehensive 
security.172 Since 2001, due to tensions in the Middle East, the pace of negotiations on the 
Charter has slowed down. The ministers have however reaffirmed their dedication to the aim of 
adopting the Charter when the political situation allows it.173 
 
When discussing the political cooperation in the Mediterranean, it is inevitable to mention the 
question of the Middle East peace process. As mentioned above, the matters relating to the peace 
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process are not directly connected to the EMP, but it is important to understand that the progress 
in political and security cooperation within the partnership is greatly limited by the absence of 
proper, long-term and comprehensive settlements between the countries in the Middle East. 
 
5.1.2 Economic and Financial Partnership 
 
The second basket on economic and financial partnership presents the ways in which the EMP 
aims to create of the Mediterranean an area of shared prosperity. According to the Barcelona 
Declaration, the long-term objectives of the partnership are the acceleration of the pace of 
sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions in the 
Mediterranean countries while increasing the employment level and reducing the development 
gap in the region; and the encouragement of regional cooperation and integration. The 
partnership is based on three main goals: the progressive establishment of a free-trade area; the 
implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas; 
and a substantial increase in the EU’s financial assistance to the Mediterranean partner 
countries.174 The plan is to progressively establish the free-trade area by year 2010 both through 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and free-trade agreements between the 
Mediterranean partner countries. When it comes to the Association Agreements, the free-trade 
area seems to be on track, but the regional and sub-regional cooperation in the MPC is behind 
schedule.175 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the level of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mediterranean 
partner countries is continuously lagging behind the amount of remittances. The importance of 
FDI as the basis for economic development is however even acknowledged in the Barcelona 
Declaration, but the main goal of the economic and financial partnership, the establishment of 
the free-trade area, attaches more weight to intra-regional trade liberalisation than to FDI. 
According to Testas, opening up to free trade without paying attention to intra-regional 
investment liberalisation, could end up increasing import to the Mediterranean partner countries. 
This would consequently lead to deteriorated trade balances and require additional efforts to 
limit public spending. Testas further demonstrates that such activities would result in a short-
term decline in the real GDP growth rates and living standard, further increasing the 
unemployment rates and possibly also the migratory flows.176 Vasconcelos and Joffé support 
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these claims by saying that the creation of an integrated free-trade area has been slowed down 
especially due to the lack of South-South cooperation, meaning economic cooperation between 
the Mediterranean partner countries. The result has been that the creation of a free-trade area has 
been limited to the bilateral Association Agreements. Furthermore, they criticise the EMP for not 
taking sufficiently into account the social consequence of trade liberalisation, which is without 
substantive support measures unlikely to be positive. The South Mediterranean is undergoing 
extensive economic restructurings but not attracting enough FDI that would help further 
transition and restructuring.177 
 
This claim is related to the idea that increased economic development could be used as a way to 
decrease emigration from the Mediterranean partner countries. The rather simple thought behind 
this idea is that economic development in the MPC leads to expanding economies and job 
creation, which in turn lead to a rise in the living standards and subsequent political stability. 
This would furthermore encourage the local politicians to cease to see migration as a source of 
income, and would decrease the incentives for the locals to emigrate. One of the basic features of 
this economic development would be Foreign Direct Investment, because “it is the arrival of 
foreign capital and the relocation of European enterprises that will be able to generate sustained 
economic growth and, consequently, provide elements allowing for alternatives to emigration, 
not targeted co-operation measures or trade liberalisation on their own”.178 The activities in the 
second basket of the EMP are thus very important when discussing the measures that the EMP 
has taken to manage migration indirectly. 
 
5.1.3 Social, Cultural and Human Affairs Partnership 
 
When it comes to the third basket of the EMP concerning social, cultural and human affairs, the 
words in the Barcelona declaration seemed to be very grand. Recognising the role of traditions of 
culture, civilisation and religion in the Mediterranean region, and seeing them and exchanges at 
human, scientific and technological level as an essential factor in bringing the peoples in the 
region closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each 
other, the signatories of the declaration acknowledged the need for a partnership in social, 
cultural and human affairs. The activities included in the work programme ranged from 
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development in human resources, dialogue between cultures and civilisations and exchanges 
between civil societies to activities related to media, youth, health and migration.179  
 
During the early years of the partnership, some criticism was expressed concerning the uneven 
development of the three different baskets. Whereas the second basket on economic and 
financial partnership was given great attention and numerous senior officials’ meeting were 
organised within the framework of the first basket, the social, cultural and human affairs 
partnership was pursued only half-heartedly. In the recent years, the third basket has however 
seen an increase in the level of activity, not least because of the widening of the partnership to 
the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The JHA questions are however also present in the first 
basket, and the main activities in the third basket also include those related to cultural 
dialogue.180 The views on this are somewhat split, according to some this is positive, whereas 
according to others, the attention given to the third basket mostly because of terrorism and 
organised crime as well as controlling and regulating migration is rather a short-term policy and 
was provoked by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.181 
 
It seems nevertheless that the cooperation in the field of social, cultural and human affairs has 
been increasing also outside the context of JHA. The importance of cultural dialogue in the 
region has been stressed at multiple occasions and this has led for example to the foundation of 
the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures in 2005. 
Furthermore, the Euro-Med Civil Forums play an important role in supporting the role of cultural 
dialogue in the partnership, bringing together an important number of NGOs, trade unions and 
regional groups around the Mediterranean.182 
 
With regard to migration, we can point out at least two different ways in which the activities in 
the third basked can influence migration. Firstly, concentrating on exchanges between people 
and cultures, it is possible that the activities taken within this framework will enable the people 
in the European Union to see migration less as a threat and more as a possibility and cultural 
richness. Moreover, mediating knowledge to the people in the Mediterranean Partner Countries 
may also give the possibility to inform them more about the problems related to migration and 
                                                 
179 Barcelona declaration. 
180 Gillespie 2003, pp. 21-22. Richard Gillespie is Professor at the School of politics and communication studies at 
the University of Liverpool. 
181 Melasuo 2002, pp. 125-126. Tuomo Melasuo is Senior Research Fellow at the Tampere Peace Research Institute. 
182 EuroMed Info Centre. Cultural, Social and Human Partnership. 
Hanna-Maija Saarinen   Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 67
especially to illegal migration, thus helping them to make rational choices concerning their 
migration decision. 
 
5.1.4 Organisation and funding 
 
From the three different areas of cooperation described above emerge also the multi-level 
organisational structure of the Barcelona process. The cooperation functions basically on three 
levels: multilateral level which covers the new, multilateral institutions such as the ministerial 
meetings and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly; the bilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements; and the unilateral MEDA (Mesures d’Ajustement) funding 
mechanism.183 The first phase, MEDA I, lasted from 1995 to 1999 and the second phase, 
MEDA II, lasted from 2000 to 2006 with a budget of € 5,3 billion. The MEDA programmes 
were giving bilateral and regional aid firstly through the European Commission’s DGs Relex and 
Aideo, and later on through the EuropeAid Office. Furthermore, the Mediterranean partner 
countries have access to funding via the European Investment Bank (EIB), which provides loans, 
investment capital and grant aid to the MPC. The operations in the Mediterranean region have 
been grouped under the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), 
which funds the development of SMEs, improves infrastructures, supports training and economic 
development and promotes environmental protection schemes. The loans reach some € 2 billion 
per year.184 The reason for which MEDA is here described as a unilateral level of partnership is 
that the decisions and administration of the programme were left in their entirety to the EU. The 
allocation of funds was decided upon in Brussels through the four-year Country Strategy Papers, 
two-year National Indicative Programmes and Annual Financial Plans. The Mediterranean 
partners were in fact consulted in the drafting process, but their opinions were not binding.185 
 
The MEDA programme ceased to exist in 2007 when it was replaced by the financial instrument 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which all the Mediterranean partner countries are also 
participating in. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was created 
especially as a means to improve the capabilities of the European Union to support cross-border 
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cooperation along its borders and to help the EU in avoiding the creation of new dividing lines 
between the EU and its neighbouring countries.186 
 
5.2 Migration and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
What are then the different activities that have been introduced within the framework of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that can influence migration at the Mediterranean, or have 
already done so? Below we provide a presentation of the policy developments with regard to 
migration in the framework of the EMP and thus collect further evidence for our analysis of the 
effects of the EMP on migration in the Mediterranean.187 The main emphasis will be put on the 
actions that are meant to influence migration directly, but actions that can have an indirect 
impact on migration will also be dealt with to some extent. 
 
Despite the statements that increasing migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the 
European Union played an important part in the initiation of the Barcelona process, migration 
itself is not strongly present in the Barcelona declaration. The specific references to migration in 
the Barcelona declaration and work programme are divided into legal and illegal migration, 
including more general comments such as acknowledging the importance of migration in the 
relationships and guaranteeing the protection of all the rights, and somewhat more specific 
recommendations to organise periodical meetings in the field of illegal immigration.188  
 
It would take some more years before migration entered the EMP agenda more extensively. This 
happened as a result of the widening EU competencies in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 
especially in the aftermath of the Tampere European Council in 1999. It has been argued that the 
uneven development of the three baskets was a result of the EU’s inexperience in dealing with 
JHA matters, and the increasing importance of the migration agenda experienced in the recent 
years results directly from the expansion of the EU’s own JHA agenda since Tampere.189 As a 
result of the Tampere European Council, the JHA matters covered an important part of the 
Common Strategy on the Mediterranean190 adopted by the European Union in Santa Maria da 
Feira in June 2000. A whole section of this strategy was devoted to JHA questions. The specific 
references to migration emphasised the need to develop effective cooperation mechanisms in the 
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field of fighting illegal immigration networks. This could be done through the establishment of 
readmission agreements. Furthermore, the causes of migration should be dealt with by 
combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, 
consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights. More specifically, 
information and statistics on migration flows should be exchanged between the partners.191 This 
Common strategy, even though it was unilateral in nature, indicates the direction that the 
migration management within EMP has taken. Firstly, it is important to deal with the causes of 
migration. Secondly, illegal migration should be fought.  
 
The first Euro-Mediterranean Conference reaching any real results when it comes to Justice and 
Home Affairs, including migration, was the fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference organised in 
Valencia in April 2002. The migration (and especially illegal migration) agenda had been pushed 
forth in particular in the name of new security concerns, which directly leads the question into 
the first basket of the partnership, but the wish of the EU to collaborate with the Mediterranean 
partner countries in regulating migratory flows pushed the agenda towards the third basket. The 
MPC tended to take up the issues of xenophobia and racism towards their nationals who had 
migrated to the EU while continuously calling for “greater human mobility across frontiers to be 
achieved through the Partnership”.192 This means that the security questions from the first basket 
were continuously blended together by the Mediterranean partner countries with the human 
rights questions from the third basket. Gillespie explains that in order to gain a more positive 
response from the Southern partners and to “legitimise” the idea of security cooperation within 
the field, the EU countries finally favoured the placing of the JHA matters in the third basket.193 
 
The Valencia Conference adopted an action plan, which did in fact open the door to the 
discussion of enhanced cooperation in the field of JHA, but did not provide any guarantee of 
such cooperation ensuing in the long run. When it comes to migration, the idea of organising a 
Ministerial conference on migration and social integration of emigrants was welcomed in 2003. 
More specifically, the Conference endorsed the Framework Document concerning a Regional 
Cooperation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and 
terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of 
migrants, migration and movement of people, which had been prepared by the senior officials, 
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and the Commission was asked to adopt it with the Mediterranean partner countries.194 This 
Framework Document was the first document listing a number of activities to be taken both in 
the field of legal and illegal migration, including for example the investigation of the possibilities 
to simplify and accelerate visa-issues, as well as reinforcing measures for social inclusion and 
family reunion.195  
 
The Framework Document led to the creation of the regional programme “MEDA Justice, 
Freedom and Security Programme”, the implementation of which started in 2004. As a part of 
this programme, a MEDA migration project was launched in January 2004. The main goal of the 
project is to assist the different bodies in the Mediterranean to design and implement their own 
migration policies. The specific tasks of the project are to establish and systematically update a 
database containing existing statistical input, to prepare and follow-up targeted training in order 
to build a Euro-Mediterranean expertise in international migration, to produce monographic, 
comparative and other types of migration-related studies and research work, and to implement 
initiatives for the dissemination of results, such as publications, brochures and a website.196 In 
practice, the project has created the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on 
International Migration (CARIM). Since February 2007, and the end of MEDA funding, CARIM 
has been funded as part of the AENEAS programme for technical and financial assistance to 
third countries in the areas of migration and asylum.197 
 
Actions dealing with migration have also been included in some of the Association Agreements 
between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries. Whereas the agreements 
with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia include specific provisions in the area of migration, the 
agreements with Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority only include very limited, or 
no provisions in the area of migration.198 When looking at our focus country, Morocco, we can 
see that the main migratory provisions have been included in Art. 71 of the Association 
Agreement, according to which it is one of the priorities of the partnership to reduce migratory 
pressure, in particular by improving living conditions, creating jobs and developing training in 
                                                 
194 Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Valencia Action Plan. 23.4.2002, final 
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the areas where the migrants come from. Furthermore, it is important to resettle those who have 
been repatriated because of their illegal status.199 
 
Since the Valencia Conference, all subsequent Euro-Mediterranean meetings of Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs have discussed the issue of migration, usually underlining the need to strengthen 
the cooperation in the field and recognising the activities that have been undertaken within the 
regional cooperation programme.200 The first set of comprehensive recommendations in the field 
of migration since Valencia were presented in the Five Year Work Programme, which was 
introduced at the Summit organised to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in 2005.201 This document, which forms the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation until 2010, when the free-trade area is meant to become operational, includes two 
overall objectives in the field of migration. Firstly, legal migration opportunities should be 
promoted, and the legal movement of individuals should be facilitated, as these movements 
“constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a means to improve links between countries, 
fair treatment and integration policies for legal migrants, and facilitate the flow of remittance 
transfers and address ‘brain drain’”. Secondly, the level of illegal migration and trafficking in 
human beings should be significantly reduced.202 More specifically the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners will: 
 
- Hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss all issues pertinent to migration […]; 
- Develop mechanisms for practical co-operation and sharing experience on managing migration 
flows humanely, deepen dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore options for 
providing assistance for countries of origin and transit; 
- Promote schemes for safer, easier, less expensive channels for the efficient transfer of migrants’ 
remittances, encourage active contacts with expatriate communities to maintain their 
participation in the development process in their country of origin; 
- Develop ways to assist capacity building for those national institutions in partner countries 
dealing with expatriates;   
- Promote legal migration opportunities and integration of migrants; and 
- Enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration. This cooperation should involve all aspects of 
illegal migration, such as the negotiation of different kinds of readmission agreements, the fight 
against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, and 
capacity building in border management and migration.203  
 
Considering that this document was approved by the participants of the Summit in Barcelona, 
some interesting issues can be pointed out. Firstly, a ministerial meeting in migration is 
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encouraged, showing that the issue of migration has become one of the priority issues within the 
EMP. Secondly, the question of illegal migration flows is also influencing the recommendations 
that are necessarily not only directed towards fighting illegal immigration. As an example, it is 
proposed to deepen the dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore the options for 
providing assistance to them. These recommendations seem especially relevant in the case of 
illegal migration, particularly from outside the Mediterranean region to the partner countries. 
Moreover, the recommendation of promoting legal migration opportunities is not supported by 
any specific means for doing so. However, including this recommendation in the work 
programme suggests that migration, as long as it is legal, is seen to be a necessary phenomenon 
by all parties, including countries of origin and countries of destination within the Euro-
Mediterranean region. Together with the recommendation on promoting safer and easier 
channels for the migrants’ transmittances to the country of origin, it seems that the aim of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is not to diminish migration, but rather to manage it, to mould it 
in such a way that it fits the needs of the partners.   
 
Most likely the main development in the field of migration until the date has been the first Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, which was organised during the Portuguese 
Presidency on 18 and 19 November 2007. The conclusions from this meeting include issues 
relating to legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration. The conclusions 
confirm the above assumption of EMP wanting to manage migration in such a way that it fits the 
needs of the different stakeholders: “[…] well-managed migration can contribute to optimise the 
economic and social benefits of migration, for countries of origin, transit and destination 
[…]”204. Migration is explicitly connected to the development of the countries of origin, and for 
the first time it is indicated what kind of measures should be taken to deal with the causes of 
migration. Firstly, poverty, unemployment and the development gap should be addressed 
through encouraging result-oriented partnership projects, in order to create a momentum for 
sustainable development. Secondly, FDI should be encouraged and promoted to generate 
employment and to thus reduce migration outflow. Finally, mechanisms, services and effective 
financial products should be set up in order to facilitate the transfer of remittances and micro 
credit opportunities. This could be done by the encouragement on using financial services for 
example by increasing migrants’ awareness of and access to the formal banking system, and by 
                                                 
204 First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, Algarve 18 and 19 November 2007. Agreed 
Ministerial Conclusions, p. 1. 
Hanna-Maija Saarinen   Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 73
constructing a website gathering together information on remittances and transfer procedures, 
promoting thus competition among financial institutions and decreasing the transfer costs.205  
 
The facilitation of legal migration continued as the main theme also in this document, which also 
acknowledged “the globally positive effect of legal migration in terms of development”.206 The 
migration of workers in demand should be facilitated, but at the same time, the consequences of 
brain drain should be taken into account. This means that on the one side, there are the labour 
markets in the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, which have specific needs for migration, 
and on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean are the countries that see migration both as a tool 
for development, but also as a problem, especially when it is the migration of the skilled people, 
who would perhaps find employment in the country of origin in any case. The recommendations 
in this field are very much directed to the facilitation of legal migration, and ranging from studies 
of the labour situation and labour market needs for migrants, training courses in countries of 
origin, professional training and language courses and information campaigns directed to 
potential migrants, to the creation of centres providing information on and manage job-seeking 
and employment in the Euro-Mediterranean region.207 
 
The provisions on illegal migration touch closely upon the operational area of the European 
borders agency, Frontex, and range from promotion of better security standards in national travel 
documents and training courses for the countries of transit to information campaigns covering all 
aspects of illegal migration.208 It seems that even though illegal migration is still playing an 
important role in the relations between the Mediterranean partners, the importance of legal 
migration as well as migration and development are emerging to the foreground of the 
partnership. One reason for this can be that the issues of illegal migration belong to a large extent 
to the area of expertise of Frontex, which became operational in 2005, and thus the operational 
cooperation in that field has been moved from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership towards the 
multilateral cooperation coordinated by Frontex. However, even though Frontex cooperates 
actively with the MPC on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, the main parties taking part 
in its projects and activities are the EU and the Schengen Associated Countries, leaving thus 
MPC outside of the decision-making. Legal migration, however, is an issue that can to some 
extent be dealt with within the framework of EMP, because an important part of the financing 
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used for dealing with the causes of migration comes from the financial support allocated to the 
Mediterranean partner countries. 
 
As a form of an introduction to the analysis, we will here recapitulate the main causes of 
migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, and try to identify in which ways 
the EMP is, in addition to the direct references and actions presented above, indirectly 
influencing migration. Above, we presented the following main causes of migration from the 
MPC to the European Union (generating, spurring and mediating factors):  
 
- Economic inequality between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean 
- Growing labour force in the Mediterranean partner countries, due to demographic growth 
- Political destabilisation in some MPC 
- Instable economies, that are dependent on the agricultural sector 
- People who migrated earlier spread news of the good life “out there” 
- Audiovisual communication, transport linkages and other communication technology has 
brought the European Union closer to the MPC 
- The shortness of the geographical distance makes the thought of emigration easier 
 
The influence that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may have on these causes is in our 
opinion two-fold. On the one hand, three of the “generating factors”, concerning economic and 
demographic issues, are to some extent dealt with especially within the second basket of the 
EMP. The measures with this regard are aiming to improve the situation in the countries of 
origin and thus to limit migratory flows. These measures include for example the financial aid 
provided to the MPC through ENPI, which is used for example for private sector development, 
support to small and medium-sized enterprises, and for developing the local infrastructure.209 
The four spurring and mediating factors, on the other hand, are more related to the cooperation in 
the third basket, which in fact includes measures that would increase the effect of these factors. 
For example the cooperation in the field of media will only bring the EU closer to the 
Mediterranean partner countries, as will the TEMPUS programme that is meant to increase 
student exchange between the MPC and the EU. While not aiming to decrease migration from 
the MPC to the EU, these activities are rather directed to increasing the understanding between 
the cultures and societies on both shores of the Mediterranean. They can, however, also function 
as a spurring factor for migration towards the EU.  
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As a concluding remark we can say, that “activation” can be identified in the Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation in the field of migration. More specific measures are being identified 
and agreed upon, and the ministerial meeting on migration indicates that an air of agreement 
concerning the migratory policies is beginning to emerge. It seems thus that the concrete actions 
taken within the framework of EMP in the field of migration have been agreed upon too recently 
for them to have taken any effect until now. We will return to this question in the analysis. Before 
we will however apply the findings to the case of Morocco, in order to find out whether we can 
see any patterns of changes in the migration policies and migratory flows that correspond to the 
equivalent provisions in the EMP. 
Hanna-Maija Saarinen   Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 76
6 CASE STUDY: MOROCCO  
 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce a number of indicators that will present us with evidence 
concerning the development of the migration policies, migratory flows, their causes and 
consequences in Morocco, especially during the time the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has 
existed. We have chosen a number of different indicators that will be presented: number of 
immigrants from Morocco to Europe (both legal and illegal); demographic growth; the amount 
of remittances sent to Morocco by migrants; unemployment rate and poverty in Morocco; and 
finally economic growth, measured in GDP, its annual growth rate and GDP per capita. Instead 
of analysing these indicators or their development in relation to the EMP in this chapter, we have 
chosen to leave this to the following chapter, which is entirely dedicated to a thorough analysis 
of the evidence present throughout this paper. With this regard, the evidence presented here will 
be used in order to determine to what extent the EMP has had an impact on migration in the 
Mediterranean. Before moving on to the indicators, the chapter will begin with a general 
description of the activities and projects undertaken in Morocco within the framework of the 
EMP. 
 
As explained in our methodology, we understand that discussing the impacts of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership on migratory flows from all the Mediterranean partner countries 
cannot be done comprehensively by looking at one country only. It is however our understanding 
that considering the scope of this paper, one Mediterranean partner country will be sufficient to 
give us an indication of the extent of the influence of EMP in questions of migration. 
Considering that Morocco is the country in the region with the largest number of nationals living 
in the European Union, showing an interest in cooperation with the EU (as shown for example 
by the Moroccan application for membership in the EU in 1987), and that Morocco has been the 
largest beneficiary of financial aid through the MEDA programme, we presume that the 
influence that the EMP may have had on migration would be the most pronounced in the case of 
Morocco.  
 
6.1 Morocco and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
Concerning the impact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has had in Morocco in general, a 
number of actions deserve to be mentioned here. The EU-Morocco Association Agreement has 
been in force since 1 March 2000, and it is implemented through Country Strategic Papers (CSP) 
and National Indicative Programmes (NIP). The assistance allocated to Morocco has focused on 
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a number of sectoral interventions: support to economic reforms, business upgrading, 
infrastructure projects, and support for the implementation of the Association Agreement. 
MEDA has invested especially on five different priority areas, including institutional support and 
reform of the public administration; a trade facilitation programme with projects to support the 
restructuring of private enterprises, the liberalisation of the transport sector, and the 
implementation of the Association Agreement; human resource development with the focus on 
vocational training and higher education; and projects in the area of migration with programmes 
to improve the socio-economic development of the poorer regions of the country, to channel 
legal immigration, and to contribute to a more effective control of illegal immigration.210 
Between 1995 and 2006, Morocco received more than € 1.6 billion in funding through MEDA, 
which makes Morocco the biggest beneficiary among the Mediterranean partner countries.211 
 
More specifically the projects funded through MEDA in Morocco have concentrated for example 
on tax reforms (with the view of increasing the number of taxpayers and the ratio of tax revenue 
to GDP), improving living conditions in slums and clearing slums by means of measures 
targeting shanty towns, under-equipped and substandard districts and decayed housing, as well 
as waste management and water sanitation (NIP 2005-2006).212 The latter actions are essential in 
the attempt to reduce poverty in Morocco. The National Indicative Programme for 2007-2010 
includes projects such as support for reducing the illiteracy rate, increasing the enrolment rate of 
children in schools, public administration reform for example through completing and 
implementing a new system of pay, recruitment and mobility, assessment, and promotion, and 
finally to strengthen the competitiveness of the Moroccan industry and improve the environment 
for business in Morocco. This is done in the context of the trade liberalisation belonging to the 
EU-Morocco Association Agreement. The funding accorded to different sectors within the 
framework of the NIP 2007-2010 is presented in Annex 5.213 
 
Morocco has also received funding from the EIB’s FEMIP-programme. For example in 2006, the 
EIB accorded € 290 Million to Morocco, concentrating on the renovation and modernisation of 
the infrastructures in health sector and hospitals (€ 70 Million), construction of a waste water 
treatment facility (€ 40 Million), bringing electricity to rural areas (€ 170 Million) and 
participation in the development of an investment fund for the financing of projects in the 
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infrastructural sector (€ 10 Million). On a more general level, the EIB concentrates its funding in 
areas such as energy, transport and telecommunications, water and environment, support for 
SMEs, infrastructures and technical assistance.214 
 
With regard to migration, the 2002-2004 NIP proposed support to three specific areas: a 
programme of institutional support for creating a national structure responsible for channelling 
legal migration to the areas with demand; a programme of institutional support for fighting 
illegal migration through support to the Moroccan government to strengthen the control of its 
external borders; and a strategy for developing the Northern provinces of Morocco, which are the 
source of app. 40% of all the Moroccan migration towards the EU.215 The support is thus both in 
form of technical and economic aid. All in all, migration management, including border control 
management, institutional support for the movement of persons and the development of the 
Northern provinces received €87 million in funding during 2002-2004.216 The 2007-2010 NIP 
includes an important sector of vocational training which aims to cut down youth unemployment 
and at the same time provide training for potential legal migrants through an investment of € 50 
million.  
 
On the basis of this short presentation of activities undertaken in Morocco within the framework 
of EMP we can see that intentions for developing the country are there and that on paper it seems 
that if all these projects are carried out successfully, the situation in Morocco should be 
improved. In order to find out whether this is so, we will turn to the five different indicators. 
 
6.2 Number of immigrants 
 
The below table presents the development of migration from Morocco to the top nine receiving 
countries, to Europe and to all receiving countries combined between 1993 and 2005. This 
period of time is interesting with regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as it covers the 
first ten years of EMP and could thus show indications of its effects on the migratory flows. We 
can see that the number of Moroccan migrants has continuously been increasing, but that the 
migration speed has recently began to slow down. 
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Table 6: Moroccan emigrants: top nine receiving countries 1993-2005 
Receiving 
Countries 1993 1997 2002 2004 2005 
France 678,917 722,000 1,024,766 1,113,176 1,036,909 
Spain 65,847 119,422 222,948 423,933 503,171 
Belgium 145,363 199,647 214,859 293,097 354,161 
Italy 91,699 146,460 287,000 298,949 345,764 
The Netherlands 164,546 274,641 276,655 300,332 324,511 
United States 25,000 24,000 85,000 100,000 125,000 
Germany 85,156 104,051 99,000 102,000 108,355 
Canada 45,000 60,000 70,000 77,713 100,000 
Libya 120,413 112,026 120,000 120,000 78,852 
Europe 1,275,567 1,609,373 2,185,894 2,616,871 2,740,000 
All receiving 
countries 1,545,036 1,917,217 2,582,069 3,089,090 3,185,386 
 
Source: Fargues 2007, Annex p. 401.217 
 
From the calculations done on the basis of the above table, we are able to see that the average 
number of migrants per year was at a strong rise until 2004. The biggest yearly increase can be 
seen between 2002 and 2004, but between 2004 and 2005, the number of migrants per year had 
already dropped from almost 254,000 to less than 100,000. 
 
Table 7: Average number of migrants per year 
  
1993-
1997 
1997-
2002 
2002-
2004 
2004-
2005 
Average growth 
per year 93,045 132,970 253,510 96,296 
 
Source: own calculations based on Table 6. 
 
Even though our data only indicates a decreasing trend in the recent years and we do not know 
whether it has continued since 2005, we can make a preliminary assumption that the migratory 
trend (at least when it comes to legal migration, which is registered by the consulates) is 
beginning to show signs of slowing down. This is interesting especially with regard to the recent 
developments within the EMP, which encourage the promotion of legal migration. 
 
Extracting data concerning illegal migrants from Morocco to the EU is however more difficult. 
To get a picture of the developments in the illegal migratory flows, we present here two different 
tables describing the number of interceptions by Moroccan officials at the Moroccan borders 
(2000-2005) and the number of detentions of Moroccan nationals in Spain (1996-2000).  
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Table 8: Detention of Moroccan nationals in Spain 1996-2000 (number and % of total detentions) 
Table 9: Interceptions by Moroccan officials 2000-2005 
Year Number Percentage 
1996 6701 86.5% 
1997 5911 80.4% 
1998 5724 81.4% 
1999 5819 81.0% 
2000 12,858 76.1% 
 
Sources: Lahlou 2005, p. 6 and Mghari 2007, p. 153. 
 
We can see that whereas there was a steep increase in the number of illegal Moroccan migrants 
until 2002, the number has been in decline since then. The total number of interceptions by 
Moroccan officials has also come down since 2003. This is confirmed by Sadiqi, according to 
whom there was a 65% drop in the detention of illegal migrants at the Moroccan borders 
between 2005 and the first four months in 2006.218 
 
6.3 Demographic growth 
 
One aspect that has played an important part in the Moroccan migratory flows to the EU is 
population growth. In Morocco, the population growth peaked in 1965 and has kept on declining 
since then, which is mainly the cause of the strong decrease in fertility rates from 6.89 in 1972 to 
2.75 in 2002. In the case of Morocco, a more significant factor than fertility rate is however the 
fact that the growth of the working age population increased clearly in the 1970s and 1980s. It is 
pointed out by Hein de Haas from the International Migration Institute at the University of 
Oxford that even though this demographic transition coincides well with the start of the 
international migration boom from Morocco and its peak in 1972, this should not mean that rapid 
population growth is always connected with more migration. This is because population growth 
only represents a part in a complex chain of processes leading to migration. De Haas explains 
that it is especially the growth in working age population combined with a shrinking demand for 
labour that first lead to high unemployment, and further possibly to migration. Furthermore, the 
migratory boom from Morocco between 1963 and 1972 was not only caused by growth in 
working age population, but is also closely related to political and economic trends of the time. 
The tendency to migrate thus always interacts with external political and economic factors, and 
                                                 
218 Sadiqi 2007b, p. 181. 
 Moroccans Foreigners Total 
2000 9850 14,395 24,245
2001 13,002 15,000 28,002
2002 16,100 15,300 31,400
2003 12,400 23,851 36,251
2004 9353 17,252 26,605
2005 8000 22,000 30,000
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the interplay between these and, for example growth in working age population, can lead to 
increased migration.219 
 
The statistics concerning population growth in Morocco that we have been able to collect 
originate from the Haut Commissariat au Plan (High Commission for Planning) of the Kingdom 
of Morocco in 2004. This number includes all the people residing in the Moroccan territory, 
including descendants of foreign nationals, but excludes Moroccans living abroad. The growth 
percentage describes the average yearly population growth rate. 
 
Table 10: Population of the Kingdom of Morocco 1960-2004 with growth rate 
Year Population Growth % 
1960 11,626,470 n/a 
1971 15,379,259 2.58 
1982 20,419,555 2.61 
1994 26,073,717 2.06 
2004 29,891,708 1.38 
 
Source: Royaume du Maroc 2004, p. 13. 
  
The population of Morocco is continuously growing, but the growth has clearly slowed down 
since the beginning of 1980s. According to the Haut Commissariat au Plan, the reason for this is 
the decrease in fertility since 1970s, which has further continued to decrease from 2.75 in 2002 
to 2.5 children in 2004.220 The reductions in fertility will begin to reduce the number of working 
age population from 2010 onwards, and will reach its full momentum in 2015-2020. This means 
that the generation entering the labour market around this time should theoretically be faced with 
smaller labour market competition and a very light demographic burden, compared both with 
previous and upcoming generations. This may subsequently lead to a decrease in international 
migration.221 
 
6.4 Amount of remittances 
 
Even though remittances are earlier in this paper categorised under the consequences of 
migration to the country of origin, we have here chosen to present the developments in the 
amount of remittances as one of the main indicators from which we can see signs of changes in 
the migratory flows and in the nature of migration from Morocco to the EU. The amount of 
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remittances from Moroccan migrants to Morocco has been increasing remarkably since the 
1970s. As we can see from table 9, only in the period 1997-2005, the amount of remittances 
more than doubled from MAD 18 billion to almost MAD 41 billion, which is approximately € 
3.5 billion. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of fund transfers originating from Moroccans residing abroad, according to the 
country of provenance, 1997-2005, millions of Moroccan dirhams (1 EUR = app. 11.5 MAD) 
Country of residence 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany 939 1070 960 980 1924 1349 n/a 1184 1479 
Saudi Arabia 446 438 432 573 628 654 n/a 544 797 
Denmark 85 117 103 156 211 176 n/a 114 110 
United Arab Emirates 612 528 516 558 628 620 n/a 843 1460 
Spain 617 787 580 924 1895 1957 n/a 4312 5290 
United States 260 311 676 896 2258 1874 n/a 3968 2320 
France 10,036 10,373 10,206 10,386 14,974 14,462 n/a 15,934 1691 
United Kingdom 349 393 487 954 1596 1293 n/a 1524 1743 
Italy 1740 1916 2044 2994 5864 3698 n/a 4308 5037 
Libya 43 44 48 34 23 10 n/a 6 5 
Netherlands 860 1315 1065 1607 3486 2109 n/a 1305 1639 
Sweden 43 48 60 60 77 72 n/a 88 * 
Switzerland 252 324 344 459 581 672 n/a 733 616 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1366 1264 1075 1854 1970 2073 n/a 1838 2207 
Other countries 386 385 405 529 743 690 n/a 701 1073 
Total 18,033 19,311 19,002 22,962 36,858 31,708 34,733** 37,401 40,738
 
* Included in “Other countries”. Source: Office des Changes (Foreign exchange office), Morocco. Cited in: Fargues 
2007, p. 190. ** Cited in: Khachani 2005, p. 4. 
 
According to Fatima Sadiqi, who is Professor at the University of Fes in Morocco, the main 
reasons for the increase are the rise in European salaries during this period and the actions taken 
by the Moroccan government to facilitate the transfer of money and investments in Morocco. 
Whereas Sadiqi states that the Moroccan government has always shown an interest in the 
Moroccan community abroad, and especially the ways in which the flow of remittances could be 
increased, de Haas states that the active policies only emerged in the 1990s as a result of “an 
ominous stagnation in remittances”.222 It is undisputed that the Moroccan government has 
actively stimulated emigration throughout the post-independence time, but it was not before 
1990 that for example the ministry for Moroccans residing abroad was created. Morocco has 
been able to direct remittances through official channels rather successfully especially through 
the effectiveness of fiscal policies, the development of an efficient banking system and also the 
return of macro-economic stability. The government has also opened banks in European 
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countries that have a strong Moroccan community.223 Nothing is mentioned here of any possible 
actions supported by the EMP to simplify the transfer of remittances. Another important reason 
for the growth of remittances is the growth of the Moroccan migrant population abroad as 
presented in chapter 6.1. The growth in the number of migrants has however not been as strong 
as the growth in remittances; whereas the number of migrants increased 1.6 fold, the amount of 
remittances more than doubled.  
 
There is no doubt about the fact that remittances account for an important part of the Moroccan 
economy; for example in 2003, remittances accounted for 9.7% of the Moroccan GDP.224 It is 
also said that more than 1.2 million people in Morocco have escaped poverty because of the 
remittances from the Moroccan migrants. As presented in chapter 4.3, remittances often tend to 
be used for fulfilling the basic needs of the family members in Morocco, instead of being used in 
investments or reconstruction of the society. According to Andrea Gallina, an important amount 
of money is under-utilised, especially outside the housing sector, due to the risk of losing the 
savings or the lack of market opportunities and proper infrastructure, as well as “limited interest 
in the local development institutions”.225 Also in the case of Morocco, the remittances raise the 
standard of living of the families receiving money from abroad, and by becoming prosperous as 
a result of migration, remittances are encouraging more people to migrate. This means that 
remittances have both a positive and negative effect for Morocco. Remittances do not guarantee 
economic growth, but they can be very useful when turned into investments. In Morocco, the 
role of the remittances is according to Sadiqi still hindered by a number of obstacles, and the 
productive use of the money transfers and their capacity to improve local development should be 
stimulated. 80% of the business projects of the Moroccan migrants in Morocco are in the 
building sector, and especially the smaller cities are very much dependent on remittances.226 This 
is why it is essential that the cooperation between Morocco and the EU increases measures not 
only to help facilitate the transfer of remittances, but also to direct these remittances to the areas 
of economy in Morocco which can improve labour productivity and increase economic growth. 
The inflow of remittances becomes even more important when considering that the flow of FDI 
to the Mediterranean partner countries is limited. As mentioned previously, FDI in the 
Mediterranean region is concentrated in Algeria, Libya and Morocco, which receive more than 
50% of the FDI, and in the oil sector, as well as the privatisation of public enterprises in strategic 
                                                 
223 De Haas 2007, p. 56; and Sadiqi 2007a, p. 12. 
224 Sadiqi 2007a, p. 13. 
225 Gallina 2006, p. 31. 
226 Sadiqi 2007a, pp. 12-13. 
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sectors. The return for FDI in the region is the lowest in the world, which has led to the North 
African countries becoming net exporters of capital.227 
 
6.5 Unemployment rate and poverty 
 
Unemployment rate is another factor that has a direct connection to the development of 
migratory flows, but it can also show us results of structural changes that may have happened in 
the Moroccan economy for example as a result of the financial aid directed to Morocco through 
EMP. The below table presents the development of the unemployment rate in Morocco in 2000-
2006. As a comparison, we have chosen to show how the development has been in two other 
countries, Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, and Algeria, which has a relatively similar 
relationship to the EU as Morocco. The choice of these countries may seem somewhat random, 
but they were chosen especially to bring some additional depth to the tables of indicators, and to 
show the developments in two other countries as a comparison to the developments in Morocco, 
in order to provide a deeper understanding of the extent of changes for example in the 
unemployment rate. Romania was chosen because of its level of GDP which responds almost 
perfectly to that of Morocco in the beginning of our comparison, 2000. Comparing Romania and 
Morocco can thus show us the difference between a country that gets the full support from the 
EU as an accession country, and later on a Member State of the European Union; and a country 
that has a status of a neighbouring country to the EU and of a Mediterranean partner country. 
Algeria was added to this comparison in order to show the development in another MPC during 
the same time span. We have however not studied the context of these developments in Algeria 
to any extent, which is why some caution is encouraged while comparing the developments in 
especially the unemployment rate between Morocco and Algeria. 
 
From the table below, w can see that the unemployment rate in Morocco seems to have been 
declining modestly since 2000, whereas in the neighbouring Algeria the unemployment rate has 
crashed down from almost 30% to 12.3%. In Romania, no important changes can be indicated, 
even during the years preceding its accession in the EU.  
 
                                                 
227 Gallina 2006, p. 20. 
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Table 12: Unemployment rate (15-64) (%) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Morocco 13.4 12.3 11.3 11.5 10.8 11.1 9.7 
Romania 7.2 6.6 8.4 7.0 8.1 7.2 7.3 
Algeria 28.9 27.3 n/a 23.7 17.7 15.3 12.3 
 
Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 92 
 
According to Sadiqi, the unemployment in Morocco has not decreased strongly partly due to the 
fact that the state has drastically reduced public administration jobs and the recruitment of people 
to the public sector. This is on the other hand a direct consequence from the liberalisation of the 
economy, which has led the Moroccan state to decrease public investments and employment.228 
This presents us with a direct connection to the goal of the EMP to create a free-trade area in the 
region by 2010. This goal is related to the liberalisation of the economy and shows us that more 
support is needed to the private sector in order to provide a positive balancing power towards the 
diminishing employment in the public sector. 
 
More than the general unemployment rate in the country as a whole, it is the unemployment rate 
in cities and among young people that function as a generating factor to migration. In 
comparison to the 10.8% unemployment in the country as a whole in 2004, the unemployment 
was 18.4% in towns and 30% among young people, including graduates and non-graduates.229 
The high unemployment rate in the towns is caused by poverty in the rural areas, which follows 
from the instability of the agricultural sector, presented above. The agricultural sector is not only 
dependent on the climate, but it is also meeting an important pressure from the liberalisation 
efforts, related for example to the creation of a free-trade area in the region.230 
 
In addition to the unemployment rate, also the poverty rate tells a lot about the development in a 
country. Unfortunately the official sources only present the poverty rate for Morocco until 2001, 
which makes it difficult for us to see an influence from the EMP. An important aspect of this 
table is that it shows us that poverty is an important phenomenon especially in the rural 
Morocco. This means that any means for fighting poverty in Morocco, should be directed to the 
development of the rural communities. 
                                                 
228 Sadiqi 2007a, p. 8. 
229 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 4. 
230 Parténariat Euro-Med, p. 15. 
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Table 13: Relative poverty rate according to area 
Year Urban Rural Total 
2000-01 7.6 25.1 15.3 
1998-99 9.5 24.1 16.2 
1990-91 7.6 18 13.1 
1984-85 13.3 26.8 21 
 
Source: Royaume du Maroc, 2008. 
 
6.6 Economic growth 
 
A strong economic growth is an important factor in creating jobs, and thus also in reducing 
migration from a country. This is why economic growth has been chosen as the fifth indicator 
presenting us with evidence on possible influence that EMP has had on Moroccan migration. We 
have chosen to compare the Moroccan GDP, GDP growth and GDP per capita with those of 
Romania and Algeria, especially because in the first year included in our comparison, the 
Romanian GDP was almost exactly at the same level as that of Morocco, and Algeria was the 
MPC with closest GDP to that of Morocco. What the below table shows us is that in terms of 
current prices growth of GDP, the growth of Morocco has been clearly slower than that in both 
Romania and Algeria. Compared to Romania, which increased its GDP 2.4 fold, and Algeria, 
which increased its GDP 1.6 fold, Morocco was only able to increase its GDP 1.3 fold.  
 
Table 14: GDP at current prices (millions of €) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Morocco 40,236 41,719 42,930 44,108 45,375 47,419 52,098 
Romania 40,346 44,904 48,442 52,613 60,842 79,551 97,118 
Algeria 59,378 61,082 60,049 60,020 68,466 82,608 92,745 
 
Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 34 
 
The picture changes however when looking at the growth of GDP at constant prices. Here the 
differences between the three countries become less pronounced, but the most significant aspect 
to notice is that whereas the growth in Romania and Algeria is relatively balanced, it fluctuates 
strongly in Morocco, between 1.8% in 2000 and 8.0% in 2006. One reason for this was presented 
in chapter 4.2.1 concerning the generating factors for migration. The economies in this region are 
characterised by the up and down effect, resulting from the dependency on agriculture and thus 
on the weather conditions. 
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Table 15: Annual growth rate of GDP at constant prices (%) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Morocco 1.8 7.6 3.3 6.1 5.2 2.4 8.0 
Romania 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7 
Algeria 2.2 2.7 4.7 6.9 5.2 5.1 5.6 
 
Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 35. 
 
The GDP and GDP per capita have constantly been growing in Morocco, whereas in Algeria, a 
decrease in GDP was seen both in 2002 and 2003. The growth in Morocco is nevertheless “too 
modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Moroccan labour 
market”.231 
 
Table 16: GDP per capita at current market prices (€) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Morocco 1413 1447 1471 1494 1518 1572 1708 
Romania 1800 2000 2200 2400 2800 3700 4500 
Algeria 1952 1978 1915 1885 2116 2510 2770 
 
Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 36. 
 
The GDP per capita comparison between Morocco and Romania show us an interesting point 
when discussing the income differentials between the countries of origin and countries of 
destination. Despite the fact that Romania is not an important receiving country of Moroccan 
migrants in the European Union, it is nevertheless a Member State of the EU and thus adding to 
the GDP per capita of the EU as a whole. What the comparison between Morocco and Romania 
shows us, is that as the Romanian GDP per capita is increasing significantly faster than the GDP 
per capita in Morocco, we can presume that the income gap between Morocco and the EU is not 
diminishing either. This would furthermore mean that when taking the income gap as one of the 
main causes of migration, we can assume that a decrease in migration towards the EU is not in 
sight. 
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The above presentation of indicators supports the explanation of de Haas, according to whom 
Morocco is a “labour frontier country”, which is characterised by “upper-lower and lower-
middle income levels, sharply falling birth rates, rather high, but decreasing population growth, 
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and a steep increase in the number of young adults entering the labour market”.232 It is said that 
the modest social, economic, and infrastructural development in these labour frontier countries 
motivates and enables people to emigrate in large numbers.233 
 
For example Sadiqi has studied the migration intentions of Moroccans towards the European 
Union. She found that almost one fifth of the Moroccan population is interested in migrating to 
Europe. Migration intentions are especially high in the North of Morocco, where the living 
conditions are characterised by insecurity, particularly due to the lack of resources and 
investments, but also because of the proximity of Spain.234 Sadiqi’s study also indicates that the 
mass media and especially the national television channels in Morocco are indirectly 
encouraging migration by giving an idealistic image of Europe. As an example she mentions the 
programme “Noujoum al hijra”, or “the stars of migration”, which shows examples of Moroccan 
migrants that have succeeded in their countries of destination. The hard conditions often 
experienced by especially the illegal migrants are not presented in the national television.235 This 
supports the theory of Khachani concerning the spurring factors that facilitate migration from the 
MPC towards the EU, presented in chapter 4.2.2. 
 
After having presented a number of indicators related to migration and development, we will 
now move on to analysing the evidence that has been presented throughout this paper in order to 
test the hypotheses presented in the beginning of the paper. 
                                                 
232 De Haas 2007, p. 58. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Sadiqi 2007a, p. 1. 
235 Ibid, p. 6 
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7 ANALYSIS 
 
Each of the previous chapters included in this paper have served a specific purpose in relation to 
the analytical part of the paper, which will be presented in this chapter. We have chosen to divide 
this analysis into two parts according to our two-fold problem formulation. In the first part of the 
analysis, we will discuss the findings in this paper with the view of answering “to what extent” 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced migration in the Mediterranean. We will 
refer to our hypotheses and try to determine which hypothesis holds true. In this part we will 
draw heavily on chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis, where we have presented the ways in which 
migration affects the countries of origin and destination, the ways in which the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership deals with migration and how migration has developed in Morocco. 
By comparing the developments in the EMP, both in general and with regard to activities 
introduced in Morocco, to those in migration policies and the migratory flows from Morocco 
towards Europe, we will try to identify patterns that would tell us more about the influence of the 
EMP. 
 
The second part of the analysis will be dedicated to a discussion concerning “why” the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership has influenced migration to the extent determined in the first part of 
the analysis. We will recapitulate the three different hypotheses and try to determine their 
explanatory power drawing on chapter 3, where we present theoretical considerations concerning 
the perception of migration as a security threat by the European Union, chapters 4 and 6, which 
present the interests of the countries of origin and destination in relation to the consequences of 
migration, and the interests of Morocco with regard to migration; and chapter 5, which presents 
the policy changes and measures taken within the framework of the EMP to address migration. 
By doing this, we aim to find an explanation (or multiple explanations) to the level of influence 
of the EMP on migration. 
 
7.1 The extent of influence on migration 
 
Based on the information concerning the increase in migration from the Mediterranean partner 
countries to the EU presented in the introduction to this thesis, we formulated our hypotheses 
following the presumption that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in 
influencing migration in the Mediterranean. Multiple pieces of evidence concerning this 
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hypothesis have been presented throughout the thesis and our aim here is to recapitulate the main 
evidence and form the final conclusions on this basis. 
 
In the text boxes below, we summarise the main causes of international immigration on the one 
hand and the main causes of immigration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU on 
the other hand. Many of the more general causes for international immigration are also valid in 
the Mediterranean context, and play a role as the fundamental reasons for the development of the 
more specific causes of migration from the MPC to the European Union. For example the 
negative or low economic growth, which is combined with unequal income distribution, 
transforms in our context to the economic inequality between the MPC and the European Union. 
Furthermore, the high underemployment and unemployment are in the MPC closely related to 
the strong demographic growth, but also to the economic restructuring that is expected from the 
MPC in order to fulfil the requirements concerning the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. One 
cause that comes through in the context of our case study on Morocco, but is not directly 
included in the lists below, is poverty. For example in 1998-1999, approximately 19% (or 5.3 
million people) of the Moroccan population were living in poverty, in comparison to 3.4 million 
people in 1990-1991. Poverty is high especially in the rural areas, and it is increasingly spreading 
to the urban areas, contributing to the increased unemployment, and functions thus as a 
generating factor to migratory flows from Morocco towards the EU.236 We can thus expect that 
the EMP activities include the aim of reducing poverty in the Mediterranean partner countries in 
order to influence migration. 
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Text box 1: Causes of international migration 
Text box 2: Causes of migration from the MPC to the European Union 
 
 
Furthermore, we presented a number of consequences that migration has both in the countries of 
origin and in the countries of destination. It has become evident that the consequences of 
migration are neither exclusively positive nor negative and for example the demographic 
changes have very different impacts in the country of origin (increase in average age due to the 
emigration of the younger people) and country of destination (a regained balance in the 
demographic profile, where immigration serves as a way of filling gaps in the labour market and 
in keeping the balance between the working age population and the people in pension). 
 
Causes of international migration: 
 
- Negative or low economic growth combined 
with unequal income distribution;   
- Overpopulation, high population growth;   
- High underemployment and unemployment 
rates, including as a result of major economic 
restructuring;   
- High pressure on land and urban environments;   
- Armed conflict, ethnic cleansing;   
- Human rights abuses, discrimination, 
persecution;   
- Natural catastrophes, ecological degradation;  
- Poor governance 
Causes of migration from the MPC to 
the European Union: 
 
- Economic inequality between the North 
and the South shores of the Mediterranean; 
- Growing labour force in the MPC; 
- Political destabilisation in some MPC; 
- Instable economies that are dependent on 
the agricultural sector; 
- Earlier migrants spread positive image; 
- EU “closer” to MPC due to 
communication and transport 
development; 
- Short geographical distance. 
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Text box 3: Consequences of migration in the country of origin 
Text box 4: Consequences of migration in the country of destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To deal with the above-mentioned causes and consequences of migration, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership has since its establishment introduced a number of direct and indirect 
measures. Below we have listed the most important actions as indicated in the Association 
Agreements, work programmes, actions plans and ministerial conclusions. 
 
Dealing with the causes of migration: 
- poverty, unemployment and the development gap should be addressed through encouraging result-oriented 
partnership projects, in order to gain momentum for sustainable development 
- FDI should be encouraged and promoted in order to generate employment and to thus reduce migration 
outflows 
Dealing with the consequences of migration: 
- developing effective cooperation mechanisms in the field of fighting illegal immigration 
- establishment of readmission agreements 
- investigate the possibility to accelerate and simplify issuing of visas 
- reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family reunion 
- develop training in the areas where the migrants come from 
- resettling those who have been repatriated because of their illegal status 
- legal migration opportunities should be promoted and facilitated 
Consequences in country of origin: 
 
- Reduction in labour force surplus;   
- Positive effect on the competitive position in 
the country;   
- Lowering the labour intensity;   
- Demographic structure changes; 
- “Brain-drain”;   
- Remittances (both positive and negative 
consequences);   
- Migrants are potential “ambassadors” for 
national interests abroad.   
Consequences in country of destination: 
 
- Demographic structure changes;   
- Provide cheap and flexible labour force (take up 
unwanted jobs);   
- Working migrants benefit the country of 
destination economically (ex. release local 
population to job market, income tax, 
consumption, accommodation);   
- Increased costs in relation to health care and 
schooling; 
- Unemployed immigrants a financial burden;   
- Illegal migration connected to corruption, 
organised crime and trafficking; 
- Negative consequences of migration can lead to 
xenophobia and fears related to security threats. 
- Migrants create a “place” in the society. 
Society’s profile changes, new kinds of jobs are 
created (supply adapts to demand).  
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- Mechanisms, services and effective financial products should be set up in order to facilitate the transfer of 
remittances and micro credit opportunities 
- Increasing migrants’ awareness of and access to the formal banking system 
- Information campaigns (also on illegal migration) in the countries of origin 
Other measures related to migration 
- exchange statistics and information on migratory flows, and establish a systematically updated database 
- prepare and follow-up on targeted training in order to build a Euro-Mediterranean expertise in international 
migration 
- produce monographic, comparative and other types migration related studies and research work  
- implement initiatives for the dissemination of results, such as publications, brochures and a website 
 
Compared to the actual causes and consequences of migration, we can identify a number of 
connections. The measures to deal with the causes of migration in the country of origin take into 
account three main points listed as causes of migration from the MPC to the EU. On the one 
hand, concentrating on sustainable development through addressing poverty, unemployment and 
the development gap by encouraging result-oriented projects, suggests a way of dealing with 
economic inequality between the MPC and the EU, as well as a growing labour force in the 
MPC. Furthermore, as presented above, poverty is one of the main causes of migration from our 
case country, Morocco, and the recommendation acknowledges this fact. On the other hand, 
encouraging and promoting FDI would help to stabilise the economies in the MPC, create more 
jobs and support the growing independence from the agricultural sector. This is important, 
because for example in the beginning of this decade, three consecutive years of drought caused 
an increase in poverty in the rural areas of Morocco237, showing that dependence on the 
agricultural sector can contribute to worsening living standards and subsequently to increased 
migratory flows towards the European Union. However, looking at the development of FDI in 
the MENA countries (table 5 in chapter 4.3) we can see that whereas the amount of FDI was 
growing strongly until 2000, it crashed to half in 2001 and was further diminishing until 2004. 
This indicates that until now, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has not been able to encourage 
the flow of FDI to the Mediterranean partner countries. This finding is furthermore supported by 
our case study, where we found that the National Indicative Programmes including activities and 
projects funded in Morocco do not include activities to support the inflow of FDI to Morocco. 
 
This is an important finding because FDI is considered as a means “to achieve economic 
development in its own right, with expected positive spillovers over and above those associated 
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with domestically financed investments”.238 Krogstrup & Matar explain that the impact of FDI is 
dependent on multiple factors, which determine whether the host country can absorb FDI and 
further benefit from it.239 When these factors are in place, FDI can contribute to the development 
of the country through four main channels: the crowding channel, the linkages channel, the 
human capital channel and the market-opening channel. Firstly, the crowding channel describes 
the impact where FDI triggers an additional need for financing, which can be sought in the 
domestic markets as a way to complement the initial FDI. Secondly, the linkages channel 
explains how FDI can result in transferring new technology to the host country’s economy. This 
can subsequently lead to growth and higher productivity.240 Thirdly, the human capital channel 
describes how FDI can influence the human capital development in the host country positively, 
“through the training and transfer of skills, managerial know-how and expertise to local 
employees and staff of upstream suppliers”.241 Finally, the market-opening channel presents the 
way in which the multinational corporations can help the host economies in accessing new 
markets through their existing trade relations. Such an exposure to global markets can support 
increased efficiency and competitiveness among the exporting industries of the host economy.242 
It seems thus that supporting FDI is in fact an important measure in influencing migration and 
that the EMP has not managed to do this. 
 
When looking at the consequences of migration and the measures to help deal with them, there 
are a number of actions that deserve mentioning. The primary observation is that the actions aim 
at supporting the consequences of migration that are considered to be positive to the countries of 
origin and destination, and finding solutions to the negative consequences. For example the 
importance of remittances is acknowledged both in the recommendation to set up mechanisms, 
services and effective financial products to help the transfer of remittances, and in the 
recommendation to increase the awareness of and access to the formal banking system. 
However, no actions are included concerning the channelling of the remittances to specific fields 
of investment, which is problematic due to the low impact on economic growth of remittances 
that are only channelled to the primary needs of the families. The negative aspects of illegal 
immigration are taken into consideration as the need for further cooperation in the area and 
                                                 
238 Krogstrup & Matar 2005, p. 2. Signe Krogstrup is Lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
Geneva, and Linda Matar is affiliated at the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Beirut. 
239 Krogstrup & Matar 2005, p. 2. The factors are for example the level of technology used in the domestic 
production of the home country, level of education, level of financial sector and the level of institutional 
development. 
240 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
241 Ibid, p. 7. 
242 Ibid. 
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readmission agreements is listed. Furthermore, information campaigns are supported. The 
problematic situation of unemployed migrants and the financial and social consequences of this 
to the country of destination are taken into consideration by supporting training and vocational 
education in the countries of origin. Finally, legal migration, which contributes positively to the 
economies in the countries of destination, is encouraged and measures to facilitate it are 
supported. The question of dealing with brain drain in the countries of origin is however not 
dealt with extensively. This seems to indicate that the areas where both the countries of origin 
and the countries of destination share the same interests (for example supporting the economic 
development in the countries of origin) are included in the list of actions, whereas the potential 
problems caused by certain actions in the countries of origin are not dealt with comprehensively. 
We will return to this problem later on in this paper. 
 
These measures listed in the action plans etc. do not however tell us anything concrete about the 
actions that have been realised and not only planned. In order to go more deeply into the actual 
projects, we will return to our case study on Morocco and try to identify specific actions that 
may have influenced migration in the Mediterranean. Due to the vastness of activities, we have 
chosen a number of specific activities that are targeted in the areas of cooperation, aiming to 
influence migration. The problem with this method is however that the long-term impacts 
expected (that is, the changes in the indicators presented in the previous chapter, such as lower 
unemployment) are very distant from the short-term objectives of the projects that have been 
planned and realised. The objectives on a more general level (such as increasing cooperation in 
the field of illegal immigration) are more directly related to our indicators, but are for their part 
difficult to measure. The data presented is from the NIP 2002-2004, as the projects realised 
within the framework of the programme should show signs of improvement by now. In addition 
to the indicators presented in the previous chapter, we have included the poverty rate as an 
additional indicator. 
 
7.1.1 Analysing the concrete effects of the EMP 
 
The National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Morocco concentrated on the second and 
third baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, dividing the funds equally between the two. 
We have chosen to present the activities within the NIP that deal most closely with migration, 
either directly or indirectly. Possible effect will be evaluated by a comparison with the 
developments in the indicators, on the one hand, and by investigating subsequent NIPs, on the 
other hand. 
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The main activity within the framework of the economic and financial partnership concerns the 
reform of public administration in Morocco. The main goals of this priority have been to 
concentrate the role of the state to specific priority tasks, and to reduce and rationalise public 
spending by redirecting funds from the salaries to priority sectors such as health, education and 
infrastructure. The support for this reform adds up to €810 million.243 Concerning the impact of 
this reform on migration in the Mediterranean, we can refer to the development of the 
unemployment rate in Morocco in the recent years, which shows (especially compared to the 
decrease in the unemployment rate in Algeria) a rather modest decrease from 13.4% to 9.7%. As 
mentioned above, the main reason for this is exactly the public administration reform, which has 
led the state to drastically cut jobs in public administration. This reduction has however not been 
met with a sufficient increase in the number of jobs in the private sector, partly caused by the 
lack of FDI. As the increased unemployment is one of the main causes of migration, it seems that 
the support to the reform of public administration has in fact rather increased the incentives to 
emigrate, than reduced them. This is however only the case in the short term and rendering the 
public administration more efficient will be an asset in the long term.  
 
Within the framework of the social, cultural and human affairs partnership, the 2002-2004 NIP 
includes a priority to deal with emigration. This priority consists of three specific support 
programmes, with a combined budget of more than €115 million. The first project has as its aim 
to create a governmental institution responsible for channelling legal emigration according to 
demand especially by using a quota system. The long-term goals of this institution will be to 
diminish illegal emigration and to make legal migration more effective.244 Though we have not 
been able to find evidence concerning this institution and its establishment, for example Sadiqi245 
refers to the ongoing plans for creating a Direction de la Migration et du Contrôle des Frontières 
(Migratory and border control authority) and of an Observatoire de la Migration (migration 
observatory). It seems thus that the plans are still waiting to be finalised and thus no effect can be 
measured. Instead, we can look at the figures for illegal migration from Morocco to the EU in 
order to see whether there have been any changes in the illegal migratory trends. It does in fact 
seem that the number of (Moroccan) illegal immigrants has decreased in the recent years, with 
16,100 migrants intercepted by the Moroccan officials in 2002, in comparison with 8000 in 
                                                 
243 Parténariat Euro-Med, pp. 29-32. 
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245 Sadiqi 2007b, p. 181. 
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2005. We cannot connect these changes directly to the support from the EU, but we can see that 
there is development in the right direction on the way. 
 
Also the following support programme concentrates on diminishing illegal migration, but it does 
it more through crime fighting mechanisms by centring on cross border crime, such as trafficking 
and smuggling human beings.246 The programme aims to do so for example through the 
establishment of a duly equipped and trained border police and a “gradual installation of 
technical means at border crossing points allowing for a rapid an effective control”.247 Once 
again we can look at the indicators for illegal migration and see that the goal may be reached 
when it comes to illegal Moroccan migrants. In addition, even if our statistics tell us that the 
number of other illegal migrants intercepted at the Moroccan borders has not diminished 
significantly, we have the statement from Sadiqi that the first months of 2006 witnessed a 65% 
decline in the number of illegal migrants intercepted in Morocco. Furthermore, 120 networks for 
illegal migration were dismantled in Morocco and new border control policies have been adopted 
together with “reinforces policies and measures to stop clandestine migration”.248 Once again, 
we can see development towards the goals of the EMP support programmes, but the 
development cannot be attributed to the EMP only.   
 
Finally, the NIP 2002-2004 includes a strategy for the development of the northern provinces of 
Morocco. This programme aims to prevent further emigration from the poor rural areas in the 
northern Morocco to both the bigger cities and the European Union by creating jobs and by 
strengthening the role of these provinces in the overall economy of the country. The 
infrastructural and rural development projects financed by MEDA were meant to create at least 
15,000 jobs connected to the execution of the programme. A similar programme had already run 
1996-2000 without significant influence.249 The success of the project should be seen for 
example in the development of the poverty rate in Morocco, but also as a decline in the number 
of immigrants. Unfortunately, the data concerning the poverty date presented above only show 
us the development until 2001, which is why we cannot make any direct conclusions from that 
basis. The data supports however the statement that the 1996-2000 programme did not result in 
comprehensive development. The overall number of Moroccan immigrants has not diminished 
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either, which leads us to conclude that the development reached through this programme have 
been a) modest or b) regional in nature and cannot thus be detected in the general indicators. 
 
On the basis of the above, rather limited analysis concerning the influence that the EMP may 
have had on migration from Morocco to the EU the main conclusion can be that if and when the 
EMP has had an influence on migration, this has either been on the root level or the influence 
cannot be detected yet. Many activities concerning the development of Morocco are present in 
the National Indicative Programmes and especially the activities presented in the conclusions 
from the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on migration in 2007 include a list of direct 
measures to deal with migration. It is however too soon to tell in which ways these activities will 
be implemented and what their effect will be. Even though migration was already present in the 
Barcelona declaration, it seems to us that it has become a priority area of cooperation only 
recently, which is why impacts are not yet visible. The conclusion of this chapter is thus that the 
first parts of our hypotheses seem to hold. However, instead of stating that the EMP has been 
unsuccessful in influencing migration on the Mediterranean, we consider it to be more correct to 
state that the influence that the EMP has had on migration in the Mediterranean has, until now, 
been modest.  
 
7.2 The reasons behind the extent of influence on migration 
 
Having established that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has, until now, only had modest 
influence on migration in the Mediterranean region leads us to the question of why it is so. We 
know that migration and the threat that the southern EU Member States felt that it poses were 
one of the main reasons behind the creation of the EMP. It would thus seem reasonable that after 
more than 12 years of the Barcelona conference, more impacts could be seen. In the 
methodological chapter of this paper, we presented a number of hypotheses that could explain 
the lack of activities in this area of cooperation. Below we deal with each hypothesis one by one 
in order to see how our evidence supports or opposes it. 
 
Based on the information that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to an important extent 
modelled by the European counterparts, we assumed that the “architects” of the partnership may 
not be fully aware of the causes and consequences of migration in the countries of origin. If the 
measures taken within the EMP to influence migration were found to be irrelevant and 
ineffective, we could find the reason for why the influence on migration has only been modest. 
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The analysis conducted in the previous parts of this chapter shows us that the activities within 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership match relatively well with the causes and consequences of 
migration in the Mediterranean partner countries, and especially in Morocco. We have 
established that Morocco suffers from both low economic growth and high population growth, 
which is however drastically slowing down and thus showing signs of improvement. 
Furthermore, migration is generated by poverty, especially in the northern and other rural 
regions, by the increasing development gap between Morocco and the EU and the economic 
instability, caused partly by the dependence on agriculture, but also by the lack of FDI. The 
general actions of the EMP, stated for example in the ministerial conclusions and action plans, 
take into consideration poverty, the development gap and the need for economic stability, and 
these are also dealt with within the framework of the more specific National indicative 
programmes.250 It appears to us that the ability to understand the causes and consequences of 
migration in the region is there and that the measures introduced within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership are targeting the right causes and consequences. 
 
Considering that our first hypothesis has been falsified, and that the EMP seems to be tackling 
the relevant issues, it appears that the problems lie rather in the way that these issues are tackled. 
This leads us to turn to the two remaining hypotheses, according to which the EMP has not been 
able to influence migration either because of the inability of the partners to develop a 
comprehensive, common strategy, which takes into account the differing interests of the EU and 
the Mediterranean partner countries, or because of the lack of ability to efficiently implement the 
decisions taken within the framework of the EMP. The reason for dealing with these two 
hypotheses together is that they are by no means exclusive, and that our final conclusion may 
very well be based on an explanation that draws partly to both hypotheses. 
 
The first of these two hypotheses is based on the differing interests of the European Union, on 
the one hand, and the Mediterranean partner countries, on the other hand, seen in the 
consequences of migration to both parties. Many of the consequences of migration can be 
positive to one party and negative to the other, and they can also be ambiguous in their impacts, 
forming partly an advantage and partly a disadvantage to both parties. Such is for example the 
case of the integration of the migrants to the country of destination. Earlier in this paper, we have 
argued that migration has become to be seen as a security issue in the EU, especially because of 
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its threat to the societal security in the Member States. Due to the process of securitisation, 
migration has been brought to the forefront of the political debate and it has been accepted by the 
European peoples as a security issue especially after migration has been associated in the public 
to a number of terrorist attacks in the Western world. At the same time for example the cultural, 
religious and linguistic differences of the migrants have come to be seen as a threat to the 
identity of the society, that is, to the ability of the society to keep its essential character also 
under changing conditions or threats, which might be both possible and actual. The society’s 
identity is connected to the ability of the society to sustain its language, culture, religion, national 
identity and customs. Immigrants entering a society bring with them language, culture, religion, 
national identity and customs of their own country or region and take thus a “place” in the 
society. Whereas it is in the interest of the immigrants to rather adapt into the society in such a 
way that there is also a place for their “societal identity”, it is often the interest of the host 
society to integrate the immigrants into the society as well as possible. Herein lays the conflict of 
interest between the countries of origin and the countries of destination. As a more practical 
example, we can mention the goals of the Delegated Ministry in Charge of the Moroccan 
Community Residing Abroad: 
 
1. To consolidate the rights and the assets of the Moroccan community residing abroad and to 
protect this community from all forms of discrimination, racism and violence. 
2. To promote a global approach of migration and to update migration policies through awareness 
campaigns. 
3. To encourage integration in the host countries while preserving the Moroccan identity, with its 
Muslim, Arabic and Berber dimensions. 
4. To organise the Moroccan community abroad as a powerful Diaspora and a lobbying force that 
will play an important role in the development of various strategies at both the national and the 
international level. 
5. To encourage the Moroccan community abroad to defend national interests and to create the 
conditions required to facilitate its participation in the public life. 
6. To intensify co-operation with the host countries in order to set rational policies and adopt a 
global approach to legal migration. 
7. To involve the Moroccan community abroad in the process of decision-making.251 
 
We can see that while integration is encouraged, it should be done by preserving the Moroccan 
identity. Furthermore, the Moroccan community is encouraged to defend the national interests of 
Morocco in the countries of destination. Close ties are encouraged in order to take full advantage 
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of the Moroccan Diaspora and of the economic possibilities that the remittances and other 
financial aid from this Diaspora can mean to Morocco. Meanwhile, in the countries of 
destination the threat felt to the societal identity is in many cases leading to racism and 
xenophobia. 
 
An especially important area of cooperation where the conflict of interests is posing difficulties 
concerns the legal migration and its management. Legal migration can basically be considered to 
be an asset both to the country of origin (for example in form of reduction of labour force surplus 
and the financial aid that the country of origin receives from the working migrants abroad) and to 
the country of destination (recovering balance in the demographic structure, filling gaps in the 
labour market). The interests are however becoming all the more diverged, as the countries of 
destination are in need of more skilled and specialised labour, whereas the countries of origin 
need the educated people to stay at home in order to improve the situation there. As seen in 
chapter 5.2, promoting legal migration has recently become one of the main issues within the 
cooperation between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries. For example 
the conclusions from the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on migration in November 
2007 dedicate a whole chapter for the facilitation of the legal movement. The main problem in 
relation to brain drain is that it can be complicated for the Mediterranean partner countries to 
make a rational choice between the benefits of migration and the disadvantages of brain drain, 
because migration can lead to direct economic benefits to the country through remittances, 
whereas the problems related to brain drain are rather seen in the long run. Whereas the above-
mentioned conclusions state that legal migration has a globally positive effect in terms of 
development, the negative consequences of legal migration are also mentioned, as it is said that 
the needs of the countries of origin with regard to transferring competences and alleviating the 
consequences of brain drain have to be taken into account.252  
 
How can the equation of encouraged legal migration versus balanced supply of skilled labour 
function? As for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the solution includes studies concerning 
the labour situation and the labour market needs for migrants, possibilities for labour matching, 
introduction of training courses in order to help the migrants enhance their skills (which can then 
be used when the migrant returns to its country of origin) and exploring possibilities to establish 
job-seeking centres in the Euro-Mediterranean region.253 Hence, the solution seems to be that the 
needs of the labour markets in the European Union (but also elsewhere in the Mediterranean 
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region) are fulfilled by managing the migratory flows in such a way that only people who fulfil 
the requirements of filling specific gaps in the labour market are given the permission to migrate. 
In these cases, however, migration will be largely facilitated and speeded up. Furthermore, the 
potential migrants in the countries of origin are educated and trained in the specialty areas where 
additional labour force is needed in the European Union. The migrants acquire an important 
skill-set while working abroad and can then take a use of these acquired skills when returning 
home. This solution leads to a number of questions. In which ways will it be made sure that the 
countries of origin have a sufficient supply of highly skilled workers, specialised in the areas 
where the country of origin is in need of labour force? Furthermore, is it a fair conclusion to 
expect the migrants to return to their countries of origin after having acquired increased skills in 
the country of destination?  
 
One recurring issue concerning the interests of the countries of origin and the countries of 
destination is that the developments in the migration cooperation within the EMP seem to have a 
direct connection to the needs and interests of the EU and the development of its migration 
policy. Migration has been on the agenda of the EMP from the beginning, but it was only after 
the European Union gained widened competences in the field of Justice and Home Affairs that 
migration became a central issue in the cooperation. When the migratory flows, and especially 
the flows of illegal immigrants, to the EU grew drastically around year 2000, migration was dealt 
with more in connection with judicial cooperation, crime and terrorism, whereas facilitating legal 
immigration has become more pronounced during the recent years, when the EU Member States 
have began struggling with a shortage of labour force in specific fields. This can be caused by 
another level of differing interests, that is, differing interests among the EU Member States. 
Whereas illegal immigration is a problem with limited effect on for example the northern EU 
Member States, the labour force shortage is a phenomenon that strikes all the Member States. It 
seems that the EU’s interests towards the Mediterranean partner countries are only as strong as 
the average interests of the Member States. This would explain why the actions to promote legal 
immigration have recently become a more multilateral interest than the fight against illegal 
immigration, which the EU has mostly dealt with unilaterally. 
 
An important concern related to the change in the migratory policies according to the needs of 
the EU Member States is that these policy changes are in our opinion showing rather short-term 
than long-term interests. When immigration became to be seen as a security threat, the EU 
strengthened its migratory policies and restricted the access to its territory. Now that there is a 
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need for additional labour force in the EU Member States, legal migration is supported and 
encouraged. The increasing interest towards legal migration could at the same time indicate that 
a process of desecuritisation with regard to migration is underway. Whereas illegal migration is 
still seen as a security threat, legal migration is now spoken for by a wide range of politicians in 
the EU, showing signs of desecuritisation from the part of the “securitising actors”. Whether this 
desecuritising speech is accepted by the general public is however less probable.  
 
Furthermore, broadening the scope of analysis in this thesis would bring us to discuss how the 
internal policies within the EU, apart from migration policy, affect the interests of the EU 
Member States towards the EMP. For example the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) plays an 
all the more important role with regard to the Mediterranean partner countries and especially the 
success of the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. Now that the world is struggling with an 
increasing food crisis, especially the agricultural producing Member States will be interested in 
limiting the support to the agricultural sectors in the MPC. The same is relevant for example with 
regard to the common commercial policy. We wanted to mention this in order to show that the 
EU’s interest towards the EMP are in fact dependent on a number of factors and that bringing up 
the analysis to another level could have provided us with a number of different answers. This 
was however not the aim of this thesis, which is why the attention has been concentrated on 
migration. 
 
This leads us to conclude that even though the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does take into 
consideration the causes and consequences of migration, it seems that the cooperation is to a 
large extent modelled by the EU partners. The interests of the Mediterranean partner countries 
are taken into account, but left to the background, whereas the areas of cooperation of direct 
interest to the EU are supported more extensively. This has for example led to the fact that 
pushing legal migration forth has only happened during the recent years. Instead, the EU partners 
have been more concerned in dealing with the consequences of migration unilaterally, 
strengthening migration laws and making it more difficult for migrants to enter the European 
Union. The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration shows however that the 
balance is now turning more towards the Mediterranean partner countries, but this is in our 
opinion only happening because of a change in the interests of the EU partners. We can thus say 
that Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s influence on migration in the Mediterranean has been 
modest because of the inability of the partners to draw a common strategy that would 
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comprehensively take into account the interests of both the countries of origin and the countries 
of destination. 
 
We have however shown that the activities within the framework of the National Indicative 
Programme for Morocco are taking into account the interests of the Mediterranean partner 
countries, as the support actions are very much concentrated on infrastructural developments and 
support in fighting poverty, areas which first and foremost benefit Morocco and only provide an 
indirect benefit to the European Union. The benefit is however expected in the long run, and 
diminishing poverty and unemployment by improving living conditions, health, education and 
sanitation is meant to tackle the issue of immigration from Morocco towards the EU. This 
approach supports the conclusion of Khachani, according to whom all the actions that try to 
tackle immigration, be it legal or illegal, should be dealt with by touching upon the underlying 
causes that create and support immigration.254 This brings us to our last hypothesis, according to 
which the EMP has only had a modest influence on migration in the Mediterranean because the 
implementation of the activities has not been carried out effectively. We postulated that this 
could be caused by lack of resources, lack of capacity, lack of skills or even lack of will from 
different stakeholders. What we find is that despite the ambitious wordings in the ministerial 
conclusions throughout the years, the National Indicative Programmes for Morocco have 
concentrated on a limited number of support areas on a relatively low level. Low, meaning 
specific, rather than lacking ambition. The projects are, to an important extent, taking place and 
implemented, but considering that their impact is not seen directly in migratory flows, but rather 
as more modest developmental steps, it is easy to consider their implementation to be ineffective. 
Rather, the results of the implementation will be seen in the long run, and due to the fact that 
many of these projects have not been running for very long yet, the influence on migration can 
not be detected yet. This connects our conclusion concerning the third hypothesis to our second 
hypothesis. We found that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership follows too much the lines of 
interest of the EU partners, and that increasing interest in managing the migratory flows in a way 
adequate to the European Union has brought migration to the foreground of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The measures taken within the EMP are relevant and effective, but 
due to the fact that dealing with migration, and especially legal migration, has been on the top of 
the agenda for a limited time only because of the interests of the European Union, the influence 
that the EMP has had on migration on the Mediterranean has been modest.  
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8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
The changing geo-political environment, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, brought 
with it the realisation of the existence of a widening and broadening scope of security issues. 
Security was no longer only connected to military threats, but became associated with the 
political, economic, societal and environmental sectors as well. To the southern EU Member 
States, this brought about the increasing threat of a massive migratory flow from North Africa as 
a result of political instability in for example Algeria. Migration became to be seen as a threat to 
the societal security in the European countries and we have argued that migration went through a 
process of securitisation, where the perception of migration as a security issue became accepted 
by the public. Subsequently, the attention of the European Union was directed towards the 
Mediterranean, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established, with a view of creating 
an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity. The 
aim of this thesis was to answer the twofold question: To what extent has the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership influenced migration in the Mediterranean region, and why?  
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has since its beginning included indirect and direct actions 
for influencing migration in the Mediterranean. In this paper, we have been able to conclude that 
the influence that the EMP has had on migration until now, has been modest. In many cases the 
influence can either be detected on the root level, or the actions have taken place too recently for 
any impact to be detected. The cooperation has however resulted in changes in migratory 
policies, especially within the cooperation itself. It can be said that increased cooperation within 
the economic and financial basket of the partnership requires a more efficiently managed 
cooperation in the field of migration, which is why the EMP has in fact had an impact on 
migratory policies. 
 
Having investigated the different measures taken within the EMP to influence migration 
especially in Morocco, we could conclude that the measures introduced within the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership are targeting the right causes and consequences of migration. Instead, 
the problems in influencing migration seem rather to be related to both the differing interests 
between the Mediterranean partner countries and the European Union, as well as to the differing 
interests among the EU Member States. These differing interests are manifesting themselves 
particularly in the earlier reluctance of the Mediterranean partner countries to limit (illegal) 
migration due to the financial benefits it brings to the country of origin in form of remittances, 
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and in the relatively recent change in the EU’s attitude towards legal migration from the 
Mediterranean partner countries. When the interest towards limiting illegal migration from the 
MPC towards the European Union was only closely touching the southern Member States of the 
EU, the measures to deal with the problem were mainly unilateral and concentrated on restricting 
access to the EU. Now that encouraging well-managed legal migration in order to balance the 
labour shortage experienced by most EU Member States has become a common interest in the 
EU, multilateral cooperation within the framework of the EMP is supported more widely.  
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in general is however affected by a much broader policy 
framework than that of the multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partner 
countries. Especially the Mediterranean free-trade area, envisaged for implementation in 2010, is 
due to its nature closely connected to international trade agreements within the framework of 
World Trade Organisation. The EU is not the only international organisation with an interest in 
the Mediterranean region, and despite the common commercial policy of the EU, the interests of 
individual EU Member States are not always unitary with the public common interests of the 
EU. We mention this in order to show that much of the cooperation within the EMP can actually 
be managed by an even more complicated network of policies and interests than those presented 
in the thesis. Taking this network of interests into consideration would however require an 
important amount of extra research. 
 
Similarly, the role of Morocco has in this thesis only been discussed from the point of view of 
Morocco being a country of origin for migration. The illegal migration originating from 
Morocco is however slowing down and Morocco’s role is now primarily that of a transit country 
for migration from more southern countries. Considering that the migratory flows in the 
Mediterranean are increasingly formed by nationals of sub-Saharan Africa, the task of 
understanding the overall causes and consequences of migration, and the ways to influence them, 
becomes even more complicated. At the same time, the field of research moves from European 
studies and international relations towards the field of development aid, which is not the aim of 
this thesis. What becomes evident is that the networks of influence and dependence are all the 
more global in nature and a complete understanding of an issue such as migration in the 
Mediterranean, has become to require a global, rather than regional perspective. 
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ANNEX 1: Net migration to the European Union, including corrections. 
 
Source: Eurostat 2008. 
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ANNEX 2: Inflows from selected MPC to selected EU Member States, thousands 
 
  Year          
To From 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belgium Morocco  4,0  3,9  4,3  4,9  5,7  7,1  8,5  8,4  8,0  7,1
France Morocco  6,6  10,3  16,1  14,3  17,4  19,1  21,7  22,5  22,2  20,0
Italy Morocco      7,3  24,9  24,7  17,8  26,1 ..  24,6   
NL Morocco  4,3  4,5  5,3  4,4  4,2  4,9  4,9  4,5  3,3  2,1
Spain Morocco      10,6  14,9  38,3  39,5  40,2  40,9  58,8  69,3
A  Morocco  14,9  18,7  43,7  63,4  90,2  88,5  101,4 76,3  116,9  98,4
Austria Turkey      5,9  7,2  7,0  7,7  10,4  9,7  7,8  7,7
Belgium Turkey  2,5  1,4  2,4  2,2  2,8  3,0  3,9  3,8  3,2  3,4
Finland Turkey  0,1  0,2  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,2  0,3
Germany Turkey  73,2  56,0  48,0  47,1  49,1  54,6  58,1  49,8  42,6  36,0
Greece Turkey      0,8               
Hungary Turkey  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,2   
NL Turkey  6,4  6,5  5,1  4,2  4,5  4,8  5,4  6,2  4,1  3,1
Poland Turkey     0,0  0,2  0,2  0,3  0,6  0,6  0,5  0,6
Sweden Turkey  1,1  0,8  0,8  0,8  0,7  0,7  0,8  1,2  1,1  1,1
B  Turkey  83,4  65,1  63,2  61,9  64,6  71,4  79,6  71,6  59,8  52,2
C Algeria  7,8  12,2  16,7  11,4  12,4  15,1  23,3  28,3  27,6  24,6
France Tunisia  2,2  3,6  5,3  4,0  5,6  6,6  7,7  9,4  8,8  7,9
Italy Tunisia      1,5  5,8  6,8  6,5  8,0 ..  6,0   
D  Tunisia  2,2 3,6  6,8  9,8  12,4  13,1  15,7  9,4  14,7 7,9
Greece Egypt      2,2               
Greece Syria      0,7               
Greece Lebanon      0,7               
 
Source: OECD 2007, B.1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality 
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ANNEX 3: The three organisational dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Source: Modified from Philippart 2003, p. 34 
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ANNEX 4: Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Data per document and action. 
Document References to migration (legal, illegal) Actions to be taken Expected impact 
Barcelona declaration       
  Declaration Acknowledge the importance migration plays in the relationships 
Strengthen the cooperation to reduce migratory 
pressures for example through vocational training 
programmes and programmes of assistance of job 
creation 
  
    
Guarantee the protection of all the rights recognised under existing 
legislation of migrants legally resident in the territories of the 
signatories 
    
    Establish closer cooperation in the field of illegal immigration 
Adopting relevant provisions and measures, by means 
of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to 
readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. 
  
  Work Programme Encourages meetings in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures 
Meetings taking into account acquired experience, 
particularly as regards improving the living conditions 
of migrants legally established in the EU. 
  
      
Periodical meetings of officials to discuss practical 
measures which can be taken to improve cooperation 
among police, judicial, customs, administrative and 
other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. 
The meetings have to take into account the need for a 
differentiated approach considering the diversity of the 
situation in each country. 
  
Association Agreements       
  Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia Article 71 
To reduce migratory pressure by means of improving 
living conditions, creating new job opportunities and 
developing trainings in those areas from which 
immigrants come 
Keeping the 
MPC nationals in 
their home 
countries by 
offering them 
what they expect 
to find in the 
host countries of 
the Community, 
namely a better 
standard of 
living and an 
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improved 
employment 
environment 
      Resettling those, who have been repatriated on account of their illegal status   
      Improving social protection system and enhancing the health cover system 
Developing more 
appealing work 
environment in 
the MPC and 
thus reducing 
migratory 
pressures. 
  Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon   
Social dialogue shall focus on problems related to 
migrant communities' living and working conditions 
(the movement of workers, illegal migration, 
repatriation of illegal immigrants) 
  
      
Priority areas: reduction of migratory pressure, 
promotion of the role of women and improvement of 
the social security and health care systems 
  
  Israel Restrictive social dialogue, no migration     
  Palestinian Authority None     
Presidency conclusions from ministerial meetings      
Malta 1997 
The signatories underline their common wish to intensify the dialogue 
and cooperation on the Euro-Mediterranean level on migration issues 
and human exchanges and in the field of illegal immigration 
    
Stuttgart 1999 
It was noted that activities in the third chapter of the Barcelona 
Process mainly cover good governance and human rights, education, 
youth, health, women's participation, migration and human exchanges, 
culture, dialogue between cultures  and civilisations, dialogue between 
civil societies, fighting international crime, particularly drugs and 
terrorism, and the fight against racism and xenophobia. Ministers 
referred to the results of the Valencia conference and urged that the 
various activities in this chapter be further concentrated on priority 
areas, notably through the updated Regional Indicative Programme. 
Ministers welcomed the meeting on migration and human exchanges 
held in The Hague on 1-2 March 1999 which provided an opportunity 
for a frank discussion on this important and delicate issue.  
Work should be pursued, which could lead to the 
holding of a high-level meeting.   
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Marseille 2000 
The ministers reaffirmed the necessity, even if the Charter is not 
adopted, to reinforce the political dialogue. The Senior Officials were 
given the mandate to do this, especially in the fields of terrorism, 
migration and human exchanges. There should be no more taboo 
topics whereas a topic is of common interest. 
    
    
The importance of the human dimension in the partnership was 
stressed. They expressed their interest to deepen the dialogue in this 
area, giving emphasis to a global and balanced approached, and 
supporting the co-development policies and the integration of 
migrants from third countries, residing legally in the territories of the 
Member States. 
    
(Brussels 2001 - 
extraordinary) 
Migration was here presented as a part of the political partnership and 
not as a part of the third basket. The Ministers expressed their 
satisfaction with the holding, on 22 October, of a further meeting of 
Senior Officials on migration and human exchanges preceded by two 
meetings of experts on 13 June. They instructed the Senior Officials to 
continue and deepen the dialogue on this sensitive topic which should, 
moreover, also form an integral part of a regional programme in the 
third chapter to be agreed by the 27 partners. The Ministers took note 
of a Presidency report on the progress of discussions by the Euro-
Mediterranean Committee on migration, judicial co-operation and the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism. They stressed the 
importance of launching a regional programme on common problems, 
the resolution of which is so important in developing the fundamental 
values on which the Partnership is based. They considered that these 
discussions were encouraging since they enabled some progress to be 
made.  
    
The Ministers requested the Euro-Mediterranean Committee to 
already reach agreement in a spirit of Partnership and within a global 
approach on a framework document, if possible for the Barcelona V 
meeting. The Ministers stressed the input of civil society into all 
aspects of the Partnership. In particular, they noted the conclusions of 
the Civil Forum that took place on 19 and 20 October in Brussels 
where three topics were discussed: peace and conflict prevention, 
migration and movement of people and cultural exchanges. The 
Ministers urged the protagonists in civil society to organise 
themselves to respond better to the terms of reference of the regional 
programmes. 
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Valencia 2002      
  Conclusions 
Welcomed the idea for a Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Social integration of emigrants to be held in the second half of 2003, 
which should include aspects such as: co-operation with the countries 
of origin, social integration of its migrant workers and management of 
migratory flows.  
Organisation of a Ministerial Conference on Migration 
and Social integration   
  Valencia Action Plan 
The Conference reiterated the importance of the third Chapter of the 
Declaration of Barcelona and mandated the Euromed Committee to 
study ways and means to develop further its contents.  
    
    
The Conference endorsed the Framework Document (see below) and 
asked the Commission to implement it with partners, notably through 
a regional cooperation programme including concrete measures on the 
above mentioned issues in a balanced, reciprocal and co-ordinated 
manner.  The Conference: Welcomed the idea for a Ministerial 
Conference on Migration and Social integration of emigrants to be 
held in the second half of 2003, which should include aspects such as: 
co-operation with the countries of origin, social integration of its 
migrant workers and management of migratory flows. 
Commission should implement the framework 
document with the partners through a regional 
cooperation programme. 
  
- Reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family 
reunion     
  - strengthen human rights and step up the fight against 
racism and xenophobia   
  
- promotion of partnerships between countries of origin 
and host countries in order to make the most of 
migrants’ contribution to the regional or local 
development of their country of origin. 
  
  - promote and improve exchanges of information and statistics on migration flows   
  
The social integration of migrants, migration and movements of 
people are of vital importance to the Partnership. A large proportion of 
migrants legally resident in the European Union are from the 
Mediterranean Partner countries. The harmonious development of the 
Partnership will be facilitated by measures aimed at promoting their 
social integration by combating racism and xenophobia.  
- investigate the possibilities of simplifying and 
accelerating visa-issue procedures in general   
  
Regional Cooperation 
Programme in the field 
of justice, in combating 
drugs, organised crime 
and terrorism as well as 
cooperation in the 
treatment of issues 
relating to the social 
integration of migrants, 
migration and movement 
of people - Framework 
Document 2002 
Furthermore, the promotion of partnerships between countries of 
origin and host countries in order to make the most of migrants’ 
contribution to the regional or local development of their countries of 
origin will stimulate trade and investment in the Mediterranean 
- Promote assistance, cooperation and training relating 
to increasing the capacities of institutions in the 
processing of asylum applications and in refugee 
protection. 
  
 Hanna-Maija Saarinen     Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 123 
  
- combat illegal immigration by developing mechanisms 
for combating networks involved in smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in human beings; provide 
appropriate assistance to the victims of such crimes; 
  
  
Partner countries. The geographical proximity and the gap in 
prosperity between the European Union and its Partners have led to 
illegal migration flows and trafficking in human beings, with very 
adverse consequences in social and human terms.  
- promote bilateral readmission agreements   
  All the Partners are aware of their common interest in combating these phenomena. 
- examine the causes of migration flows in order to take 
appropriate development measures   
  Furthermore, the implementation of procedures governing the issue of visas to nationals of the Mediterranean 
- strengthen solidarity and exchanges of information 
between countries of origin, transit and destination   
  Partners has often been placed on the agenda for our Euro-Mediterranean meetings. 
- set up modern and effective systems to control and 
monitor borders   
  All these issues should be approached in a spirit of cooperation and with a view to identifying mutually acceptable solutions. 
- encourage accession to and real application of relevant 
existing international instruments.   
Naples 2003 
The Ministers expressed strong support for all  present and future 
initiatives aiming at integration at a sub-regional level such as the 
AMU or Agadir, on issues such as trade, infrastructure networks, and 
migration policies. They supported the implementation of policies of 
sub-regional integration in both the Western and Eastern 
Mediterranean, beginning with the three central Maghreb countries 
(Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). The latter could constitute a "pilot 
experiment" in that respect aimed at being extended, to other partner 
countries.  
Partners should agree upon readmission agreements 
including illegal migration. Conducting a study on the 
relationship between illegal and legal immigration.  
  
   
The Ministers took note of the progress made in the implementation of 
the regional programme covering the justice, police and migration 
sectors which for the first time in the framework of the partnership 
allowed experts and practitioners from the Euro-Mediterranean 
countries to work together in judicial co-operation, in the fight against 
terrorism, drugs and organised crime and in a joint approach to 
migration. The Ministers gave full support for this first experience of 
concrete teamwork, on training of judges, training of police forces and 
the development of a common tool of observation and analysis of the 
migratory flows in the Mediterranean and look forward to the further 
development of this co-operation. Migration and movement of people.    
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The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and express the 
view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for 
the socio-economic growth of the whole region. They ensured that the 
dialogue and co-operation on migration which has started with some 
Mediterranean Partners is extended to all and covers the root causes of 
migration, the possibilities to promote legal migration and to combat 
illegal migration through readmission agreements covering illegal 
immigration, to be agreed upon with Partners most directly involved. 
In this respect, they confirmed the need to adopt a global approach 
balancing security concerns and the management of migratory flows, 
on the one hand, with the facilitation of legal movement of persons 
and social integration of migrants, on the other. The Ministers also 
took note of the Commission's intention to initiate a study into the 
relationship between legal and illegal migration.   
    
Luxembourg 2005 
Migration and social integration of migrants is a central issue of the 
Euromed Partnership. Partners should agree on a strategic approach 
that aims to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners. Such an 
approach would include intensified cooperation aimed at encouraging 
cooperation programmes with countries of origin of potential 
migrants. Ministers examined the possibility to hold  specific  
Ministerial  meetings  prepared  in  advance  by  relevant  Senior  
Officials  meetings. Association Agreements and Neighbourhood 
Action Plans will help in promoting joint management of the 
movement of people as well as the integration of migrants.  
Designing a regional strategy against racism, 
xenophobia and intolerance. 
Justice, Security, 
Migration and 
Social 
Integration has 
its own chapter 
outside the three 
baskets 
  
  
Efforts need to continue to foster integration within the host country, 
including through intensifying the fight against discrimination and 
social exclusion. The new ENPI can be used to promote a 
comprehensive approach including cross-border cooperation among 
the partners and between them and the countries of origin. All aspects 
should be taken into account, including the fight against racism and 
xenophobia as well as a study of the labour markets in the EU and in 
partner countries. Ministers agreed that a regional strategy against 
racism, xenophobia and intolerance should be designed in the 
framework of the partnership instruments, including the Anna Lindh 
Foundation.  
    
 Hanna-Maija Saarinen     Master Thesis, Spring 2008 
 
 125 
    
In  light  of  the  common  problem  of  illegal  migration  to  the  EU,  
characterised  by  human suffering and tragedy, there is a need for 
intensified co-operation that addresses root causes as well as  negative  
effects  of  illegal  migration,  including  transit  migration.  This  co-
operation  should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the 
negotiation of re-admission agreements, the fight against human 
trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal 
migration, border management and migration related capacity 
building.   
    
    
At the bilateral level, the Association Agreements progressively 
started including provisions on Justice, Liberty and Security, reflected 
in the implementation of ENP action plans concluded so far, which 
contain sections referring to legal systems, corruption, asylum, 
migration, the movement of  people,  readmission,  border  controls,  
the  fight  against  organised  crime  including  human trafficking, 
drugs, money laundering and the financing of terrorism, as well as 
policing and legal co-operation. At  the  regional  level,  the  Euromed  
Justice  programme  covering  the  justice,  police  and migration 
sectors continued its activities aiming at allowing experts and trainers 
from the Euromed countries to work together in judicial co-operation, 
civil and penal matters, fight against terrorism, drugs and organised 
crime and in a joint approach to migration.  
    
    
Those activities have involved the European Institute of Public 
Administration in Maastricht, the European Police College (CEPOL) 
and the European University Institute-Robert Schumann Centre in 
Florence. Thus: -  the second part of the Euromed Justice Programme 
was launched on 20 December 2004, in Brussels, aiming at creating an 
inter-professional community of magistrates, lawyers and  legal  
practitioners  in  the  framework  of  an  open  and  modern  justice  
service, strengthening the rule of law and the effective implementation 
of human rights.  
- The 5th Training Seminar on EU Basics for Mediterranean Civil 
Servants took place from 14 to 18 March 2005, in Brussels, as part of 
the "Training of Public Administrations" Regional Programme.  
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Tampere 2006 
Ministers underline the need to strengthen the management of 
migratory flows in a comprehensive and balanced manner beneficial 
to the peoples in the whole Mediterranean region while respecting 
migrants’ rights, and to intensify co-operation on all aspects of 
migration between all parties concerned, including the fight against 
trafficking in human beings and negotiations of different kinds of 
readmission agreements. In a spirit of partnership and on the basis of 
the Barcelona 5-year Work Programme the Ministers stress the need 
to increase cooperation in the fields of legal migration, migration and 
development, and illegal migration. The Ministers take note of the 
work of the FRONTEX agency. Ministers welcome Euromed 
Partners’ contribution to the preparatory work of the Euromed 
Ministerial meeting on migration due to take place in 2007 in 
coordination with the Commission, aiming at agreeing on a series of 
further measures to promote co-operation on all issues pertinent to 
migration. In this context, an overview of existing bilateral and 
Community funded projects in the areas of migration and 
development, legal and illegal migration have been compiled on the 
basis of information provided by all Partners.  
Working towards the objectives of the 5-year work 
programme   
    
Ministers also take note of the contributions from other international 
initiatives such as the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting on Migration and 
Development held in Tripoli on 22-23 November, as well as the Rabat 
Euro-African Ministerial meeting on migration. Expressing their 
renewed commitment to implement the 5-year work programme 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2005, 
Ministers commit to work towards the objectives contained in these 
Ministerial conclusions. 
    
Lisbon 2007 
In relation to the upcoming ministerial meeting on migration, the 
ministers stressed the opportunity to underline the added value of the 
regional cooperation framework, stressing the need for continued 
progress by all Partners to achieve the strategic goal of optimising the 
social and economic benefits of migration for countries of origin, 
transit and destination, as well as continued cooperation in efficiently 
tackling illegal immigration.  In this context Ministers stress the 
importance of the contributions and follow-up from other international 
initiatives such as the Rabat Euro-African ministerial meeting on 
migration and development, held on 10-11 July 2006, as well as the 
EU-Africa ministerial meeting on migration and development held in 
Ministers mandated the senior officials to undertake a 
reflection on ways and means to increase the added 
value of regional cooperation in the fields of Justice and 
Security in accordance with the Five Year Work 
programme. 
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Tripoli on 22-23 November 2006. 
Other important documents contributing to migration      
- Developing effective cooperation mechanisms to fight 
against illegal immigration networks,    
- establishment of readmission arrangements,  
Common Strategy of the 
European Council of 19 
June 2000 on the 
Mediterranean region 
- exchange information and statistics on migration flows  
    
       
    
Building on the acquis of the Barcelona Process and further to the 
conclusions of the European Council in Tampere, the EU will: 
develop effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal 
immigration networks, including trafficking in human beings, inter 
alia, through the establishment of readmission arrangements relating 
to own and third country nationals as well as persons without 
nationality, — work with Mediterranean partners to address the 
question of migration, taking into full consideration the economic, 
social and cultural realities faced by partner countries. Such an 
approach would require combating poverty, improving living 
conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating 
democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, exchange 
information and statistics with the Mediterranean partners on 
migration flows.    
Final Report on an EU 
Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, 
2004 
The EU aims to promote a comprehensive approach towards migration 
and the social integration of legally residing migrants and extend to all 
partners the dialogue and co-operation on migration which has already 
started with some Mediterranean partners. 
Continue to provide technical assistance and 
cooperation for improved joint management of 
migration flows, including border control, and 
institutional capacity building; Seek the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with our partners; Strengthen 
the safeguards with respect to international obligations 
to provide protection for refugees alongside fair 
treatment of third country nationals who reside legally 
in the EU. 
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Five Year Work 
Programme to celebrate 
the 10th anniversary of 
the Barcelona Process, 
2005 
Acknowledging that Migration, Social Integration, Justice and 
Security are issues of common interest in the Partnership, and should 
be addressed through a comprehensive and integrated approach, the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership will enhance co-operation in these 
fields to:  
 
With a view to contributing to the above objectives 
Euro-Mediterranean partners will:  
(a) Hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss all issues 
pertinent to migration. And hold an expert senior 
officials meeting to prepare the Ministerial and discuss 
other issues of relevance.  
(b) Develop mechanisms for practical co-operation and 
sharing experience on managing migration flows 
humanely, deepen dialogue with countries of origin and 
transit and explore options for providing assistance for 
countries of origin and transit.  
  
  
(a) Promote legal migration opportunities, work towards the 
facilitation of the legal movement of individuals, recognising that 
these constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a mean of 
improving links between countries, fair treatment and integration 
policies for legal migrants,  
and facilitate the flow of remittance transfers and address ‘brain 
drain’; 
(c) Promote schemes for safer, easier, less expensive 
channels for the efficient transfer of migrants’ 
remittances, encourage active contacts with expatriate 
communities  to maintain their participation in the 
development process in their country of origin, (d) 
Develop ways to assist capacity building for those 
national institutions in partner countries dealing with 
expatriates; 
 
  
(b) Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in 
human beings and loss of life through hazardous sea and border 
crossings; 
(c) Continue to pursue the modernisation and efficiency of the 
administration of justice and facilitate access to justice by citizens,   
(e) Promote legal migration opportunities and 
integration of migrants;  
(f) Enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration.   This 
cooperation should involve all aspects of illegal 
migration, such as the negotiation of different kinds of 
readmission agreements, the fight against human 
trafficking and related networks as well as other forms 
of illegal migration, and capacity building in border 
management and migration. 
 
   
(d) Reinforce judicial co-operation, including on cross border issues;   
(e) Facilitate solutions to problems arising from mixed marriage 
disputes and child custody cases and encourage cooperation in 
accordance with the principle of the UN Convention of 1989 on the 
Rights of the Child and national legislation.   
(f) Promote the ratification and further implementation of the relevant 
UN conventions on combating organised crime and drugs, and 
improve co-operation by law enforcement agencies. 
(g) The Euromed Partners welcome the convening of a 
Euro-African Conference on Migration.   
(h) Develop contacts, training and technical assistance 
for judicial and legal professionals, building on the 
Euromed Justice Programme, the ENP Action Plans and 
other agreed multilateral and bilateral instruments, with 
the participation of the concerned Mediterranean 
partners in the design and implementation process; 
(i)  Develop contacts, training and technical assistance 
for police and law enforcement officers,  building on 
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ENP Action Plans, other agreed instruments and the 
Euromed Police Programme, encouraging networks in 
the Euromed region and drawing on the expertise of 
Europol with the  
participation of the concerned Mediterranean partners in 
the design and implementation process; 
Well-managed migration can contribute to optimise the economic and 
social benefits of migration and represents a bridge for the 
enhancement of mutual understanding between cultures and 
civilizations.  
- Setting up a working group on the migration aspects of 
the labour market with the aim of carrying out an in-
depth exploratory and technical study of the labour 
situation and labour market needs for migrants 
  
- Joint management of migratory flows - Promote the introduction of training courses   
- facilitation of people-to-people exchanges, promote faster issuance 
of visa and look at specific procedures, taking into account the needs 
of the labour market 
- Promote pre-departure professional training and 
linguistic courses   
- migration constitutes a factor that contributes to economic and social 
development 
- Carry out information campaigns directed towards 
potential migrants   
Ministerial Conclusions: 
First Euro-
Mediterranean 
Ministerial Meeting on 
Migration, November 
2007 
- further promote capacity building in the institutional framework and 
management of migrants flows, to develop and intensify mutual 
cooperation and covational training projects 
- Consider how to make the use of EU protal technolocy 
in the area of migration and employment beneficial to 
all partners 
  
 - define measures to avoid brain drain and skills shortages 
- explore the possibility to set-up centres to provide 
information on and manage job-seeking and 
employment opportunities 
  
 - facilitate the secure transfer of remittances - Promote programmes and activities for newly arrived legal immigrants   
   - Address the root causes of migration (poverty, unemployment and the development gap 
Create a 
momentum for 
sustainable 
development 
   - encourage and promote foreign direct investment  
Generate 
employment and 
reduce migration 
outlow 
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 - help to set up mechanisms and services and effective financial products 
- A seminar on transfer of funds and micro-credit 
opportunities. - construction of Euro-Mediterranean 
website which will gather all the available information 
on remittances and respective transfer procedures, - 
study the possibility to supporting legal migrants 
financially 
Facilitate 
transfer of 
remittances and 
micro credit 
opportunities, 
which will result 
in an incentive 
for migrants to 
transfer larger 
sums of money 
and in that 
manner 
voluntarily  
contribute to the 
development of 
their countries of 
origin 
   - promotion of projects aiming at better security standards in national travel documents 
Reinforcement 
of trust in the 
travel documents 
utilisation and 
the 
corresponding 
facilitation of the 
movement of 
people 
   - promotion of training courses for the countries of transit   
   - Workshop on voluntary return and readmission issues   
Regional Strategy paper 
and Regional Indicative 
Programme 2007-2013 
Presents the objective of creating a common area of justice, security 
and migration cooperation. Migration questions will be dealt with at 
national, regional and global level, in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle.  
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ANNEX 5: Projects and programmes financed in Morocco 2007-2010 within the framework of 
the National Indicative Programme 
 
2007-2010 (In millions of euros) 
Social sector 
Initiative for Human Rights 60 
Education and literacy 
campaigns 
17 
Education 93 
Support to health insurance 40 
Health 86 
Governance and human rights sector 
Support to the Ministry of 
Justice 
20 
Human rights 8 
Institutional support sector 
Public administration reform 20 
Support Programme to the 
Action Plan 
20 
Economic sector 
Private sector 60 
Vocational training 50 
Agriculture 40 
Mediterranean Rocade 25 
Opening up isolated zones 25 
Energy 40 
Environmental sector 
FODEP (Industrial De-
pollution Fund) 
15 
Water sanitation 35 
TOTAL 654 
 
Source: EuropeAid: Morocco. 
